System dynamics of behaviour-evolutionary mix-game models

In real financial markets there are two kinds of traders： one is fundamentalist, and the other is a trend-follower. The mix-game model is proposed to mimic such phenomena. In a mix-game model there are two groups of agents： Group 1 plays the majority game and Group 2 plays the minority game. In this paper, we investigate such a case that some traders in real financial markets could change their investment behaviours by assigning the evolutionary abilities to agents： if the winning rates of agents are smaller than a threshold, they will join the other group; and agents will repeat such an evolution at certain time intervals. Through the simulations, we obtain the following findings： （i） the volatilities of systems increase with the increase of the number of agents in Group 1 and the times of behavioural changes of all agents; （ii） the performances of agents in both groups and the stabilities of systems become better if all agents take more time to observe their new investment behaviours; （iii） there are two-phase zones of market and non-market and two-phase zones of evolution and non-evolution; （iv） parameter configurations located within the cross areas between the zones of markets and the zones of evolution are suited for simulating the financial markets.

Research on Financing Game Model of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises based on Different Risk Categories

With the development of market economy and the deepening of economic system reform, some of the Small and medium-sized（SME） enterprises have become the most dynamic economic growth point in the national economy. Nevertheless, SMEs are facing a lot of problems in the market competition, such as technical backwardness, information lag, lack of talents, etc.. The healthy development of SMEs is very important, whereas, SMEs’ financing is a worldwide problem, and the result of financing game between banks and enterprises depends on a variety of decision-making factors. In this paper, from the point of view of bank, we analyze the diffi culties of external financing of SMEs, and establish a financing game model based on different risk categories, in order to better solve the problems that remain in the process of financing and promote the healthy and sustainable development of SMEs.

Hysteresis behavior and nonequilibrium phase transition in a one-dimensional evolutionary game model

We investigate a simple evolutionary game model in one dimension. It is found that the system exhibits a discontinuous phase transition from a defection state to a cooperation state when the b payoff of a defector exploiting a cooperator is small. Furthermore, if b is large enough, then the system exhibits two continuous phase transitions between two absorbing states and a coexistence state of cooperation and defection, respectively. The tri-critical point is roughly estimated. Moreover, it is found that the critical behavior of the continuous phase transition with an absorbing state is in the directed percolation universality class.

Game Modeling and Strategic Behavior Analysis in Public Goods Provision： Evidence From Water Resources Management

The utility of public goods vary with the behaviors of stakeholders （players）, and it is appropriate to study effective supply and management of public goods with game modeling and analysis. The comparison effect is the key issue of public good provision both in theoretical analysis and in practice. One major contribution of the paper is the extension of Clarke-Groves mechanism, to achieve which strategic behavior analysis is applied through the analysis and the comparison effect among various stakeholders in different stages is created and highly emphasized. In the first section of this paper, the definition of integrated water resources management （IWRM）, the importance of stakeholder participation as well as some models and methods that have been applied are illustrated. Following this, the framework of analysis is elaborated, in which the scenario and aims are shown, and it is claimed that game theory is the main approach, which includes both cooperative games and non-cooperative games. To achieve the aims of the public project, five approaches from game theory are able to cover the entire process of the project, and the fourth approach on interest compensation mechanism is the highlight of the research. After this, the interest compensation mechanism is demonstrated in the model section, and is proved to be an incentive compatible mechanism that makes each stakeholder choose to behave in accordance with the interest of the entire project. The Clarke-Groves mechanism is applied and extended in establishing the model, and the utility change by the comparison among stakeholders （defined as the comparison effect） is involved. In the application section, a water project is analyzed in consideration of various stakeholders, and other possible applications are also indicated.

Urban Configuration Analysis of Idle Land Market Based on Game Model

In recent years, the speed of urban development becomes faster and faster with expanding of land construction scale, and a lot of idle lands lead to serious land waste. This paper builds game model by carrying out a market allocation analysis and applying economic game theory to the analysis of current idle land problem; it gets six kinds of results through analyzing the game model of idle land market, and the final Nash equilibrium is(system innovation, publicly traded) through contrastive to help balance the game relationship between government and the user of idle land and raise some new scientific and rational institutions to serve as future references for effective usage of idle land.

