In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote clien...In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent.展开更多
As to the goal and task of an enterprise, planned economy and market economy have different definitions. Under the circumstances of market economy, the goal of an enterprise is to pursuing maximum proits. Accordingly,...As to the goal and task of an enterprise, planned economy and market economy have different definitions. Under the circumstances of market economy, the goal of an enterprise is to pursuing maximum proits. Accordingly, the ederphse has more autonomic rights. In the early 1980s, a lot of western couothes implemetned large- scale privatisation policies towards state- owned enterpses sraively. This was because there were many disadvantages within the system of State - owned enterprises in those countries, in other words, the state -owned enterprises couldn’ t comghe with private enterprises saressfully and had become a fiscal burden.Many Chinese enterrises were established in the system of planned economy. and the state had been in all charge of ther profits or deficits for about half a century, This model has been proved inappropriate.Along with the gradual reform in China, Chinese state - owned enterprises have experienced several stages as follows:" releasing rights and yielding profits"," contracting out system",’ renting system"," modern enterprise system" and" releasing the small and grasping the large". Meanwhile, as for the management sysem of state -owned edterprises,the Chinese govemment has changed the collecting profit system to levying taxes system in two steps. At present, the new state -owned enterprises, which was established under the circumstances of market economy in recent years, have adapted themselves to the environment basically. However, the old state -owned enterprises are still in no laughing predicament : slow growth, wide rage of deficits, low efficency and many lay -off wothers.lt still needs a relatively long and severe priod for Chinese state - owned enterprises to adapt themselves to the market economy completely.We must abandon and break free from the old system, and establsih a new sysem instead .All the state - owned enterprises need systematic reform except some state - owned public utilities and speial industries. We also ed to discuss and aolve a lot of problems as follows: How to make a clear distinction between the adrinistrative nghts of govemment and the proprietary rights of enterprises? How to separate state ownership and en terprises pewer in opration and management? ls the apent relation between the whole people,who is final client ,and the government aea sonable?We discussed the problems concerning the reform of state - owned enterprises severa times odore. ln this issue, we again publish a series of articles on this topic with new angle and theep theoretical analysis. The authors make deep anatysis on this topic from the aspects of the definition of state-owned enterprise, speial legal person, and asset reorganization . etc. They also sum up the main developmental experience of the new state-owned enterphses. These articles will be a useful refereoce for the deision - naking bodies and the leaders of enterprises.展开更多
Distributed certification via threshold cryptography is much more secu re than other ways to protect certification authority (CA) 's private key,and c an tolerate some intrusions. As the original system such as IT...Distributed certification via threshold cryptography is much more secu re than other ways to protect certification authority (CA) 's private key,and c an tolerate some intrusions. As the original system such as ITTC,etc.,is unsaf e ,inefficient and impracitcal in actual network environment,this paper brings u p a new distributed certification scheme,which although it generates key shares concentratively,it updates key shares distributedly,and so,avoids single-po in t failure like ITTC. It not only enhances robustness with Feldman verification and SSL protocol,but can also change the threshold (t,k) flexibly and robu stly,and so,is much more practical. In this work,the authors implement the prototype sy stem of the new scheme and test and analyze its performance.展开更多
In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the m...In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the model of the principal-agent to analyze government procurement activity, and proposes some countermeasures to improve principal-agent in government procurement.展开更多
Corporate governance represents institutional structures and incentive mechanisms that are implemented in order to mitigate the principal-agent problem and to thus promote the long-term competitiveness of the firm. Th...Corporate governance represents institutional structures and incentive mechanisms that are implemented in order to mitigate the principal-agent problem and to thus promote the long-term competitiveness of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of corporate governance best practice and the new listing rules in Sri Lanka. The paper discusses the evolution of the corporate governance best practice giving special reference to the new listing rules in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan stock market overview and the importance of best practice governance for the developing economy of Sri Lanka. Corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka has made a progress towards best practice, but, this paper argues, that substantial reforms need to be implemented to effectively promote and sustain the accountability and transparency.展开更多
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71071033)the Youth Foundation of Humanity and Social Scienceof Ministry of Education of China(No.11YJC630234)
文摘In order to solve principal-agent problems caused by interest inconformity and information asymmetry during information security outsourcing, it is necessary to design a reasonable incentive mechanism to promote client enterprises to complete outsourcing service actively. The incentive mechanism model of information security outsourcing is designed based on the principal-agent theory. Through analyzing the factors such as enterprise information assets value, invasion probability, information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree how to impact on the incentive mechanism, conclusions show that an enterprise information assets value and invasion probability have a positive influence on the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient; while information security environment, the agent cost coefficient and agency risk preference degree have a negative influence on the compensation coefficient. Therefore, the principal enterprises should reasonably design the fixed fee and the compensation coefficient to encourage information security outsourcing agency enterprises to the full extent.
