Decentralization, Supervision, and Chinese Local Government Debt

Decentralization can alter the incentive structure of local governments and one outcome of this is debt accumulation. Based on the “Province-Managing-County” pilot policy, a fiscal decentralization reform devolving fiscal power from the prefecture-level city to the county level, we assess the impact of fiscal decentralization on local government debt using a difference-in-differences model with a unique county-level dataset from 2011 to 2019. According to the study findings, the “Province-Managing-County” reform resulted in an average increase of 5.758 percent in the local government debt ratio across the pilot counties. Mechanism analyses suggest that this may have arisen from changes in the incentive structure, including external pressures from government assessments and internal developmental needs for promotion, leading to a rise in expenditure pressures on local governments. The role of supervision in mitigating the impact of fiscal decentralization on debt growth was also demonstrated, indicating that an appropriate supervision mechanism must be in place in conjunction with a decentralization policy.

Local Government Debt,Sectoral Linkage and Resource Allocation Efficiency

Increasing the efficiency of resource allocation is the basis and guarantee for boosting high-quality economic development.Based on the panel data of Chinese industrial enterprises and cities from 2008 to 2013,this paper studies the influence of infrastructure construction demand shocks represented by local government debt expansion on the efficiency of sectoral resource allocation from the perspective of sectoral linkage.According to the empirical findings,local government debt significantly reduces the resource allocation efficiency of manufacturing sector that is highly related to infrastructure construction.This conclusion is still tenable after the robustness test using the simulated local government debt as an instrumental variable.Further mechanism tests show that there are two reasons for the decline of the efficiency of resource allocation in manufacturing sector that is highly related to infrastructure construction.First,more product demands and investments brought by the expansion of local government debt flow to less productive enterprises in the sector.Second,resource misallocation reduces the probability of high-productivity enterprises entering the market and low-productivity enterprises exiting the market,and the effect is more prominent in cities with high dependence on state-owned enterprises and high pressure on officials to be promoted.According to this study,the performance management of local government debt should be further strengthened,and particular attention should be paid to the influence of local government debt on enterprise investment and financing crowding out and resource misallocation.

The Governance of Local Government Debt from the Perspective of Fiscal and Financial Coordination:Evidence from Financial Markets

Theories based on fiscal guarantees cannot explain either the fact that the continuously decline in local fiscal resources has not significantly increased local government financing costs,or the fact that local government debt has been rising at a time of strict central government regulation.The theoretical and empirical analyses provided in this study show that it is the financial resources under local government control that provide the implicit guarantee for local government debt.Such financial resources lower local governments’financing costs but have the potential to lead to the contagion of financial risk through local government to the financial sector.Therefore,to look at the question solely in terms of either fiscal or financial sector guarantees will not be sufficient to resolve the problem of local government debt.The central government needs to coordinate fiscal and financial policies under a joint management framework in a way that rationally disperses and resolves the risks attached to local government debt and avoids the assumption of excessive risk by either sector.At the same time,close attention should be paid to local financial institutions’asset quality and their money market reputation to avoid the risk of contagion from local financial institutions to local public finance.

Local Government Debt, Factor Misallocation and Regional Economic Performance in China

This paper examines total factor efficiency and productivity performance by taking into account local government debt （LGD） in 31 Chinese provincial regions for the period 2000-2013. The results show that neglecting LGD may overstate economic performance in Chinese provinces. The eastern region shows better performance in single jactor efficiency and total factor efficiency than the non-eastern regions. The western region shows the worst total factor performance. The north-eastern region is the only region that has experienced a decline in total factor performance. The state-dominated, investment- driven development model may help technological progress across Chinese regions but could lead to significant factor misallocation. We argue that biases towards more state- dominated investment and land supply in less productive western, central and north- eastern regions, at the expense of investment and land supply in more productive eastern regions, have contributed to the recent slowdown in economic growth in China. Therefore, .further market-oriented reforms in factor markets should be considered in the future.

Local Government Debt in China:Development in Seven Decades,Current Situation,and Reform Suggestions

Since 1949,local government debt in China has gone through the stages from scratch,then banned,and reintroduced,and then to the scale expansion,market construction and improvement under the system construction.In the past 70 years,although there have been twists and turns in its development,local government debt has undergone a“perfect transformation”.Based on a comprehensive review of the development of local government debt in China from 1949 to 2019,this paper refi nes its evolution logic,forecasts its development trend,and puts forward relevant policy recommendations for the future management and risk control of local government debt in China.

