China＇s High-Speed Railway Industry and Applicability of the Anti-Monopoly Law

China＇s high-speed railway industry achieved dazzling development over the years, but not much research has been devoted to this industry from the perspeetive of competition policy. This paper focuses on the industrial organization of China＇s high-speed railway industry and the applicability of the Anti-Monopoly Law. We intend to answer the following questions： （l） Why is the high-speed railway industry not an industry of natural monopoly？ Which segments of the industry have elements of natural monopoly？ （2） At the level of corporate organization, what is the legal and economic rationale behind the patterns of China＇s high-speed railway undertakings evolving from government-affiliated enterprises to special legal person enterprises and then shareholding companies？ （3） The applicability of the Anti-Monopoly Law to the high-speed railway industry. Our conclusions from the perspective of competition policy are worth referencing for similar industries such as electric power, telecommunications, and water and gas supply.

China's anti-monopoly system lacks internal coordination

The implementation mechanism of China’s anti-monopoly system features a double-layered model, where anenforcement framework supports an anti-monopoly committee.This is an advisable choice based on variousconsiderations like realities in China and experiences abroad.However, this implementation mechanism is not immunefrom defects and problems, which mainly are reflected as follows: the legal basis for anti-monopoly actions needs tobe improved and coordinated, and anti-monopoly entities need to coordinate with one another and enhance theircompetency.A stronger and better anti-monopoly implementation mechanism will help to promote China’s socialistmarket economic system.

China＇s Choice of Analytical Models for Its Anti-Monopoly Law

Modem analytical models for anti-monopoly laws are a core element of the application of those laws. Since the Anti-Monopoly Law of the People＇s Republic of China was promulgated in 2008, law enforcement and judicial authorities have applied different analytical models, leading to divergent legal and regulatory outcomes as similar cases receive different verdicts. To select a suitable analytical model for China＇s Anti-Monopoly Law, we need to consider the possible contribution of both economic analysis and legal formalism and to learn from the mature systems and experience of foreign countries. It is also necessary to take into account such binding constraints as the current composition of China＇s anti-monopoly legal system, the ability of implementing agencies and the supply of economic analysis, in order to ensure complementarity between the analytical model chosen and the complexity of economic analysis and between the professionalism of implementing agencies and the cost of compliance for participants in economic activities. In terms of institutional design, the models should provide a considered explanation of the legislative aims of the law＇s provisions. It is necessary, therefore, to establish a processing model of behavioral classification that is based on China＇s national conditions, applies analytical models using normative comprehensive analysis, makes use of the distribution rule of burden of proof, improves supporting systems related to analytical models and enhances the ability of public authorities to implement the law.

Anti-Monopoly Regulation of Digital Platforms

Characterized as they are by dynamic competition,cross-border operation,the network effect and oligopoly competition,digital platforms present a serious and complex monopoly problem,one that undermines competition,damages consumers’ interests,suppresses the vitality of innovation and hinders high-quality development.They should therefore be brought under stricter anti-monopoly regulation.The traditional regulatory cycle of “stricter regulation brings everything to a standstill;looser regulation brings chaos in its wake” is a chronic problem in China’s market regulation,so the anti-monopoly regulation of digital platforms needs to avoid this regulatory paradox.To address digital platforms’ two-sided markets,dynamic competition and disruptive innovation,we need to create appropriate new theories of anti-monopoly regulation by establishing the principle of positive,inclusive and prudent regulation based on the concept of modesty.In the current context,efforts to strengthen regulation do not lay undue emphasis on tighter regulation and heavier penalties,but rather focus on regulatory transformation and innovation,aiming thereby to effectively improve regulation.Good law is the premise of good governance.It is necessary to speed up the revision of the Anti-Monopoly Law to include provisions for improving digital competition rules in order to provide high-quality regulatory systems.Actively promoting efficient,inclusive and prudent regulation,fair and impartial regulation,collaborative and integrated regulation,incentive-based regulation,credit regulation and intelligent regulation on the basis of good law,along with technology-enabled regulation,is a good governance approach to realizing anti-monopoly platform regulations.

On the Macro Positioning Regarding Anti-Monopoly Considerations Relating to Internet Platform—An Analysis Based on Politics,Policies and Laws

The positioning of anti-monopoly law depends on its unique value,goal and function.From the beginning,anti-monopoly law has had a great political and economic mission,and can become a“super law”with a grand value goal and a powerful function in economic adjustment.The uniqueness of the Internet,in capital,technology and business models,easily allows Internet platforms to grow anarchically,and to have a high correlation with anti-monopoly concerns.Internet anti-monopoly policy should first expand its thinking and elevate its stance in macro value,and seek appropriate legal and economic technical paths.China’s Internet platform anti-monopoly policy cannot simply follow today’s international and superficial trend,which does not contribute to positive experience and may conceal various interests.Instead,China’s Internet platform anti-monopoly policy should actively follow,respect and serve the substantial development interests of China’s digital economy,operating in a timely fashion and at the right location,in ways that are opportune,moderate and modest.It should always be committed to the innovation and development of China’s Internet industry and to international competitiveness.Internet anti-monopoly policy should adhere to the rule of law,build a corresponding rule system,ensure objectivity,neutrality and rationality,and prevent irrationality and over-excitement.

