In late August 2023,China cut off seafood imports from Japan[1]and criticized its neighbor for being “extremely selfish and irresponsible”[2].In Seoul,the Republic of Korea,protesters marched through the streets,hel...In late August 2023,China cut off seafood imports from Japan[1]and criticized its neighbor for being “extremely selfish and irresponsible”[2].In Seoul,the Republic of Korea,protesters marched through the streets,held a candlelight vigil,and attempted to force their way into the Japanese embassy[3].The environmental organization Greenpeace denounced Japan for violating human rights and breaking international law[4].展开更多
Introduced by the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and inherited and developed by Fumio Kishida,Japan's“Indo–Pacific”strategy has gradually taken shape.This strategy can be deemed a broad vision,covering a wide r...Introduced by the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and inherited and developed by Fumio Kishida,Japan's“Indo–Pacific”strategy has gradually taken shape.This strategy can be deemed a broad vision,covering a wide range of topics and an extensive network of partners,with a strong trend of pan-securitization.It is a comprehensive inter national st rateg y based on Japan's alliance policy and China containment strategy,following a global,security-oriented approach.Driven by considerations such as maintaining its economic status,realizing its long-cherished dream of becoming a political powerhouse,and containing China,Japan has stepped up its“Indo–Pacific”strategy,which may influence global development,undermine regional maritime security,and impede China's reunification process.Meanwhile,Japan's“Indo–Pacific”strategy faces the triple challenge of a strategic overdraft,the unstable economic foundations,and the weak external support.These constraints may not suffice to reverse the direction of Japan's“Indo–Pacific”strategy in the short term but will limit its effectiveness.展开更多
Against the backdrop of the current international situation,which remains complex and fast-changing, Japan dances to America's tune, attempting to rebuild its industrial power featuring “strategic indispensabili...Against the backdrop of the current international situation,which remains complex and fast-changing, Japan dances to America's tune, attempting to rebuild its industrial power featuring “strategic indispensability,” establish resource power based on the independent and stable supply of strategic materials, and construct normative power to influence or even dominate the international economic order. Such an approach closely echoes the current three strategic preferences of Japan:re-emergence as a global power has been Japan's long-held political aspiration, conservatism defines the country's way of thinking, and liberalization and openness reflect realistic needs. Japan relies excessively on conservative thinking, overemphasizes “small security,” and stresses “strategic autonomy.” However, the greater importance it places on security, the less secure it will become. Similarly, decoupling and supply chain disruption will only retard the development of Japan, pushing the country into the trap of Braess' s Paradox. The rise of the East, the decline of the West, and the advent of the Asian century are historical trends.Japan cannot achieve secure development in isolation from Asia and the East, much less from China.展开更多
Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has officially designated 2023 as the year of realist diplomacy in a new era. In actual terms, the main focuses of Kishida's diplomacy in the current year are strengthening th...Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has officially designated 2023 as the year of realist diplomacy in a new era. In actual terms, the main focuses of Kishida's diplomacy in the current year are strengthening the US–Japan alliance with the outcome of the revision of the security strategy.展开更多
The quasi-alliance strategy is part of the national security strategy and lies in the grey area between alliance and neutrality.1 In recent years,major countries,including Japan,have positioned quasi-alliance as a fea...The quasi-alliance strategy is part of the national security strategy and lies in the grey area between alliance and neutrality.1 In recent years,major countries,including Japan,have positioned quasi-alliance as a feasible unwritten option in their respective national security strategies.2 Japan’s quasialliance strategy was already in its infancy when former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first came to power in September 2006 but was put on hold after his resignation in September 2007.展开更多
文摘In late August 2023,China cut off seafood imports from Japan[1]and criticized its neighbor for being “extremely selfish and irresponsible”[2].In Seoul,the Republic of Korea,protesters marched through the streets,held a candlelight vigil,and attempted to force their way into the Japanese embassy[3].The environmental organization Greenpeace denounced Japan for violating human rights and breaking international law[4].
文摘Introduced by the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and inherited and developed by Fumio Kishida,Japan's“Indo–Pacific”strategy has gradually taken shape.This strategy can be deemed a broad vision,covering a wide range of topics and an extensive network of partners,with a strong trend of pan-securitization.It is a comprehensive inter national st rateg y based on Japan's alliance policy and China containment strategy,following a global,security-oriented approach.Driven by considerations such as maintaining its economic status,realizing its long-cherished dream of becoming a political powerhouse,and containing China,Japan has stepped up its“Indo–Pacific”strategy,which may influence global development,undermine regional maritime security,and impede China's reunification process.Meanwhile,Japan's“Indo–Pacific”strategy faces the triple challenge of a strategic overdraft,the unstable economic foundations,and the weak external support.These constraints may not suffice to reverse the direction of Japan's“Indo–Pacific”strategy in the short term but will limit its effectiveness.
基金the phased achievement of a National Social Science Fund project (No.21BGJ057)。
文摘Against the backdrop of the current international situation,which remains complex and fast-changing, Japan dances to America's tune, attempting to rebuild its industrial power featuring “strategic indispensability,” establish resource power based on the independent and stable supply of strategic materials, and construct normative power to influence or even dominate the international economic order. Such an approach closely echoes the current three strategic preferences of Japan:re-emergence as a global power has been Japan's long-held political aspiration, conservatism defines the country's way of thinking, and liberalization and openness reflect realistic needs. Japan relies excessively on conservative thinking, overemphasizes “small security,” and stresses “strategic autonomy.” However, the greater importance it places on security, the less secure it will become. Similarly, decoupling and supply chain disruption will only retard the development of Japan, pushing the country into the trap of Braess' s Paradox. The rise of the East, the decline of the West, and the advent of the Asian century are historical trends.Japan cannot achieve secure development in isolation from Asia and the East, much less from China.
文摘Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida has officially designated 2023 as the year of realist diplomacy in a new era. In actual terms, the main focuses of Kishida's diplomacy in the current year are strengthening the US–Japan alliance with the outcome of the revision of the security strategy.
文摘The quasi-alliance strategy is part of the national security strategy and lies in the grey area between alliance and neutrality.1 In recent years,major countries,including Japan,have positioned quasi-alliance as a feasible unwritten option in their respective national security strategies.2 Japan’s quasialliance strategy was already in its infancy when former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first came to power in September 2006 but was put on hold after his resignation in September 2007.