基层转移支付与地方政府债务扩张--项目制的视角与四川省的实证

财政转移支付对地方政府债务规模的影响,不仅仅是一个公共财政或金融信贷问题,更是一个与我国基本治理结构紧密相关的政治经济学问题。论文以项目制治理为理论导向对此问题展开了实证研究。研究认为,在此治理模式下,基层地方政府可以将省以下的转移支付作为项目运作的资源配置杠杆,申请更多的信贷资金支持,从而推高其地方政府债务。利用对四川省2016-2019年县级面板数据的实证分析,论文揭示了二者之间的因果关联:基层转移支付收入在整体上会扩张地方政府债务规模,并加重其债务成本;这一扩张效应更多是由专项转移支付带来的,而一般转移支付则与债务付息支出更为相关。该发现说明,我国基层转移支付的预算软约束问题已经深深嵌入到更为宏观的政治激励与经济建设模式之中,从而也需要从完善官员治理、优化政府间财政关系以及加强各种财政资源有效配置等方面加以改善。

Status analysis and control measures of the debt risk in Chinese local government:based on the study of the relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”

From the view of current condition and developing trend of the debt scale in Chinese local government,if it could not be controlled by an effective way,the debt crisis will explode in the near future.According to the regional distribution in our country,except for Beijing,Shanghai,Tianjin and Hainan,the debt risk mainly concentrates in the western region.In a further step,it can be seen that this risk of debt is resulted by the imbalanced relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”which contains none-accordance of debt power(such as debt financing power),confusion of debt responsibility(such as debt management responsibility)and distortion of debt interests(such as the private benefit and the public interests).If we want to correct this problem,the keynote is to prevent the local government’s debt to be used by the purpose of reaching the private interests.Actually,it should play a role that the local debt financing takes to the“faithful”service for the social interests.For realizing this purpose,it should keep eyes on the relationship among“power,responsibility and interests”,which is the most important factor as for setting up the control system of debt risk about our local governments.Particularly,it includes the following aspects.First of all,it should find the right time to empower the local government with the debt power.Secondly,on the basis of both positive and negative sides,it should design a system to restrict the debt responsibility in the local government,in order to solve the problems such as new debt,invalid debt and overdue debt expansion.Thirdly,it should propose the guidance mechanism to realize the convergence from the private benefit to the social interests on the local debt.

论我国地方政府债务风险的四大成因

积极防范和化解地方政府债务风险的前提是对风险的成因做出系统、合理的分析，以便"对症下药"。基于此，本文对我国地方政府债务风险的形成机理做了初步的系统分析，认为，目前我国地方政府债务风险的形成与我国经济体制的转轨、财政体制的转换、现行地方政府债务管理制度改革的滞后以及市场经济风险性的逐步显现等四大因素密切相关。

风险预警、地方政府性债务管理与财政风险监管体系催生

构建规范有序的地方政府性债务管理制度和风险预警机制是防范财政风险、实现政府债务融资健康发展的重要举措。我国地方政府性债务的快速扩张有其理性因素,不能轻易否定地方政府债务存在的合理性。地方政府投资范围过宽、事权和支出责任的非对称性、地方政府债务管理制度不健全构成地方政府负债融资的非理性因素。应深化体制改革,加快政府职能转变,调整政绩考核机制,继续深化政府间财政体制改革,逐步实现事权和支出责任相匹配;构建规范有序的地方政府性债务管理制度;有效构建地方政府性债务的风险预警和防范机制。

我国地方投融资平台债务运行现状及其治理之道

伴随着我国地方投融资平台的快速发展,地方政府投融资的债务规模也开始急剧扩张,地方政府债务日益膨胀。各方面对由此引发的债务风险乃至可能出现的严重的系统性风险颇为关注。当前,我国地方投融资平台债务正处于拐点的状态,即介于风险与危机之间的位置,因而必须通过建立控制和预警地方投融资平台债务存量、政府和银行联合规避风险、拓宽地方融资市场渠道以及增加地方财政收入的综合治理路径来有效治理地方投融资平台的债务风险。

我国地方债务风险隐患、成因及化解对策

当前,我国地方债务的规模已十分庞大,并呈现不断扩张的趋势,不但偿债压力大、债务结构不合理,而且债务隐性化趋势明显、管理混乱,存在较大的风险隐患。我国地方债务的累积及其风险的扩张,将阻碍经济发展方式的转变,降低经济发展质量,对私人投资产生"挤出效应",使经济保持较高的通胀率,引发高房价问题,不利于收入分配的改革,并恶化政府和金融体系的信用。地方债务风险的成因是多元的,包括财政体制、预算软约束、地方财政收入增长困难、投资拉动型的经济增长方式、政绩考核机制等。控制和化解地方债务风险,在短期可通过资产证券化、引进民间资本和出售地方国有资产方式快速筹集偿债资金以尽快偿债;在长期则必须进行实质性改革,如构建市场化的地方政府融资机制、转变政府职能、改革分税体制、加强中央政府对地方政府举债管理约束、建立债务风险预警机制等。

转轨时期地方政府债务风险及其防范

我国正处于经济转轨时期,由于受多种因素的影响,地方政府债务规模急速膨胀,债务风险凸显。地方政府债务风险,特别是隐性债务风险已经成为威胁我国经济安全与社会稳定的重要因素。研究我国地方政府债务风险的表现,并提出防范与控制的对策,具有非常重要的现实意义。

