We propose a heterogeneous agent herding model, in which the agent clusters are in active or inactive states. When agent clusters are in active states, they tend to buy or sell. In active states, an exchange may occur...We propose a heterogeneous agent herding model, in which the agent clusters are in active or inactive states. When agent clusters are in active states, they tend to buy or sell. In active states, an exchange may occur when two heterogeneous agent clusters encounter each other, and they may merge into a bigger one when two homogeneous agent clusters meet. The ratio of successful exchange or merging depends on two parameters： i.e. the reliability κ, reflecting the credible degree in the interacting agent clusters, being the space effect of the market, and the response degree q, reflecting the influence of the former trading to the current action, being the time effect of the market. Our numerical calculation shows that the dynamics of the model exhibits some behaviour very close to real markets when tuning the reliability and the degree of reaction to some specific values.展开更多
The co-evolutionary dynamics of a cyclic game system is investigated in a two-dimensional square lattice with the asymmetrical rates for three species. Different with the well-mixed system, coexistence and extinction ...The co-evolutionary dynamics of a cyclic game system is investigated in a two-dimensional square lattice with the asymmetrical rates for three species. Different with the well-mixed system, coexistence and extinction emerge alternately in the system, where a ＂zero-one＂ behavior is robust for a small population size, whereas, the system is predominated by coexistence for a big population one. We study in detail the influence about the fluctuation to the change of the state, and find that the difference between the maximal amplitude about the fluctuation and the average intensity determines which state the system is ultimately. In addition, we introduce Ports energy to explain the reason of the ＂zero-one＂ behavior. It is shown that the average Ports energy per site is the distance to the ＂zero-one＂ behavior in the model.展开更多
This paper investigates the dynamic evolution with limited learning information on a small-world network.In the system, the information among the interaction players is not very lucid, and the players are not allowed ...This paper investigates the dynamic evolution with limited learning information on a small-world network.In the system, the information among the interaction players is not very lucid, and the players are not allowed to inspectthe profit collected by its neighbors, thus the focal player cannot choose randomly a neighbor or the wealthiest one andcompare its payoff to copy its strategy.It is assumed that the information acquainted by the player declines in theform of the exponential with the geographical distance between the players, and a parameter V is introduced to denotethe inspect-ability about the players.It is found that under the hospitable conditions, cooperation increases with therandomness and is inhibited by the large connectivity for the prisoner's dilemma; however, cooperation is maximal atthe moderate rewiring probability and is chaos with the connectivity for the snowdrift game.For the two games, theacuminous sight is in favor of the cooperation under the hospitable conditions; whereas, the myopic eyes are advantageousto cooperation and cooperation increases with the randomness under the hostile condition.展开更多
文摘We propose a heterogeneous agent herding model, in which the agent clusters are in active or inactive states. When agent clusters are in active states, they tend to buy or sell. In active states, an exchange may occur when two heterogeneous agent clusters encounter each other, and they may merge into a bigger one when two homogeneous agent clusters meet. The ratio of successful exchange or merging depends on two parameters： i.e. the reliability κ, reflecting the credible degree in the interacting agent clusters, being the space effect of the market, and the response degree q, reflecting the influence of the former trading to the current action, being the time effect of the market. Our numerical calculation shows that the dynamics of the model exhibits some behaviour very close to real markets when tuning the reliability and the degree of reaction to some specific values.
基金Supported by Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.10974146the Zhejiang Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.Y6090222the Wenzhou Science & Technology Bureau under Grant No.R20080059
文摘The co-evolutionary dynamics of a cyclic game system is investigated in a two-dimensional square lattice with the asymmetrical rates for three species. Different with the well-mixed system, coexistence and extinction emerge alternately in the system, where a ＂zero-one＂ behavior is robust for a small population size, whereas, the system is predominated by coexistence for a big population one. We study in detail the influence about the fluctuation to the change of the state, and find that the difference between the maximal amplitude about the fluctuation and the average intensity determines which state the system is ultimately. In addition, we introduce Ports energy to explain the reason of the ＂zero-one＂ behavior. It is shown that the average Ports energy per site is the distance to the ＂zero-one＂ behavior in the model.
基金Supported by Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.10974146
文摘This paper investigates the dynamic evolution with limited learning information on a small-world network.In the system, the information among the interaction players is not very lucid, and the players are not allowed to inspectthe profit collected by its neighbors, thus the focal player cannot choose randomly a neighbor or the wealthiest one andcompare its payoff to copy its strategy.It is assumed that the information acquainted by the player declines in theform of the exponential with the geographical distance between the players, and a parameter V is introduced to denotethe inspect-ability about the players.It is found that under the hospitable conditions, cooperation increases with therandomness and is inhibited by the large connectivity for the prisoner's dilemma; however, cooperation is maximal atthe moderate rewiring probability and is chaos with the connectivity for the snowdrift game.For the two games, theacuminous sight is in favor of the cooperation under the hospitable conditions; whereas, the myopic eyes are advantageousto cooperation and cooperation increases with the randomness under the hostile condition.
