Supply Chain Network Equilibrium with Revenue Sharing Contract under Demand Disruptions

Contract is a common and effective mechanism for supply chain coordination,which has been studied extensively in recent years.For a supply chain network model,contracts can be used to coordinate it because it is too ideal to obtain the network equilibrium state in practical market competition.In order to achieve equilibrium,we introduce revenue sharing contract into a supply chain network equilibrium model with random demand in this paper.Then,we investigate the influence on this network equilibrium state from demand disruptions caused by unexpected emergencies.When demand disruptions happen,the supply chain network equilibrium state will be broken and change to a new one,so the decision makers need to adjust the contract parameters to achieve the new coordinated state through bargaining.Finally,a numerical example with a sudden demand increase as a result of emergent event is provided for illustrative purposes.

Research on two-part revenue-sharing contract under demand disruption

Assuming that the realized demand is determined by the inventory level,a two-part revenue sharing contract of one supplier and one retailer is analyzed under the circumstance of demand disruption(the disruption cost occurs at the supplier).Based on the centralized optimization,the profits of the two members are maximized in sequential optimization though a two-part revenue-sharing contract.The result shows that when the demand disruption occurs,if the degree of disruption is within some range,the ordering and manufacturing plans need not be changed,while only the revenue sharing fraction for the retailer should be diminished;if not,both the plan and the revenue sharing fraction should be changed for the possible coordination of the supply chain.Finally,numerical illustrations of the contract for various scenarios are given.

Optimal strategies of automakers with demand and credit price disruptions under the dual-credit policy

In this paper,a production and pricing decision model for automakers under the dual-credit policy is formulated.Then,with consideration of demand and credit price disruptions,a nonlinear programming model that maximizes automakers’profit and constrains the production of fuel vehicles(FVs)and new energy vehicles(NEVs)is investigated.Furthermore,four strategies that involve adjusting the production or price of FVs and NEVs are proposed,and four optimal solutions for each strategy are obtained.Finally,16 scenarios are comprehensively analyzed,and a case study involving demand and credit price disruptions is conducted.The results show that the dual-credit policy has a positive impact on the development of NEVs,especially in early stages of NEV development.The FV credit coefficient has a significantly positive impact on the probability of automakers adopting adjustment strategies,while the NEV credit coefficient has almost no such impact.Moreover,automakers are inclined to adjust the prices of NEVs or the production of FVs to cope with demand and credit price disruptions.