地方政府债务的效应及形成机制新探

地方政府债务是在我国社会主义市场经济体制改革进程中,伴随着计划经济体制向市场经济体制的转轨和政府职能的转换而产生的一种社会经济现象。地方政府债务包括地方政府从商业银行获得的贷款、中央政府将国债部分收入转贷给地方政府和地方政府为企业担保等形成的隐性债务等。地方政府债务的迅速膨胀已对社会经济发展产生了诸多负面影响。这种债务的形成和扩张既有显性的正式预算制度的制约,也有非正式预算制度、地方政府间财政竞争和地方政府债务动态发展机制等因素的拉动。

基于防控债务危机的重庆公租房供应可持续发展研究

目前,在我国地方债务风险加剧的背景下,公租房建设财政支出大、政府举债多,使其还款来源存在问题。重庆寄希望于通过出售公租房来保证还款来源的做法虽然能够解一时之急,但并不利于公租房供应的可持续性。重庆公租房建设与运营可持续发展的瓶颈在于政府独自承担巨大的财政压力和债务风险潜在压力。为了实现重庆公租房供应的长期可持续发展,政府需要调整其在公租房建设中的角色定位和有效整合社会资源,应改变政府为公租房唯一投资主体的模式,吸引社会机构参与建设公租房,增加公租房的资金来源渠道,降低新建公租房的资金投入,并加强监管,实现公租房资源利用最大化。

地方政府债务、土地财政与房地产价格的关系——基于省际面板数据的分析

基于2004-2014年中国31个省市自治区面板数据,在统计意义上分别探讨了地方政府债务与土地财政之间的关系,土地财政对房地产价格的影响,得出了地方政府债务催生土地财政,土地财政推动房价上涨的结论,并在此基础上研究了地方政府债务对房地产价格的影响。结果显示:在限定居民收入水平和城镇化水平的条件下,地方政府债务依然能显著推动房价上涨,且对房价上涨的影响存在明显的区域差异,其中东部地区地方政府债务对房价上涨的推动作用最大,中部地区次之,西部地区最小。基于上述结论,提出了相应的对策建议。

中国地方政府债务的形成机制与化解对策

中国地方政府债务危机可以看作是在财政关系尚未理顺的情况下政府间机会主义行为的结果。基层政府因为收支紧张产生举债冲动 ,但债务的积累主要起因于财政产权制度下地方政府的攫取———对金融租金的分割 ,它实际是一种变相的财政竞争。其原因在于存在着财政收益、财政控制权与财政风险的不对称分布。国有金融体制的软预算约束也应承担很大责任。规范政府间财政关系、建立各级政府债务约束制度 ,使每一级政府的财政行为与风险匹配 。

地方政府债务:现状、效应与改革

本文基于审计署2011年和2013年公布的全国政府性债务数据,结合2014年地方债"自发自还"试点,着重分析了地方政府债务现状、效应与改革。首先,通过债务规模、分级债务结构、债务期限结构和举债主体五个方面对当前地方政府债务现状进行总体考察;其次,从道德风险、财政危机和政府信用、国民经济安全和经济波动、房地产市场调控、地方债评级与地方债可持续发行角度剖析了地方债的现存问题和不良影响;最后,论让地方债改革必须找到引致地方债过度膨胀的原因。增长主义地方政府、以GDP为主要内容的政绩考核、现有财政体制安排下地方政府财权财力与支出责任不对称以及缺少有效的监管机制,是地方债不断膨胀的根本原因。换言之,地方债改革不仅是一个经济问题,它更关涉政府职能、官员考核、财政体制调整和公共监督等诸多维度,是一个综合命题。

基于资产净值的地方政府债务规模问题研究

分税制改革以来,地方政府债务规模迅速扩大,加上地方政府预算软约束、政治激励的负面影响,以及应对金融危机所采取的政策,加剧了地方政府债务规模的膨胀。利用"资产净值"分析后发现,截至2010年底"地方政府资产净值"为正,说明我国地方政府债务规模尚可持续,但债务风险依然存在。因此,地方政府应当防止债务规模持续扩大演变成债务危机。

对发行地方政府债券的几点认识

为了启动经济 ,需要调动地方政府积极性 ,需要适当增加地方政府财力 ;而要调动地方政府积极性和增加地方政府财力 ,发行地方政府债券是一个重要举措。现在地方政府发行债券既必要 ,叉可行 ;

Credit Spreads,Probability of Default and Debt Risk Measurement of Prefectural Governments in China:2014-2017

In this paper,the concepts of probability of default,loss given default and expected loss in the internal ratings-based approach are introduced into the measurement of local government debt risk.Based on issuing interest rate and credit spreads of provincial government bonds,the default probability models of general debt and special debt are constructed and estimated,and the general and special debt risk of 333 prefectural governments in China from 2014 to 2017 are estimated respectively,and their regional distribution and changes are analyzed.The conclusions are as follows:Both general and special debt risk are different among regions.In terms of vertical changes in 2014-2017,debt risk has increased on the whole,but this increase has been driven more by the increase in the size of the debt,with no significant change in the probability of default,and the debt risk is concentrated in a small number of prefectural governments.The general debt risk accounts for about two-thirds of the total debt risk,the special debt risk accounts for about one-third,and this proportion structure is basically unchanged in 2014-2017.Based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward corresponding policy recommendations for governance and control of local debt risk.