In order to analyze the effects of different cooperative mechanisms between a mobile device manufacturer and a mobile network operator （ MNO ）, a Stackelberg structure is constructed. The manufacturer acts as a lead...In order to analyze the effects of different cooperative mechanisms between a mobile device manufacturer and a mobile network operator （ MNO ）, a Stackelberg structure is constructed. The manufacturer acts as a leader, while the MNO acts as a follower, i. e., a traditional retailer. Three cooperative mechanisms are considered： the manufacturer does not invest in developing the propriety function and software to support the infrastructure capacity of the MNO; the manufacturer invests in the development; the MNO offers a subsidy to encourage the manufacturer to invest in development. The results reveal that investing in the development can increase the profits of both the manufacturer and the MNO. Furthermore, if the MNO shares certain investment costs with the manufacturer, the MNO may charge higher prices of mobile connection services and mobile value-added services, and the profits of the two players may be enhanced.展开更多
Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic kno...Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.展开更多
This paper first gives an explanation of moral hazard in the insurance field,and then offers a game theory model about insurance pricing according to the non zero sum game analysis between the insurer and the insured...This paper first gives an explanation of moral hazard in the insurance field,and then offers a game theory model about insurance pricing according to the non zero sum game analysis between the insurer and the insured when moral hazard exists.On the basis of the game analysis,this paper also presents a lowest pricing formula and studies the cost of moral hazard simultaneously.展开更多
The collector managed inventory(CMI)management idea is introduced based on the comparison of manufacturer and third-party logistics(3PL)implementing vendor managed inventory(VMI)services.Considering recovery costs,the...The collector managed inventory(CMI)management idea is introduced based on the comparison of manufacturer and third-party logistics(3PL)implementing vendor managed inventory(VMI)services.Considering recovery costs,the service pricing strategies for 3PL corporations implementing VMI are studied to meet two conditions of participation constraints and incentive-compatibility constraints.The numerical simulation results indicate that the supply chain partners' profits change after considering recovery costs,and the 3PL corporation's profits and the total profits increase first,and then decrease.The retailers' and manufacturers' profits also increase.The total profits of the supply chain have a characteristic of increasing first and then decreasing with the increase of the callback ratio of unsold products.The concrete extremum point is codetermined by price flexibility,service pricing of the 3PL corporation,callback price and callback ratio.展开更多
A two-period model is developed to investigate the competitive effects of targeted advertising with imperfect targeting in a duopolistic market. In the first period, two firms compete in price in order to recognize cu...A two-period model is developed to investigate the competitive effects of targeted advertising with imperfect targeting in a duopolistic market. In the first period, two firms compete in price in order to recognize customers. In the second period, targeted advertising plays an informative role and acts as a price discrimination device. The firms＇ optimal advertising and pricing strategies under imperfect targeting are compared with those under perfect targeting. Equilibrium decisions show that, under imperfect targeting, when the advertising cost is low enough, both firms will choose to target ads at the rivals＇ old segments. This equilibrium, which could not exist under perfect targeting, results in two opposite results. When cost is high, the effect of mis-targeting will soften price competition and increase profits; on the contrary, when cost is low enough, it will lead to aggressive price competition and profit loss with the increase of imperfect targeting, so firms may have incentives to reduce the mis- targeting degree.展开更多
Strategic alliance has suffered much instabilities since its first implementation. Scholars have carried out many em- bedded, precise and comprehensive researches from both theory and empiricism. Here we try to find c...Strategic alliance has suffered much instabilities since its first implementation. Scholars have carried out many em- bedded, precise and comprehensive researches from both theory and empiricism. Here we try to find certain stable solutions by employing game theory, in an attempt to construct theoretical bases for strategic alliance, which people called “one of the most important organizational innovation in the end of the 20th century” (Shi, 2001), to exploit its advantages in the process of glob- alization. Finally, this article puts forward some advices for its success.展开更多
In non-dedicated cooperative relay networks, each node is autonomous and selfish in nature, and thus spontaneous cooperation among nodes is challenged. To stimulate the selfish node to participate in cooperation, a pr...In non-dedicated cooperative relay networks, each node is autonomous and selfish in nature, and thus spontaneous cooperation among nodes is challenged. To stimulate the selfish node to participate in cooperation, a pricing-based cooperation engine using game theory was designed. Firstly, the feasible regions of the charge price and reimbursement price were deduced. Then, the non-cooperative and cooperative games were adopted to analyze the amount of bandwidth that initiating cooperation node(ICN) forwards data through participating cooperation node(PCN) and the amount of bandwidth that PCN helps ICN to relay data. Meanwhile, the Nash equilibrium solutions of cooperation bandwidth allocations(CBAs) were obtained through geometrical interpretation. Secondly, a pricing-based cooperation engine was proposed and a cooperative communication system model with cooperation engines was depicted. Finally, an algorithm based on game theory was proposed to realize the cooperation engine. The simulation results demonstrate that, compared with the system without pricing-based incentive, the proposed system can significantly improve the ICN's metric measured by bit-per-Joule and increase the PCN's revenue.展开更多
