Incentive-compatible and budget balanced AGV mechanism for peer-to-peer energy trading in smart grids

Peer-to-peer(P2P)energy trading refers to a type of decentralized transaction,where the energy from distributed energy resources is directly traded between peers.A key challenge in peer-to-peer energy trading is designing a safe,efficient,and transparent trading model and operating mechanism.In this study,we consider a P2P trading environment based on blockchain technology,where prosumers can submit bids or offers without knowing the reports of others.We propose an Arrow-d’Aspremont-Gerard-Varet(AGV)-based mechanism to encourage prosumers to submit their real reserve price and determine the P2P transaction price.We demonstrate that the AGV mechanism can achieve Bayesian incentive compatibility and budget balance.Kernel density estimation(KDE)is used to derive the prior distribution from the historical bid/offer information of the agents.Case studies are carried out to analyze and evaluate the proposed mechanism.Simulation results verify the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism in guiding agents to report the true reserve price while maximizing social welfare.Moreover,we discuss the advantages of budget balance for decentralized trading by comparing the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves(VCG)and AGV mechanisms.

UNIFORM-PRICE AUCTION FOR BANDWIDTH ALLOCATION IN THE INTERNET

It has been widely accepted that auctioning which is the pricing approach with minimal information requirement is a proper tool to manage scare network resources. Previous works focus on Vickrey auction which is incentive compatible in classic auction theory. In the beginning of this letter, the faults of the most representative auction-based mechanisms are discussed. And then a new method called Uniform-Price Auction (UPA), which has the simplest auction rule is proposed and its incentive compatibility in the network environment is also proved. Finally, the basic mode is extended to support applications which require minimum bandwidth guarantees for a given time period by introducing derivative market, and a market mechanism for network resource allocation which is predictable, riskless, and simple for end-users is completed.

Optimization of Supplier Switching with Asymmetric Information

The buyer-supplier relationship plays a great role in most economic systems. The buying firm usually tries to find a new supplier who provides products with satisfying quality and lower price. A broad branch of literature deals with the development of buyer-supplier relationships, but limited research is on the circumstances under which a buyer should terminate such a relationship and switch to a new supplier. In this paper, the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) which induces the entrant supplier to report his true cost is considered, and the participation constraint (PC) which ensures the entrant supplier to get at least reservation profit is taken into account. Then the supplier switching model is set up to minimize the buying firm's total procurement cost which includes the transfer payment to the incumbent supplier, the payment to the entrant supplier and the switching cost, and the buying firm's switching cost is considered as a function of the switching quantity. With the theoretical analysis of IC, PC and the proposed model, the optimal supplier switching strategy can be obtained. Finally, a numerical example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed model and the switching strategy.

OPTIMAL AND INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE PRICING FOR HETEROGENEOUS PERIODS

This paper studies a service firm whose business time can be divided into several periods, each providing different value to customers. Heterogeneous service is a major reason resulting in imbalances between supply and demand. Since customers differ in their degree of impatience, firrns can use differential pricing mechanisms to optimize their objectives and match supply with demand in each period, by inducing customers to choose different periods. We study two types of firrns, an internal firm, the objective of which is to maximize the system＇s （including the f＇nan and all the customers） total net value, and a commercial firm, which aims to optimize its own profit. Though impatience factors are customers＇ private information, for each type of firm, we derive the optimal incentive compatible pricing policy, under which all the coming customers will follow the firm＇s assignment, that is, patient customers will buy the service in high-value periods, but their waiting time will be longer, while impatient customers will enter into the low-value periods, but they will be compensated by shorter waiting times. Furthermore, in the internal firm, we also prove that this mechanism enables the decentralization of decisions, while maintaining centralized system-wide optimality. Numerical analysis shows that when there is sufficient capacity, the internal firm does not always need to set lower prices than the commercial firm in every period.

Hukou System Reform and Unification of Rural-urban Social Welfare

Using apolitical economy analytical framework, the present paper examines the hukou system reform in China. The potential unification of the social welfare system of rural and urban areas is discussed. The paper reviews the progress ofhukou system reform since 2004. It is suggested that since China met its Lewis turningpoint in about 2004, and a labor shortage became a limiting factor in production, there has been stronger demand for hukou system reform. In the meantime, various levels of government have apoint where incentives are compatibile for carrying out reforms. The paper also explores some limitations of the currently implemented reform in certain regions andputs forwardrelevantpolicy suggestions.