Pricing Game Model of Wasted Clothing Recycling and Remanufacturing Based on Government Subsidy

In the global environment of pursuing resource regeneration and green environmental protection, more and more wasted clothing need to be solved. In order to make full use of the wasted clothing and save land and soil resources, an idea of wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing is put forward. In the new idea a pricing game model is established basing on Stacklberg differential game theory between traditional and remanufactured clothing. In this model, the differences in consumers' willingness to pay and the government's subsidies are considered. Government's optimal subsidy are obtained which ensure not only the interests of manufacturers but also environmental reputation and maximum social benefits. The study is helpful to push the wasted clothing's recycling and remanufacturing plan. It makes some index more precise quantification as government's subsidy, manufacturers and the social benefits. Government and manufactures can make the detailed cooperation plan reference to it.

A Three-Stage Stochastic Dynamic Pricing Game Model Affected by New Products into the Market

In real-life marketing, a common phenomenon is that the prices of current product will have been cut down even the new product has not gone into market yet. Thus, it is very important for merchant to set the strategy which can make the excepted revenue maximum. So, this paper constructs a three-stage stochastic dynamic pricing game model for analyzing the influence of the uncertainty of entry timing of the new products on pricing of products being sold. By analyzing of the pricing strategy, there are big differences in the predictions of new product going into market between merchant and customers;the merchant will adopt cutting price for promotion strategy to reduce negative influence of the new products on the demand of the products sold now. Otherwise, the merchant will adopt the strategy of maximizing current period’s profit.

Chaos game representation walk model for the protein sequences

A new chaos game representation of protein sequences based on the detailed hydrophobic-hydrophilic （HP） model has been proposed by Yu et al （Physica A 337（2004） 171）. A CGR-walk model is proposed based on the new CGR coordinates for the protein sequences from complete genomes in the present paper. The new CCR coordinates based on the detailed HP model are converted into a time series, and a long-memory ARFIMA（p, d, q） model is introduced into the protein sequence analysis. This model is applied to simulating real CCR-walk sequence data of twelve protein sequences. Remarkably long-range correlations are uncovered in the data and the results obtained from these models are reasonably consistent with those available from the ARFIMA（p, d, q） model.

Multi-Modal Data Analysis Based Game Player Experience Modeling Using LSTM-DNN

Game player modeling is a paradigm of computational models to exploit players’behavior and experience using game and player analytics.Player modeling refers to descriptions of players based on frameworks of data derived from the interaction of a player’s behavior within the game as well as the player’s experience with the game.Player behavior focuses on dynamic and static information gathered at the time of gameplay.Player experience concerns the association of the human player during gameplay,which is based on cognitive and affective physiological measurements collected from sensors mounted on the player’s body or in the player’s surroundings.In this paper,player experience modeling is studied based on the board puzzle game“Candy Crush Saga”using cognitive data of players accessed by physiological and peripheral devices.Long Short-Term Memory-based Deep Neural Network(LSTM-DNN)is used to predict players’effective states in terms of valence,arousal,dominance,and liking by employing the concept of transfer learning.Transfer learning focuses on gaining knowledge while solving one problem and using the same knowledge to solve different but related problems.The homogeneous transfer learning approach has not been implemented in the game domain before,and this novel study opens a new research area for the game industry where the main challenge is predicting the significance of innovative games for entertainment and players’engagement.Relevant not only from a player’s point of view,it is also a benchmark study for game developers who have been facing problems of“cold start”for innovative games that strengthen the game industrial economy.

Modelling of a Human Driver’s Interaction with Vehicle Automated Steering Using Cooperative Game Theory

The introduction of automated driving systems raised questions about how the human driver interacts with the automated system. Non-cooperative game theory is increasingly used for modelling and understanding such interaction, while its counterpart, cooperative game theory is rarely discussed for similar applications despite it may be potentially more suitable. This paper describes the modelling of a human driver’s steering interaction with an automated steering system using cooperative game theory. The distributed Model Predictive Control approach is adopted to derive the driver’s and the automated steering system’s strategies in a Pareto equilibrium sense, namely their cooperative Pareto steering strategies. Two separate numerical studies are carried out to study the influence of strategy parameters, and the influence of strategy types on the driver’s and the automated system’s steering performance. It is found that when a driver interacts with an automated steering system using a cooperative Pareto steering strategy, the driver can improve his/her performance in following a target path through increasing his/her effort in pursuing his/her own interest under the driver-automation cooperative control goal. It is also found that a driver’s adoption of cooperative Pareto steering strategy leads to a reinforcement in the driver’s steering angle control, compared to the driver’s adoption of non-cooperative Nash strategy. This in turn enables the vehicle to return from a lane-change maneuver to straight-line driving swifter.