This paper presented a game theoretic model to study the competition for a single investment oppertunity under uncertainty. It models the hazard rate of investment as a function of competitors' trigger level. Unde...This paper presented a game theoretic model to study the competition for a single investment oppertunity under uncertainty. It models the hazard rate of investment as a function of competitors' trigger level. Under uncertainty and different information structure, the option and game theory was applied to researching the optimal Nash equilibrium strategies of one or more firm. By means of Matlab software, the paper simulates a real estate developing project example and illustrates how parameter affects investment strategies. The paper's work will contribute to the present investment practice in China.展开更多
The effect of verapamil on Ca2+ influx across the myocardial plasma membrane and coxsackie virus B3 ( CVB3)-RNA replication in cultured neonatal rat heart cells infected with CVB3 was investigated. It was found that t...The effect of verapamil on Ca2+ influx across the myocardial plasma membrane and coxsackie virus B3 ( CVB3)-RNA replication in cultured neonatal rat heart cells infected with CVB3 was investigated. It was found that the Ca2+ influx could be inhibited significantly (P<O. 01) by verapamil (1 μmol/L) after infection of heart cells for 48h. However, when the cultured heart cells infected with CVB3 and treated with verapamil (Iμmol/L and 10 nmo/L) at the same time for 48h, the amounts of CVB3-RNA in myocytes were significantly higher than that in infected control group (P<O. 05). These phenomena suggest that the increase of Ca2+ influx of cultured heart cells infected with CVB3 could be inhibited by some calcium antagonists, e. g. verapamil at the early stage. On the other hand, verapamil might accelerate viral replication in myocardium. Thus, although verapamil could be beneficial for decreasing the secondary Ca2+ damages and improve the myocardial electric activity, it isn’t a sensible choice for therapy in early stage of virus infection with cardiac symptoms.展开更多
Quantitative study of the impact of Shanghai World Expo on green GDP （GGDP） is significant for deploying sustainable development policy in China. The formula of GGDP is： GGDP = GDP--the loss of natural resources en...Quantitative study of the impact of Shanghai World Expo on green GDP （GGDP） is significant for deploying sustainable development policy in China. The formula of GGDP is： GGDP = GDP--the loss of natural resources environment relegation cost ＋ comprehensive utilized value of waste. Based on this, the study employed vector autoregressive （VAR） model to predict the value of GGDP and other economic variables on condition that there was no Shanghai World Expo. Then Influence of Expo is defined as the rate of increase of GGDP. The result demonstrated that Shanghai World Expo had accelerated the growth rate of GGDP vastly with the elimination of effect of Beijing Olympics. Additionally, the quantitative analysis between GGDP and other economic variables suggested GGDP would replace GDP to evaluate the development of economy. Finally, the paper proposed that incidents like World Expo can enhance the level of influence for a country and that post-impact of Shanghai Expo should continue to be used to promote GGDP and that GGDP should serve as one of the indicators in assessment of political achievement.展开更多
文摘In order to analyze the effects of different cooperative mechanisms between a mobile device manufacturer and a mobile network operator （ MNO ）, a Stackelberg structure is constructed. The manufacturer acts as a leader, while the MNO acts as a follower, i. e., a traditional retailer. Three cooperative mechanisms are considered： the manufacturer does not invest in developing the propriety function and software to support the infrastructure capacity of the MNO; the manufacturer invests in the development; the MNO offers a subsidy to encourage the manufacturer to invest in development. The results reveal that investing in the development can increase the profits of both the manufacturer and the MNO. Furthermore, if the MNO shares certain investment costs with the manufacturer, the MNO may charge higher prices of mobile connection services and mobile value-added services, and the profits of the two players may be enhanced.
文摘Characteristics of knowledge exchanging behavior among individual agents in a knowledge dynamic interaction system are studied by using the game theory. An analytic model of evolutionary game of continuous dynamic knowledge interaction behavior is founded based on the structure of the evolutionary game chain. Possible evolution trends of the model are discussed. Finally, evolutionary stable strategies （ESSs） of knowledge transactions among individual agents in the knowledge network are identified by simulation data. Stable charicteristics of ESS in a continuous knowledge exchanging team help employee to communicate and grasp the dynamic regulation of shared knowledge.
文摘This paper first gives an explanation of moral hazard in the insurance field,and then offers a game theory model about insurance pricing according to the non zero sum game analysis between the insurer and the insured when moral hazard exists.On the basis of the game analysis,this paper also presents a lowest pricing formula and studies the cost of moral hazard simultaneously.
基金The National Key Technology R&D Program of China during the11th Five-Year Plan Period(No.2006BAH02A06).
文摘The collector managed inventory(CMI)management idea is introduced based on the comparison of manufacturer and third-party logistics(3PL)implementing vendor managed inventory(VMI)services.Considering recovery costs,the service pricing strategies for 3PL corporations implementing VMI are studied to meet two conditions of participation constraints and incentive-compatibility constraints.The numerical simulation results indicate that the supply chain partners' profits change after considering recovery costs,and the 3PL corporation's profits and the total profits increase first,and then decrease.The retailers' and manufacturers' profits also increase.The total profits of the supply chain have a characteristic of increasing first and then decreasing with the increase of the callback ratio of unsold products.The concrete extremum point is codetermined by price flexibility,service pricing of the 3PL corporation,callback price and callback ratio.
