Impact of Crowdsourcee’s Vertical Fairness Concern on the Crowdsourcing Knowledge Sharing Behavior and Its Incentive Mechanism

This paper examines in detail the impact of the crowdsourcee’s vertical fairness concern on the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism in crowdsourcing communities.The conditions for the establishment of the incentive mechanism are analyzed and the impact of fairness concern sensitivity on expected economic revenues of both sides as well as the crowdsourcing project performance is studied by game theory and computer simulation.The results show that the knowledge sharing incentive mechanism can only be established if the ratio between the performance improvement rate and the private cost reduction rate caused by shared knowledge is within a certain range.The degree of the optimal linear incentives,the private solution efforts,and the improvement of knowledge sharing level are positively correlated with the sensitivity of vertical fairness concern.In the non-incentive mode,the ratio between the performance conversion rate of private solution effort and the performance conversion rate of knowledge sharing effort plays an important role in moderating a crowdsourcing project’s performance.The authors find that the number of participants is either conducive or nonconducive to the improvement of performance.The implementation of knowledge sharing incentive can achieve a win-win situation for both the crowdsourcer and the crowdsourcee.

Pricing Decisions in Dual-Channel Closed-Loop Supply Chain Under Retailer’s Risk Aversion and Fairness Concerns

This paper studies the price decisions in a dual-channel closed-loop supply chain with a risk-averse retailer and a risk-neutral manufacturer by modeling and analyzing three cases:(1)the retailer does not have fairness concerns;(2)the retailer has fairness concerns and the manufacturer considers it;and(3)the retailer has fairness concerns and the manufacturer does not consider it.The effects of risk aversion and fairness concerns on the pricing decisions,profits and demand are examined in differing scenarios.

Ordering policies and coordination in a twoechelon supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns

This paper investigates the ordering policies of two competitive retailers,and the coordination status of a two-echelon supply chain by considering the fairness concerns of channel members.We consider that two retailers compete with each other over price,where overstock and shortage are allowed.We assume that the demand is stochastic and considered with additive form.First,based on the Nash bargaining fairness reference point,we obtain the optimal decisions of the fairness-concerned channel members in both the centralized and the decentralized cases using a two-stage game theory.Secondly,we analyze the coordination status of the supply chain with Nash bargaining fairness concerns using ideas of optimization.Finally,numerical experiments are used to illustrate the influence of some parameters,the fairness-concerned behavioral preference of the channel members on the optimal decisions and the coordination status of supply chain.Some managerial insights are obtained.

Group Buying of Competing Retailers with Fairness Concerns

The fairness concern behavior is particularly common among members in supply chain framework.The downstream retailers often compare their profits with those of the other members in the supply chain,especially that of the supplier,and do not like the unfavorable distribution of the total profits.This work considers a supply chain consisting of a supplier and two competing retailers with fairness concerns.The supplier offers a wholesale contract with quantity discount,and the two competing retailers have the options of individual purchasing and group buying.Through a Stackelberg game model,the optimal decisions for the players are obtained for the group buying and the individual purchasing strategies.The results indicate that the supplier benefits more than the retailers from the group buying strategy.In particular,the group buying strategy gives the supplier a higher profit if the operational cost of group buying is below a threshold.Furthermore,the fairness concern behavior of the retailers does not always hurt the profit of the supplier.Specifically,the supplier will benefit from the fairness concern behavior of the retailers in individual purchasing when the retailers operates in a relatively poor environment.Finally,market competition between the two fairness concerned retailers does not always benefit the supplier.Fierce competition between the fairness concerned retailers reduces the supplier's profit if the group buying strategy is used when the retailers operates in a relatively poor environment.

Recycling decision,fairness concern and coordination mechanism in EC-CLSC

Taking the e-commerce platform’s fairness concern into account,three decision-making models of e-commerce closed-loop supply chain are constructed.Then,the recycling decisions under three models are studied and the impact of fairness concern is analysed.The‘effort costs sharing contract’is proposed to realise the coordination of the supply chain.Finally,the conclusions are verified by numerical analysis.The results show that the e-commerce platform’s fairness concern reduces own profit and the remanufacturer’s profit,and decreases system efficiency.The‘effort costs sharing contract’can realise the centralised model where recycling price of waste products is the highest,commission is the lowest,and system profit is the highest.In the coordinated system,the higher the proportion of remanufacturer sharing effort costs,the higher the profit of remanufacturer.

Cooperative mechanism on a three-echelon supply chain with remanufacturing outsourcing

This paper studies the cooperative mechanism for a three-echelon supply chain with remanufacturing outsourcing comparing a supplier,a manufacturer,and a third-party remanufacturer,wherein we take the relative fairness concerns into consideration.The Stackelberg game theory is introduced to analyze the best values for the supply chain and each member.Nash bargaining solution is used as the relative fairness-concerned reference to discuss the corresponding optimal solutions of these models.By determining and comparing the equilibrium solutions across the five models,we discover that given the Nash bargaining fairness-concerned behavior,the system profits in the completely decentralized and three cooperative scenarios are lower than they are for products in the completely centralized decision model.The results show that in the centralized channel,the optimal profit and market demand in the three-echelon supply chain are maximized.Furthermore,it turns out that a cooperative mechanism can bring great benefits to its performance.