The Governance Model for Entrepreneurial Enterprises:A Study Based on Dynamic Ownership Governance Platform

When human capital becomes the most important strategic capital,an entrepreneurial enterprise has to reform and innovate its corporate governance around human capital and its dynamism so as to acquire the capacity of sustainable endogenous growth.This article is intended to discuss the meaning and adaptability of Huawei’s characteristic systems and mechanisms and then proceeds to introduce the general design of entrepreneurial enterprises'dynamic ownership governance platform and the possible effect of corporate governance.Subject to existing Chinese laws and regulations and with full consideration of the dynamics of human capital,this article recommends an entrepreneurial enterprise to set up a dynamic ownership governance platform,innovate and optimize its corporate governance structure and relevant mechanisms and promote the gradual socialization of its founder/founding team’s rights to earnings,control and management;then put in place scientific and proper counterbalance mechanisms in accordance with the principle of separation of powers and incentive compatibility,reform its selection of managing staff and introduce market mechanisms to promote fair competition and dynamic incentive compatibility between its founder/founding team and other key stakeholders.This article is meant to facilitate an entrepreneurial enterprise to turn to socialization corporate governance,and acquire the motivation and gradually form the capacity for endogenous growth.

Multi-objective resource optimization scheduling based on iterative double auction in cloud manufacturing

Cloud manufacturing is a new kind of networked manufacturing model.In this model,manufacturing resources are organized and used on demand as marketoriented services.These services are highly uncertain and focus on users.The information between service demanders and service providers is usually incomplete.These challenges make the resource scheduling more difficult.In this study,an iterative double auction mechanism is proposed based on game theory to balance the individual benefits.Resource demanders and providers act as buyers and sellers in the auction.Resource demanders offer a price according to the budget,the delivery time,preference,and the process of auction.Meanwhile,resource providers ask for a price according to the cost,maximum expected profit,optimal reservation price,and the process of auction.A honest quotation strategy is dominant for a participant in the auction.The mechanism is capable of guaranteeing the economic benefits among different participants in the market with incomplete information.Furthermore,the mechanism is helpful for preventing harmful market behaviors such as speculation,cheating,etc.Based on the iterative double auction mechanism,manufacturing resources are optimally allocated to users with consideration of multiple objectives.The auction mechanism is also incentive compatibility.

China’s Inclusive Public Finance System:Based on an Examination of Irregular Revenue

China's achievement of miraculous economic growth is a theoretical proposition that calls for an explanation.The key to understanding the logic of China’s economic reform is a rational explanation of the logical paradox between irregular local finance and the incentive compatibility of central and local governments.Based on the fact that autonomous local financial resources have long been dependent on irregular fiscal revenue,this paper constructs an inclusive public financial system analysis framework from the dual perspectives of the central and local government.This analytical framework offers an explanation of the long-standing implicit fiscal decentralization contract in which irregular fiscal revenue is the carrier in the reform process,together with a description of the central-local interaction process and institutional space underlying the behavioral motivations of central finance tolerance and local financial autonomy.It demonstrates the logical consistency of irregular fiscal revenue,central and local incentive compatibility,economic growth and market-oriented reform.The inclusive public finance system,which takes into account both local dynamism and central control,provides the important institutional logic that has enabled China to reach the dual goals of economic growth and market-oriented reform.

A Comparison of Value Elicitation Question Formats in Multiple-Good Contingent Valuation

This paper provides a convergent validity test of two types of multinomial choice questions vis-a-vis a dichotomous choice question by formally testing whether these stated preference elicitation question formats provide comparable welfare estimates. In particular, a dichotomous choice question, a traditional multinomial choice question, and a modified multinomial choice question suggested by Carson and Groves （2007） were applied in split samples to assess the influence of the informational and incentive properties on the respondents＇ annual willingness to accept compensation for adopting costly conservation practices in agriculture that benefit the environment. Our findings suggest that the two multinomial choice question formats elicit a similar mean willingness to accept distributions, but they are both different from a standarddichotomous choice question. Further, the willingness to accept distributions derived from the multinomial choice question formats are more dispersed than those from the dichotomous choice question.

On the Fundamentals of a Successful Reform for National Prosperity--An Economic Analysis Based on the Practice of China＇s Reform

This paper discusses the fundamentals required for successful reform, i.e., the necessary institutional changes required to make a nation grow sustainably wealthier. It argues that enriching the people is a prerequisite for a prosperous nation and further reveals the inherent logic behind the statement ＂in order to enrich the people, they must be given private rights, and in order to protect the people＇s private rights, public power must be limited.＂ Based on this argument, we examine and analyze the experience of China＇s reform over the past 30 years and come to the conclusion that it is necessary to transform government functions and further deepen market-oriented reform. We hold that China＇s economic performance bears no special or exceptional economic law, and there does not exist the so-called ＂China Model＂ characterized by government taking the leading role as a relatively mature, stable, and widely applicable development model, but that there does exist a Chinese development path or experience featuring the inherent logic of ＂prospering the nation through enriching its people＂ that can be employed by countries all over the world.