We investigate an evolutionary snowdrift game on a square N ： L × L lattice with periodic boundary conditions, where a population of no （no ≤ N） players located on the sites of this lattice can either coopera...We investigate an evolutionary snowdrift game on a square N ： L × L lattice with periodic boundary conditions, where a population of no （no ≤ N） players located on the sites of this lattice can either cooperate with or defect from their nearest neighbours. After each generation, every player moves with a certain probability p to one of the player＇s nearest empty sites. It is shown that, when p = 0, the cooperative behaviour can be enhanced in disordered structures. When p 〉 0, the effect of mobility on cooperation remarkably depends on the payoff parameter r and the density of individuals ρ （ρ = no/N）. Compared with the results of p = 0, for small r, the persistence of cooperation is enhanced at not too small values of p; whereas for large r, the introduction of mobility inhibits the emergence of cooperation at any p 〈 1; for the intermediate value of r, the cooperative behaviour is sometimes enhanced and sometimes inhibited, depending on the values of p and p. In particular, the cooperator density can reach its maximum when the values of p and p reach their respective optimal values. In addition, two absorbing states of all cooperators and all defectors can emerge respectively for small and large r in the case of p 〉 0.展开更多
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China （Grant No 10775060）.
文摘We investigate an evolutionary snowdrift game on a square N ： L × L lattice with periodic boundary conditions, where a population of no （no ≤ N） players located on the sites of this lattice can either cooperate with or defect from their nearest neighbours. After each generation, every player moves with a certain probability p to one of the player＇s nearest empty sites. It is shown that, when p = 0, the cooperative behaviour can be enhanced in disordered structures. When p 〉 0, the effect of mobility on cooperation remarkably depends on the payoff parameter r and the density of individuals ρ （ρ = no/N）. Compared with the results of p = 0, for small r, the persistence of cooperation is enhanced at not too small values of p; whereas for large r, the introduction of mobility inhibits the emergence of cooperation at any p 〈 1; for the intermediate value of r, the cooperative behaviour is sometimes enhanced and sometimes inhibited, depending on the values of p and p. In particular, the cooperator density can reach its maximum when the values of p and p reach their respective optimal values. In addition, two absorbing states of all cooperators and all defectors can emerge respectively for small and large r in the case of p 〉 0.
