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Competition and Political Factors in the Russian Media Market During Putin’s Fourth President Term
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作者 LI Xuan 《Journal of Literature and Art Studies》 2020年第11期1068-1077,共10页
The frequency of Russian media usage has been declining since 2018, but television is still the most popularmedium in Russia. The rise of digital radio and television represents a mixed picture, in part because of pol... The frequency of Russian media usage has been declining since 2018, but television is still the most popularmedium in Russia. The rise of digital radio and television represents a mixed picture, in part because of politicalpressures, but the digital transition between federal and regional media is not synchronized;on the other hand, theRussian print media market has suffered from poor returns and high costs since 2012. Insufficient facilities withpoor quality and lack of advertisement revenues have made it difficult for print media to survive. The governmenthas provided financial subsidies for media, but it will still support economic independence of media. Thegovernment has strictly regulated foreign investments after 2014, which ensure the concentration of mediaownership but reduced the media market’s competitiveness. Now the Russian government is adjusting policies,seeking ways to balance media market competition and retaining political control of media. 展开更多
关键词 media market competition political control of media RUSSIA
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Private Benefits of Politicians and Delayed Privatization
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作者 Michal Katdofiski Jacek Mizerka 《Journal of Modern Accounting and Auditing》 2011年第4期368-379,共12页
The aim of this paper is to consider the problem of politicians' control of state-owned enterprises in a transforming economy. The control of a company can be treated as a choice of a strategy pursued by this company... The aim of this paper is to consider the problem of politicians' control of state-owned enterprises in a transforming economy. The control of a company can be treated as a choice of a strategy pursued by this company. In order to present politicians' influence on a company's strategy, we consider the case of a firm controlled by the State Treasury (i.e., by politicians) and a company outside politicians' control, both functioning in a favorable and an unfavorable state of the economy. We propose the option-to-switch valuation model as a method of measuring politicians' private benefits of control. We illustrate the considerations using data concerning Poland's printing industry. 展开更多
关键词 political control private benefits PRIVATIZATION real options
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