文摘As to the goal and task of an enterprise, planned economy and market economy have different definitions. Under the circumstances of market economy, the goal of an enterprise is to pursuing maximum proits. Accordingly, the ederphse has more autonomic rights. In the early 1980s, a lot of western couothes implemetned large- scale privatisation policies towards state- owned enterpses sraively. This was because there were many disadvantages within the system of State - owned enterprises in those countries, in other words, the state -owned enterprises couldn’ t comghe with private enterprises saressfully and had become a fiscal burden.Many Chinese enterrises were established in the system of planned economy. and the state had been in all charge of ther profits or deficits for about half a century, This model has been proved inappropriate.Along with the gradual reform in China, Chinese state - owned enterprises have experienced several stages as follows:" releasing rights and yielding profits"," contracting out system",’ renting system"," modern enterprise system" and" releasing the small and grasping the large". Meanwhile, as for the management sysem of state -owned edterprises,the Chinese govemment has changed the collecting profit system to levying taxes system in two steps. At present, the new state -owned enterprises, which was established under the circumstances of market economy in recent years, have adapted themselves to the environment basically. However, the old state -owned enterprises are still in no laughing predicament : slow growth, wide rage of deficits, low efficency and many lay -off wothers.lt still needs a relatively long and severe priod for Chinese state - owned enterprises to adapt themselves to the market economy completely.We must abandon and break free from the old system, and establsih a new sysem instead .All the state - owned enterprises need systematic reform except some state - owned public utilities and speial industries. We also ed to discuss and aolve a lot of problems as follows: How to make a clear distinction between the adrinistrative nghts of govemment and the proprietary rights of enterprises? How to separate state ownership and en terprises pewer in opration and management? ls the apent relation between the whole people,who is final client ,and the government aea sonable?We discussed the problems concerning the reform of state - owned enterprises severa times odore. ln this issue, we again publish a series of articles on this topic with new angle and theep theoretical analysis. The authors make deep anatysis on this topic from the aspects of the definition of state-owned enterprise, speial legal person, and asset reorganization . etc. They also sum up the main developmental experience of the new state-owned enterphses. These articles will be a useful refereoce for the deision - naking bodies and the leaders of enterprises.
文摘Distributed certification via threshold cryptography is much more secu re than other ways to protect certification authority (CA) 's private key,and c an tolerate some intrusions. As the original system such as ITTC,etc.,is unsaf e ,inefficient and impracitcal in actual network environment,this paper brings u p a new distributed certification scheme,which although it generates key shares concentratively,it updates key shares distributedly,and so,avoids single-po in t failure like ITTC. It not only enhances robustness with Feldman verification and SSL protocol,but can also change the threshold (t,k) flexibly and robu stly,and so,is much more practical. In this work,the authors implement the prototype sy stem of the new scheme and test and analyze its performance.
文摘In government procurement activities, asymmetric information, incomplete contracts and opportunism, led to the dysfunction of principal-agent. Through the reference of the principal-agent theory, this paper uses the model of the principal-agent to analyze government procurement activity, and proposes some countermeasures to improve principal-agent in government procurement.
文摘Corporate governance represents institutional structures and incentive mechanisms that are implemented in order to mitigate the principal-agent problem and to thus promote the long-term competitiveness of the firm. The purpose of this paper is to examine the nature of corporate governance best practice and the new listing rules in Sri Lanka. The paper discusses the evolution of the corporate governance best practice giving special reference to the new listing rules in Sri Lanka, Sri Lankan stock market overview and the importance of best practice governance for the developing economy of Sri Lanka. Corporate governance practices in Sri Lanka has made a progress towards best practice, but, this paper argues, that substantial reforms need to be implemented to effectively promote and sustain the accountability and transparency.
