Using economics and game theory, two kinds of models have been proposed in this paper under the assumption that foreign and domestic firms behave under the condition of dynamic game of perfect information. One model i...Using economics and game theory, two kinds of models have been proposed in this paper under the assumption that foreign and domestic firms behave under the condition of dynamic game of perfect information. One model is for calculating Anti-dumping rate which is obtained according to current regulations of Anti-dumping, but it is not optimal. The other is an optimal model of Anti-dumping which is obtained according to the maximum principle of domestic social welfare. Then, through the comparison of this two models in detail, several shortages have been revealed about Anti-dumping rate model based on current regulations of Anti-dumping. Finally, a suggestion is indicated that WTO and China should use the optimal model to calculate Anti-dumping rate.展开更多
The game theory was firstly used for description of economic phenomena and social interaction. But there are certain type of perfect information games （PI-games）, the so-called positional game or Banach-Mazur games,...The game theory was firstly used for description of economic phenomena and social interaction. But there are certain type of perfect information games （PI-games）, the so-called positional game or Banach-Mazur games, which so far have not been applied in economy. The perfect information positional game is defined as the game during which at any time the choice is made by one of the players who is acquainted with the previous decision of his opponent. The game is run on a sequential basis. The aim of this paper is to discuss selected Banach-Mazur games and to present some applications of positional game. This paper also shows new theoretical example of a determined PI-game, based by theoretical overview. All considerations are pure theoretical and based by logical deduction.展开更多
As an efficient method of solving subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium,the backward induction is analyzed from an evolutionary point of view in this paper,replacing a player with a population and turning a game into a pop...As an efficient method of solving subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium,the backward induction is analyzed from an evolutionary point of view in this paper,replacing a player with a population and turning a game into a population game,which shows that equilibrium of a perfect information game is the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models in the limit.展开更多
文摘Using economics and game theory, two kinds of models have been proposed in this paper under the assumption that foreign and domestic firms behave under the condition of dynamic game of perfect information. One model is for calculating Anti-dumping rate which is obtained according to current regulations of Anti-dumping, but it is not optimal. The other is an optimal model of Anti-dumping which is obtained according to the maximum principle of domestic social welfare. Then, through the comparison of this two models in detail, several shortages have been revealed about Anti-dumping rate model based on current regulations of Anti-dumping. Finally, a suggestion is indicated that WTO and China should use the optimal model to calculate Anti-dumping rate.
文摘The game theory was firstly used for description of economic phenomena and social interaction. But there are certain type of perfect information games （PI-games）, the so-called positional game or Banach-Mazur games, which so far have not been applied in economy. The perfect information positional game is defined as the game during which at any time the choice is made by one of the players who is acquainted with the previous decision of his opponent. The game is run on a sequential basis. The aim of this paper is to discuss selected Banach-Mazur games and to present some applications of positional game. This paper also shows new theoretical example of a determined PI-game, based by theoretical overview. All considerations are pure theoretical and based by logical deduction.
文摘As an efficient method of solving subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium,the backward induction is analyzed from an evolutionary point of view in this paper,replacing a player with a population and turning a game into a population game,which shows that equilibrium of a perfect information game is the unique evolutionarily stable outcome for dynamic models in the limit.
