New Restructuring Model for Chinese M&S SOEs:A Case of Executive Holding Major Capital Stock

The reform for Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)during the past twenty years selected several ways which couldn't solve essential problems and improve the performance of the SOEs in China. The reason is that traditional ownership instituton wasn't changed at all,the institution reach an impasse in market system which resulted in the fact that SOEs couldn't get used to keen competition. This paper analyses an ownership restructuring case in which an executive holds major capital stock in a state textile institute restructured and therefore the state ownership was withdrawn from it completely, it expounds the rationality of the model selected and points out that the model is currently a very effective way by which M & S SOEs would withdraw from competitive business field successfully.

China’s Central SOEs’ Corporate Social Responsibility Performance under the BRI

How are central SOEs driven by external context and internal value chain to perform their corporate social responsibility(CSR)?What is the relationship between various types of CSR?This paper divides CSR into strategic and responsive CSR,and uses case studies to discuss how central SOEs should fulfill their CSR commitments under the Belt and Road Initiative(BRI).This paper finds that under the BRI,China’s central SOEs face a host of challenges in their cross-border operations with respect to the legal environment,political risks,workforce competence,and supports to industries in host countries,and extend the value chain through industrial chain integration.All the above internal and external attributes may drive central SOEs to perform their strategic and responsive CSR initiatives,and responsive CSR could also reinforce strategic CSR initiatives.Finally,this study offers advice on how Chinese companies should perform CSR under the BRI.

Analysis on auditing problems in SOEs joint share system reform

At the present stage of the SOEs joint share system reform, the problem of distorted accounting information, the failed financial audit and the ensuing erosion of the state： Owned assets, have severely impeded the process of the SOEs reform. This paper conducts an in-depth analysis on auditing problems in the process of the SOEs reform from managerial points of view, makes the suggestion that we should introduce governmental audit into the auditing supervision of the SOEs reform, and discusses its methods, approaches, contents and procedures in detail. This paper also indicates the possible obstacles of implementing this suggestion.

Central SOEs and State-owned Assets Management System Witness Great Reform&Development

Since the beginning of 2005, the central SOEs (state-owned enterprises) earnestly carried out and put into effect various strategies and policies as well as work plans of the Central Committee of the Party and the State Council.They kept forging ahead and carved out in an innovative spirit, and made great achievements worth celebrating in their various work.Both sales revenue and total profits of the central SOEs have been growing rapidly and synchronously, and the quality of the stateowned assets have been further improved and appeared a good momentum.……

SOEs to Face Market Competition

ACCORDING to an Economic Information Daily report on January 11, notable progress has been made in this classification process, which will be made public in the near future. A corresponding assessment scheme has also been formulated, Consequently, mixed ownership reform based on SOE classification will be accelerated.

How ＂New SOEs＂ Come of Age： Four Decades of China＇s SOE Reform

China＇s complex and twisted journey of SOE reform over the past four decades is an unprecedented transformation in its history and is at the center stage of its economic reforms. Over the past four decades, SOEs transitioned from being affiliates of a planned economy to ＂new SOEs＂ as modern enterprises under the market economic system. This journey can be roughly divided into the following four stages： the reform to expand SOE autonomy during 1978-1993, the reform to create a modern enterprise system during 1993- 2003, the reform to create a new system for the administration of state assets during 2003- 2013, and the new era of classified SOE reform since 2013. After the four stages, China＇s SOE reform has made tremendous achievements, particularly since the 18th CPC National Congress. V~th policy readiness for SOE reform in the new era, reform should be carried out in a comprehensive and systematic manner for different types of SOEs in the future.

SOEs’ performance to be evaluated by profitability and social contributions

The global financial crisis has brought stateowned enterprises (SOEs) into the spotlight. Even Western countries like the U.S. have been forced to take some measures of nationalization, a departure

SOEs urged not to profit by crowding out private economy

Hu Deping,68,is the oldest son of Hu Yaobang,a late Party secretary general. His name has recently appeared in the press not because of his father’s reputation but for his own

Effective Incentive and Discipline Mechanisms for Top manage-ment in SOEs

Key to energize State-Owned-Enterprises (hereinafter SOEs) is to set up effective incentive and discipline mechanisms. First of all, the paper analyses the problems existing in the current incentive and discipline mechanism system in SOEs, including low transparency income and considerable covert income, insider control,corporate governance nominalization and so on; next,the paper explores the causes behind these problems,such as incomplete corporate governance and imperfect market mechanism; finally, the paper proposes a series of solutions from the aspects of incentive mechanism and discipline mechanism.

The Claim that “SOEs Are Inefficient” Is Unfounded

This paper paints out that historical factors and ’high withdrawal barriers’ are to blame for some low indices of SOEs.Supposing SOEs can withdraw freely as non.SOEs do,their indices will not necessarily be lower than the non-SOEs.If we take into account the input of the current period,the efficiency of SOEs is actually higher than that of non-SOEs.The author concludes that the notion that"SOEs are inefficient"is ungrounded and instead that historical factors and ’high withdrawal barriers’ are to blame for some low indices of SOEs.

The Steel Backbone of China’s SOEs

ANSTEEL,one of the largest iron and steel producers in China,is a pioneer of high-quality development of China’s iron and steel industry,a spearhead of the rejuvenation of old industrial bases in the country’s northeastern provinces,and a pacesetter in the reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs).

Free cash flow productivity among Chinese listed companies:A comparative study of SOEs and non-SOEs

This paper investigates the free cash flow productivity of SOEs compared with non-SOEs and examines its possible determinants.We find that SOEs have slightly weak free cash flow productivity but significantly stronger than non-SOEs.Similar performance exists among commercial class I and II SOEs and public-benefit SOEs.Further analyses suggest that firm size,age,sales growth,ownership concentration,government subsidies,and industry monopoly factors cannot explain this phenomenon.The common driver for all types of SOEs to generate stronger free cash flows than non-SOEs is their stronger expense control capability.