基金The National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.71371050)
文摘A two-period model is developed to investigate the competitive effects of targeted advertising with imperfect targeting in a duopolistic market. In the first period, two firms compete in price in order to recognize customers. In the second period, targeted advertising plays an informative role and acts as a price discrimination device. The firms＇ optimal advertising and pricing strategies under imperfect targeting are compared with those under perfect targeting. Equilibrium decisions show that, under imperfect targeting, when the advertising cost is low enough, both firms will choose to target ads at the rivals＇ old segments. This equilibrium, which could not exist under perfect targeting, results in two opposite results. When cost is high, the effect of mis-targeting will soften price competition and increase profits; on the contrary, when cost is low enough, it will lead to aggressive price competition and profit loss with the increase of imperfect targeting, so firms may have incentives to reduce the mis- targeting degree.
基金Project (No. 05JA630052) supported by the Literature and Social Science Foundation of Ministry of Education of China
文摘Strategic alliance has suffered much instabilities since its first implementation. Scholars have carried out many em- bedded, precise and comprehensive researches from both theory and empiricism. Here we try to find certain stable solutions by employing game theory, in an attempt to construct theoretical bases for strategic alliance, which people called “one of the most important organizational innovation in the end of the 20th century” (Shi, 2001), to exploit its advantages in the process of glob- alization. Finally, this article puts forward some advices for its success.
基金Project(61201143)supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China
文摘In non-dedicated cooperative relay networks, each node is autonomous and selfish in nature, and thus spontaneous cooperation among nodes is challenged. To stimulate the selfish node to participate in cooperation, a pricing-based cooperation engine using game theory was designed. Firstly, the feasible regions of the charge price and reimbursement price were deduced. Then, the non-cooperative and cooperative games were adopted to analyze the amount of bandwidth that initiating cooperation node(ICN) forwards data through participating cooperation node(PCN) and the amount of bandwidth that PCN helps ICN to relay data. Meanwhile, the Nash equilibrium solutions of cooperation bandwidth allocations(CBAs) were obtained through geometrical interpretation. Secondly, a pricing-based cooperation engine was proposed and a cooperative communication system model with cooperation engines was depicted. Finally, an algorithm based on game theory was proposed to realize the cooperation engine. The simulation results demonstrate that, compared with the system without pricing-based incentive, the proposed system can significantly improve the ICN's metric measured by bit-per-Joule and increase the PCN's revenue.
文摘This paper presented a game theoretic model to study the competition for a single investment oppertunity under uncertainty. It models the hazard rate of investment as a function of competitors' trigger level. Under uncertainty and different information structure, the option and game theory was applied to researching the optimal Nash equilibrium strategies of one or more firm. By means of Matlab software, the paper simulates a real estate developing project example and illustrates how parameter affects investment strategies. The paper's work will contribute to the present investment practice in China.
文摘The effect of verapamil on Ca2+ influx across the myocardial plasma membrane and coxsackie virus B3 ( CVB3)-RNA replication in cultured neonatal rat heart cells infected with CVB3 was investigated. It was found that the Ca2+ influx could be inhibited significantly (P<O. 01) by verapamil (1 μmol/L) after infection of heart cells for 48h. However, when the cultured heart cells infected with CVB3 and treated with verapamil (Iμmol/L and 10 nmo/L) at the same time for 48h, the amounts of CVB3-RNA in myocytes were significantly higher than that in infected control group (P<O. 05). These phenomena suggest that the increase of Ca2+ influx of cultured heart cells infected with CVB3 could be inhibited by some calcium antagonists, e. g. verapamil at the early stage. On the other hand, verapamil might accelerate viral replication in myocardium. Thus, although verapamil could be beneficial for decreasing the secondary Ca2+ damages and improve the myocardial electric activity, it isn’t a sensible choice for therapy in early stage of virus infection with cardiac symptoms.
文摘Quantitative study of the impact of Shanghai World Expo on green GDP （GGDP） is significant for deploying sustainable development policy in China. The formula of GGDP is： GGDP = GDP--the loss of natural resources environment relegation cost ＋ comprehensive utilized value of waste. Based on this, the study employed vector autoregressive （VAR） model to predict the value of GGDP and other economic variables on condition that there was no Shanghai World Expo. Then Influence of Expo is defined as the rate of increase of GGDP. The result demonstrated that Shanghai World Expo had accelerated the growth rate of GGDP vastly with the elimination of effect of Beijing Olympics. Additionally, the quantitative analysis between GGDP and other economic variables suggested GGDP would replace GDP to evaluate the development of economy. Finally, the paper proposed that incidents like World Expo can enhance the level of influence for a country and that post-impact of Shanghai Expo should continue to be used to promote GGDP and that GGDP should serve as one of the indicators in assessment of political achievement.
