学习苏联：中共宣传与民间回应

Learning from the Soviet Union: Chinese Communist Propaganda and Its Effects

抗战结束之後，中共基於内外在形势的考虑，逐渐形成向苏联一边倒的政策。然而，在中共夺取政权前後，中国除了少数亲苏人士之外，许多知识分子因爲种种历史情结或教育背景的关系而有反苏情绪。至於占全国人口绝大多数的农民则对苏联毫无认识与了解。如何改变这种情势，成爲中共执政之後的重要工作。1949年秋天成立的全国性中苏友好协会就是中共在全国开展「宣传苏联、学习苏联」的关键组织，透过琳琅满目的宣传活动，改变人民对苏联无知或不满的情绪，从而树立对苏友好、以俄爲师的观念，将全国人民的思想统一到中共所制订的亲苏政策，并且在这样的过程中，型塑出社会主义新人。 中共的宣传带有明显的强制灌输单一思想的特色。当中共需要全面倒向苏联之时，农民大众对苏联一无所知，许多知识分子则又有很大的反苏情绪；而当民间逐渐对苏产生好感之後，中共领导人却开始考虑与苏抗衡。因此，中共的宣传既不能须臾放松，也往往与民众情绪相对立，这便造成了官方宣传与民间情绪错位的现象。虽然中共宣传亲苏或反苏会产生错位现象，却也说明中共的宣传具有相当成效。不过，我们也不能忽略在这成效的背後，占全国人口少数的知识分子，他们所发出异於官方观点的「杂音」。从他们对宣传苏联回应的多样性，可以清楚地说明即使在共产主义社会里，人民也不是像极权主义理论者所言，只能被动承受当权者的意识形态灌输，沦爲国家政策下的棋子，完全被原子化(atomized)，毫无自己的看法。由本文之举证在在显示极权理论者诠释国家与社会关系的局限。

Taking into account internal and external factors after the end of Sino-Japanese war, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) gradually formed the policy of leaning toward the Soviet Union. However, before and after 1949, except for a small quantity of pro-Soviet intellectuals, many intellectuals were anti-Soviet due to their educational backgrounds or to the troubled nature of Sino-Russian relations in the past. As for the majority of the Chinese population-the peasantry-they knew almost nothing about the Soviet Union. How to change popular mentality became an urgent task after the founding of the People's Republic. In the fall of 1949 a key organization was founded specifically for the purpose of propagating learning from the Soviet Union, the Sino-Soviet Friendship Association (SSFA). Through various activities organized by SSFA, the CCP hoped to inculcate favorable views of the Soviet Union in the Chinese populace. A key feature of CCP propaganda was its attempt to impose a single unified ideology. While the CCP wanted all Chinese to embrace pro-Soviet sentiment, it had to battle against both ignorance and anti-Soviet sentiment. Ironically, after the Chinese people eventually developed favorable views of the Soviet Union, top CCP leaders began to think of competing with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the CCP constantly had to intensify its propaganda on the one hand, while the party's propaganda ran against the actual views of the people on the other. To be sure, the intellectuals' responses to the official pro-Soviet propaganda are relatively small in terms of percentage to the entire Chinese population. However, judging from the variety of their responses, it is clear that even in a communist society, people were not completely atomized and fully under the control of the party-state, as the totalitarian model claims. In fact, people were not like chess pieces always passively moved by the party and lacking their own opinions. Examples cited in this article indicate the limits of the theory of totalitarianism for interpreting the relations between state and society.