‘Partly'globalized networks and driving mechanism in resource-based state-owned enterprises:A case study of J Group

In the context of economic globalization,while multinational enterprises from developed countries occupy a high-end position in the global value chain,enterprises from developing countries are often marginalized in the world market.In China,resource-based state-owned enterprises(SOEs)are tasked with the mission of safeguarding resource security,and their internationalization development ideas and strategic deployment are significantly and fundamentally different from those of other non-state-owned enterprises and large multinational corporations.This study provides ideas for the globalization policies of enterprises in developing countries.We consider J Group in western China as a case and discuss its productive investment and global production network development from 2010 to 2019.We found that J Group was‘Partly'globalized,and there are multiple core nodes with the characteristics of centralized and decentralized coexistence in the production network;in addition,the overall layout centre shifted to Southeast Asia and China;however,its global production was restricted by the enterprise's investment security considerations,support and restrictions of the home country,political security risk of the host country,and sanctions from the West.These findings provide insights for future research:under the wave of anti-globalization and'internal circulation as the main body',resource SOEs should consider the potential risk of investment,especially keeping the middle and downstream industrial chain in China as much as possible.

基于AUKF的可穿戴式设备用锂离子电池SOE在线估计方法

可穿戴式设备(wearable devices,WDs)体积小、工作时间长,在工业监测等领域应用越来越广泛。锂离子电池为WD上电子设备提供能量,其准确的能量状态(state of energy,SOE)在线估算对WDs的电源实时管理与延长设备寿命有重要影响。传统的基于模型的估算方法需要离线获取SOE与开路电压(open circuit voltage,OCV)的关系,实验时间长,不能适应实际工况变化,难以在线实施,本工作提出一种基于开路电压(opencircuit voltage,OCV)在线辨识的可穿戴式设备用锂离子电池SOE在线估算方法。首先基于锂离子电池的一阶RC模型,采用带遗忘因子的递推最小二乘法(forgetting factor recursive least squares,FFRLS)在线辨识电池OCV等参数。分析了WDs运行负载变化特征,构建了WD运行工况和参数辨识工况,并开展锂离子电池实验。结合WDs工作负载特性,研究了开路电压和端电压的关系,在线获得OCV与SOE的关系曲线。采用无迹卡尔曼滤波(adaptive unscented Kalman filter,AUKF)算法实现SOE的在线估计,与传统通过离线实验获得OCVSOE关系的方法进行了对比。研究结果表明,所提的SOE在线估算方法具有较好的精度,并在不同的SOE初始值时具有较好的鲁棒性。

Tracing back to the source: Understanding the corporate governance of boards of directors in Chinese SOEs

Based on the relevant theories of corporate governance and the special institutional background of Chinese state-owned enterprises(SOEs),this paper systematically reviews the literature on the independence and governance effect of SOE boards.We find that the governance effect of SOE boards is driven by the dual characteristics of SOEs:state involvement in ownership and market incentives.With the state involved in ownership,SOEs adhere to the leadership of the Communist Party of China(CPC),which results in an enhanced governance effect.Under market incentives,SOEs tend to have an optimal board structure that helps mitigate both the shareholder–management agency problem(Type I agency problem)and the controlling shareholder–minority shareholder agency problem(Type II agency problem).In terms of the governance effect of boards,directors appointed by non-controlling shareholders are effective in alleviating Type I and Type II agency problems,and this highlights the importance of mixed-ownership reforms in SOEs.Independent directors,especially those with a professional background,also play a role in improving corporate governance.However,independent directors in SOEs have relatively weak incentives to monitor,which limits their governance effect.This paper shows positive implications for promoting mixed-ownership reforms and improving board governance in SOEs.

和利时SOE超时报警因素简析

和利时DCS控制系统SOE是向双网全好的最小号控制站校时,机组正常运行期间部分SOE模块存在超时报警,在没有其他厂任何经验可以借鉴的前提下,工作人员通过对主从历史站切换、重启、下装、生效,控制器和通讯卡主从切换,交换机断电重启等现场大量测试验证,最终找到SOE模块超时报警的影响因素。

基于H_(inf)的并联混合动力汽车控制策略研究

介绍了一种用于并联混合动力电动汽车(Parallel Hybrid Electric Vehicle,PHEV)能量管理策略开发的鲁棒Hinf算法,该方法用于确定发动机和电池之间的功率分配比,并将电池的能量状态保持在合理的范围内,防止电池出现故障。首先阐述了由发动机部分、电动机部分和电池部分组成的系统模型(采用等效电路模型);然后阐述了考虑电池故障和控制信号限制的控制系统结构;最后推导出了控制器,并对特定PHEV进行了仿真。

提高计算机监控系统上送开关量信号稳定性的实践

水电站计算机监控系统用于实现厂内各系统运行监视、状态控制、数据采集、数据处理、事件记录等功能,是电站极为重要的系统之一,同时计算机监控系统负责将各采集信息及控制功能上送至集控中心、电网调度,以实现远程监视及控制。随着“无人值班、少人值守”运行理念的推广实施,计算机监控系统上送信号的稳定变得尤为重要。通过对电站一次开关量信号误报及漏送事件进行分析,解决了站内计算机监控系统的固有漏洞,总结了提高开关量稳定性的方法。

Putting a Lid on Costly SOEs

Cuts and closures are in store for state-owned enterprises that continuously recordde ficits while China tries to improve the sector’s risk-control