A Fractional Micro-Macro Model for Crowds of Pedestrians Based on Fractional Mean Field Games

Modeling a crowd of pedestrians has been considered in this paper from different aspects. Based on fractional microscopic model that may be much more close to reality, a fractional macroscopic model has been proposed using conservation law of mass. Then in order to characterize the competitive and cooperative interactions among pedestrians, fractional mean field games are utilized in the modeling problem when the number of pedestrians goes to infinity and fractional dynamic model composed of fractional backward and fractional forward equations are constructed in macro scale. Fractional micromacro model for crowds of pedestrians are obtained in the end. Simulation results are also included to illustrate the proposed fractional microscopic model and fractional macroscopic model, respectively. © 2014 Chinese Association of Automation.

Case Study on the Forestry Cooperation Model from Game Structure Perspective

Take Chinese yew cooperative organization for example,different game structures of forestry cooperation model were analyzed,the elative merit and applicable occasion was discussed combined with empirical investigation,and some suggestions were given also.The results showed that depending entirely on normal forest farmers cooperate spontaneously is difficult.Policies should be designed from the perspective of promoted village cadres and influential family salons to cooperation.When market factors become the main obstacle,it is necessary to introduce companies,relax constraints of forest management and build the right market atmosphere.According to unequal status of company and forest farmers,develop the cooperation model of " company + cooperation organization + farmers".In certain circumstances,especially there are several companies vicious competition,the intervention of association can play a coordinating role.

Game model of safety monitoring for arch dam deformation

Arch dam deformation is comprehensively affected by water pressure,temperature,dam's structural behavior and material properties as well as other factors.Among them the water pressure and temperature are external factors(source factors) that cause dam deformation,and dam's structural behavior and material properties are the internal factors of deformation(resistance factors).The dam deformation is the result of the mutual game playing between source factors and resistance factors.Therefore,resistance factors of structure and materials that reflect resistance character of arch dam structure are introduced into the traditional model,where structure factor is embodied by the flexibility coefficient of dam body and the maximum dam height,and material property is embodied by the elastic modulus of dam.On the basis of analyzing the correlation between dam deformation and resistance factors,the game model of safety monitoring for arch dam deformation is put forward.

A CONNECTION ADMISSION CONTROL SCHEME BASED ON GAME THEORETICAL MODEL IN ATM NETWORKS

In this paper, the main schemes of connection admission control (CAC) in ATM networks are briefly discussed especially the principle of dynamic bandwidth allocation. Then the fair share of the bandwidth among different traffic sources is analyzed based on cooperative game model. A CAC scheme is proposed using the genetic algorithm (GA) to optimize the bandwidth-delay-product formed utilization function that ensures the fair share and accuracy of accepting/rejecting the incoming calls. Simulation results show that the proposed scheme ensures fairness of the shared bandwidth to different traffic sources.

基于演化博弈的我国分级诊疗策略分析

目的在分级诊疗制度中涉及政府、医院和患者之间的利益关系,探讨三方动态博弈策略,有利于完善分级诊疗的理论范式和政策逻辑。方法构建政府、医院和患者三方模型,分析其策略选择及演化路径,求解三方演化博弈的稳定策略,探究如何进行利益平衡和合作以实现三方共赢。另外,利用Matlab R2018b对模型进行仿真,进一步分析三方主体的演化路径以及不同策略选择对分级诊疗制度推广的影响。结果政府、医院和患者3个主体的决策行为之间相互影响,最终将演化至点(1,1,1)的理想稳定状态。增大政府补贴会加速医院和患者的初始参与概率值收敛至1,但过多的补贴会使政府逐渐背离鼓励分级诊疗的策略。结论政府应在成本范围内加大对医院优质医疗资源下沉的专家补贴力度,并加强政府监管。大型医院和基层医疗卫生机构重要的是实现医生资源的自由流动和合理分布。患者还需转变固有的就医观念,才能最终实现有序就医。

