Objectives:This study aimed to explore the preferences and influencing factors of self-management behaviors in patients with recurrent gout and provide a theoretical basis for developing targeted strategies to improve...Objectives:This study aimed to explore the preferences and influencing factors of self-management behaviors in patients with recurrent gout and provide a theoretical basis for developing targeted strategies to improve self-management preferences.Methods:A total of 10 patients with recurrent gout were recruited from the gout specialist outpatient clinic at a tertiary hospital in Shenyang,Liaoning Province,China.Semi-structured interviews were conducted with these patients,and the Kawakita Jiro(KJ)method was used to analyze the interview data.Results:After four rounds of screening by five researchers,35 codes were selected from an initial 132.After three rounds of discussion and induction,the KJ method identified seven domains of selfmanagement behavior preferences in patients with recurrent gout:1)extensive knowledge of gout,yet difficulty in distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate information;2)a passive attitude of“no pain,no management”;3)the challenge of changing entrenched daily habits;4)the optimistic but unrealistic belief of“self-delusion”;5)a tendency to seek medical attention late due to hopelessness of cure and familiarity with recurrences;6)preference for analgesics for gout recurrences while neglecting long-term urate-lowering therapy(ULT);and 7)gout-related stigma.Conclusion:The results of this study showed that the self-management behavior of patients with recurrent gout could be improved,especially in the aspects of medical seeking behavior,medication compliance,daily management and emotional management.At the same time,we found that gout stigma,difficulty in distinguishing true and false knowledge of gout and negative attitude of“ignoring pain”were significantly associated with self-management behavior.展开更多
A model of continuous-time insider trading in which a risk-neutral in-sider possesses two imperfect correlated signals of a risky asset is studied.By conditional expectation theory and filtering theory,we first establ...A model of continuous-time insider trading in which a risk-neutral in-sider possesses two imperfect correlated signals of a risky asset is studied.By conditional expectation theory and filtering theory,we first establish three lemmas:normal corre-lation,equivalent pricing and equivalent profit,which can guarantee to turn our model into a model with insider knowing full information.Then we investigate the impact of the two correlated signals on the market equilibrium consisting of optimal insider trading strategy and semi-strong pricing rule.It shows that in the equilibrium,(1)the market depth is constant over time;(2)if the two noisy signals are not linerly correlated,then all private information of the insider is incorporated into prices in the end while the whole information on the asset value can not incorporated into prices in the end;(3)if the two noisy signals are linear correlated such that the insider can infer the whole information of the asset value,then our model turns into a model with insider knowing full information;(4)if the two noisy signals are the same then the total ex ant profit of the insider is increasing with the noise decreasing,while down to O as the noise going up to infinity;(5)if the two noisy signals are not linear correlated then with one noisy signal fixed,the total ex ante profit of the insider is single-peaked with a unique minimum with respect to the other noisy signal value,and furthermore as the noisy value going to O it gets its maximum,the profit in the case that the real value is observed.展开更多
文摘Objectives:This study aimed to explore the preferences and influencing factors of self-management behaviors in patients with recurrent gout and provide a theoretical basis for developing targeted strategies to improve self-management preferences.Methods:A total of 10 patients with recurrent gout were recruited from the gout specialist outpatient clinic at a tertiary hospital in Shenyang,Liaoning Province,China.Semi-structured interviews were conducted with these patients,and the Kawakita Jiro(KJ)method was used to analyze the interview data.Results:After four rounds of screening by five researchers,35 codes were selected from an initial 132.After three rounds of discussion and induction,the KJ method identified seven domains of selfmanagement behavior preferences in patients with recurrent gout:1)extensive knowledge of gout,yet difficulty in distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate information;2)a passive attitude of“no pain,no management”;3)the challenge of changing entrenched daily habits;4)the optimistic but unrealistic belief of“self-delusion”;5)a tendency to seek medical attention late due to hopelessness of cure and familiarity with recurrences;6)preference for analgesics for gout recurrences while neglecting long-term urate-lowering therapy(ULT);and 7)gout-related stigma.Conclusion:The results of this study showed that the self-management behavior of patients with recurrent gout could be improved,especially in the aspects of medical seeking behavior,medication compliance,daily management and emotional management.At the same time,we found that gout stigma,difficulty in distinguishing true and false knowledge of gout and negative attitude of“ignoring pain”were significantly associated with self-management behavior.
文摘A model of continuous-time insider trading in which a risk-neutral in-sider possesses two imperfect correlated signals of a risky asset is studied.By conditional expectation theory and filtering theory,we first establish three lemmas:normal corre-lation,equivalent pricing and equivalent profit,which can guarantee to turn our model into a model with insider knowing full information.Then we investigate the impact of the two correlated signals on the market equilibrium consisting of optimal insider trading strategy and semi-strong pricing rule.It shows that in the equilibrium,(1)the market depth is constant over time;(2)if the two noisy signals are not linerly correlated,then all private information of the insider is incorporated into prices in the end while the whole information on the asset value can not incorporated into prices in the end;(3)if the two noisy signals are linear correlated such that the insider can infer the whole information of the asset value,then our model turns into a model with insider knowing full information;(4)if the two noisy signals are the same then the total ex ant profit of the insider is increasing with the noise decreasing,while down to O as the noise going up to infinity;(5)if the two noisy signals are not linear correlated then with one noisy signal fixed,the total ex ante profit of the insider is single-peaked with a unique minimum with respect to the other noisy signal value,and furthermore as the noisy value going to O it gets its maximum,the profit in the case that the real value is observed.