ANTI-MONOPOLY PERSPECTIVES OF CHINESE PUBLIC AIR TRANSPORT MARKET

Chinese public air transport market has been undergoing restructuring and marketization since the reform and opening up, which plays a special and significant role in the social and economic aspects of the state. After the enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law of China in 2008, the issue of effective regulation on the anticompetitive practices of public air transport market has become the focus of the relevant discussions, in which monopoly agreements and concentration of undertakings play a key part. Only thorough understandings of and insights from the competition motives of relevant industry, markets and enterprises based on comprehensive legal controls, can the relevant anti-monopoly legislation and law enforcement be effectively optimized and improved.

China’s Anti-Monopoly Odyssey

A new law facilitates the detection of monopolistic activities, but theregulation’s shortcomings will make its implementation

Anti-Competitive Effects of Discriminatory Licensing for Standards-Essential Patents and Antitrust Policymaking

Antitrust examination of discriminatory patent licensing fees imposed by companies who own standards-essential patents(SEPs) is a difficult issue in antitrust law enforcement. After studying Huawei's litigation against IDC and China's anti-monopoly investigation of Qualcomm, this paper creates a vertical oligopolistic game theory model to demonstrate that discriminatory licensing fees imposed by firms with patent monopoly will lead to the collection of high licensing fees from downstream low-cost firms, weaken their competitive advantage, reduce their output and market share, impede their follow-up innovations, and generally harm the social welfare. Therefore, charging high discriminatory licensing fees constitutes an act that harms competition and should be prohibited by antitrust law. Antitrust examination of discriminatory licensing fees should make assessments primarily on the basis of the FRAND principle. Antitrust examination may adopt a triple-structure method to assess the reasonableness of licensing fees, but antitrust authorities should avoid directly prescribing the level of licensing fees and should safeguard the effectiveness of transaction mechanisms based on free negotiations among micro-level entities. Antitrust remedies should follow the principle of "intervening in the price formation mechanism rather than prescribing the level of licensing fees."

Analysis of monopoly risks in international standardization activities from the perspective of market competition and relevant suggestions

With the development of International SDOs,the relationship between standardization activities and market competition has become closer and more complex.Some International SDOs may restrict enterprises from participating in relevant standardization activities without justifiable reasons,which is contrary to the international consensus on the principles of openness,fairness and transparency in standardization,in which there is a risk of monopoly that excludes and restricts competition.Enterprises can consider defending their legitimate rights and interests through anti-monopoly litigation.A sustainable international standardization ecological environment should be actively created to fundamentally reduce the above-mentioned risks.

RESEARCH ON THEORY, LEGISLATIONS AND PRACTICES ABOUT REGULATING NON-PRACTICING ENTITIES IN CHINA

Abstract Non-Practicing Entities （NPE）, as a subject, is a neutral concept, but the derogatory sense of translation and understanding on this concept and the chaos of understanding make the legal regulation of NPE encounter more difficulties and challenges. In fact, NPE issues are con~,erned, discussed and researched in China within quite a long period, however, it would not become an outstanding legal issue nowadays. NPE as a market entity, its existence is legitimate per se, and what the law should focus on is the unfair conduct that NPE might be engaged in rather than the subject of NPE itself. It is not necessary to make specific articles and provisions on the subject of NPE at present in the Patent Law of the People＇s Republic of China （PRC） and the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the PRC which are revised in China, and a serial of rules and guidelines for Anti-Monopoly Law of the PRC which are formulated in China. It proved that the unfair conducts of NPE should be regulated according to Patent law, Anti-Unfair Competition Law and Anti-Monopoly Law as well as, reconfirmed that the conclusion that the regulation of NPE in China laws focus on conducts rather than subject in a serial of cases such as the anti-monopoly investigation case against INTERDIGITAL Corporation initiated by the National Development and Reform Commission, the case that the Ministry of Commerce imposed restrictive conditions to approve that Microsoft acquired Nokia equipment and service business, and the commercial defamation case that Shenzhen Libang Precision Instrument Co., Ltd vs Shenznen Mairui Divlogivai Meliva Electronic Co,Ltd.which was reviewed by the Supreme People＇s Court.