Certainty of patient survival with reference to game information dynamic model

This paper is concerned with Hepato-Cellular Carcinoma (HCC) patients treated naturopathic agents. Patients treated with ≥4 agents survived significantly longer than patients treated with ≤3 agents. The great effect is seen in patients treated with at least 4 agents that include Cordyceps sinensis. This greater certainty of patient survival without toxic side effects is significant benefit comparing with the conventional therapy. Treatment of HCC with a regimen of ≥4 agents prepared from natural products is associated with greater certainty of patient survival in a substantial portion of patients. The information dynamic model for certainty of patient survival is derived based on fluid mechanics, where a series of approximate solutions of the flow between two parallel flat walls, one of which is at rest, the other is suddenly accelerated from the rest to a constant velocity are used. The kinetic energy of certainty of patient survival decreases with increasing time, while the potential energy increases with increasing time. Total mechanical energy of patients treated with 4 or more agents is smaller than that treated with 3 or fewer agents. The kinetic energy (potential energy) of patients treated with 4 or more agents decreases (increases) more slower than the kinetic energy (potential energy) of patients treated with 3 or fewer agents.

Application of fuzzy optimization model in the evaluationof urban flood-waterloggedvulnerabilitybased on the synthetic weight ofgame theory

The evaluation of urban flood-waterlogged vulnerability is very important to the safety of urban flood control. In this paper, the evaluation of consolidated index is used. Respectively, AHP and entropy method calculate the subjective and objective weight of the evaluation indicators, and combine them by game theory. So we can obtain synthetic weight based on objective and subjective weights. The evaluation of urban flood-waterlogged vulnerability as target layer, a single variable multi-objective fuzzy optimization model is established. We use the model to evaluate flood-waterlogged vulnerability of 13 prefecture-level city in Hunan, and compare it with other evaluation method. The results show that the evaluation method has certain adaptability and reliability, and it＇ s helpfid to the construction planning of urban flood control.

跨境电商退货模式选择研究

基于一个跨境电商和一个第三方海外仓组成的零售场景,构建斯塔克伯格博弈模型,研究在无退货服务、提供退货服务且退回货物运回国内以及提供退货服务且退回货物就地促销等3种退货模式下跨境电商和第三方海外仓的最优定价策略和利润,探讨跨境电商的最优退货模式。以浙纺尼日利亚海外仓为调研对象,将其部分进仓产品的实际运行数据作为数值分析的基础,对模型结果进行检验。研究发现:当产品回收价值较大且退货率较小时,应选择将退回货物运回国内的退货服务模式;当产品退货率和回收价值都较小时,应选择将退回货物就地促销的退货服务模式;当产品退货率较大时,应选择无退货服务模式。同时,存在最优售后服务水平使双方利润达到最优。

基于组合赋权-VIKOR法的山区施工便道方案优选模型

为对山岭地区施工便道方案进行客观、全面、精准评价,结合行业设计规范和相关研究成果,构建山区施工便道方案指标评价体系,提出一种山区施工便道方案优选模型。该模型采用三标度层次分析法和熵权法分别计算评价指标的主、客观权重,基于博弈论思想对主、客观权重进行赋权确定综合权重,并运用VIKOR法(多准则妥协解排序法)对山区施工便道方案进行优选。以某高速公路山区施工便道方案比选为工程实例,针对4种施工便道方案进行综合比选,并将本文模型与加权TOPSIS法(优劣解距离法)、灰色加权关联分析法进行对比分析。研究结果表明:3种计算模型得出的最优方案一致,组合赋权的方法克服了单一赋权的缺陷,使指标评价更客观。相比于加权TOPSIS法和灰色加权关联分析法,本文模型能抵御外部因素的干扰,明显地辨别方案之间的差距,得到准确清晰的方案排序,且当评价方案众多时,本文模型能够提供更多方案选择,得到最优化方案。

基于博弈论的弹目攻防决策方法研究

针对空战环境中弹目攻防双方的对抗特性,提出了一种基于博弈论的弹目攻防决策方法。基于导弹目标运动数学关系得到状态方程,根据弹目攻防对抗机理建立“一对一导弹-目标”动态博弈模型,确定弹目双方策略集与收益矩阵,提出混合策略纳什均衡求解方法,并结合模型滚动预测方法获得该策略空间的纳什均衡点。算例仿真结果表明,基于混合策略下导弹制导律为该策略空间的纳什均衡点,且该方法可以减小导弹对目标的脱靶量,提高导弹的命中精度,为导弹攻防作战提供了依据。