Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank,as both the firm's credit risk and information risk increase after punishment By focusing on Chin...Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank,as both the firm's credit risk and information risk increase after punishment By focusing on Chinese firms'borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud,we find that firms'bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower,but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms.In addition,loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before,but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts.In addition,we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the"performance-bank loan"relationship.Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm's ability to source debt financing,which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.展开更多
This paper examines how independent directors’social capital,as measured by their social network,affects corporate fraud.We find that firms with wellconnected independent directors are less likely to commit fraud,sup...This paper examines how independent directors’social capital,as measured by their social network,affects corporate fraud.We find that firms with wellconnected independent directors are less likely to commit fraud,supporting our monitoring effect hypothesis.This result is robust to a battery of tests.Further analyses show that the effect is stronger for firms with a relatively poor legal environment,for firms whose independent directors face strong reputation incentives and when independent directors are audit committee members.Moreover,we explore a potential economic mechanism of the effect and observe that well-connected independent directors are associated with less absenteeism and more dissension.Overall,our findings suggest that independent directors’social capital plays an important role in corporate governance.展开更多
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Project No.70772017)Scholarship Award for Excellent Doctoral Student granted by Ministry of Education+1 种基金grants from the Beijing Municipal Commission of Education"Joint Construction Project"the"Project 211"(Phase-3)Fund of the Central University of Finance and Economics,China
文摘Receiving punishment from regulators for corporate fraud can affect financing contracts between a firm and its bank,as both the firm's credit risk and information risk increase after punishment By focusing on Chinese firms'borrowing behavior after events of corporate fraud,we find that firms'bank loans after punishment are not only significantly lower,but are also less than those for non-fraudulent firms.In addition,loan interest rates after punishment are not only higher than before,but also higher than those for their non-fraudulent counterparts.In addition,we find that corporate fraud indirectly destabilizes the"performance-bank loan"relationship.Our results suggest that corporate fraud negatively affects a firm's ability to source debt financing,which provides new evidence about the economic consequences of fraud.
文摘This paper examines how independent directors’social capital,as measured by their social network,affects corporate fraud.We find that firms with wellconnected independent directors are less likely to commit fraud,supporting our monitoring effect hypothesis.This result is robust to a battery of tests.Further analyses show that the effect is stronger for firms with a relatively poor legal environment,for firms whose independent directors face strong reputation incentives and when independent directors are audit committee members.Moreover,we explore a potential economic mechanism of the effect and observe that well-connected independent directors are associated with less absenteeism and more dissension.Overall,our findings suggest that independent directors’social capital plays an important role in corporate governance.
