Exploring the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma is valuable and it arises considerable concerns of many researchers. In this paper, we propose a mechanism to promote cooperation, called benefi...Exploring the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma is valuable and it arises considerable concerns of many researchers. In this paper, we propose a mechanism to promote cooperation, called benefit community,in which cooperators linking together form a common benefit community and all their payoffs obtained from game are divided coequally. The robustness of conclusions is tested for the PDG(prisoners' dilemma game) on square lattice and WS small world network. We find that cooperation can be promoted by this typical mechanism, especially, it can diffuse and prevail more easily and rapidly on the WS small world network than it on the square lattice, even if a big temptation to defect b. Our research provides a feasible direction to resolve the social dilemma.展开更多
Payoff-driven strategy updating rule has always been adopted as a classic mechanism,but up to now,there have been a great many of researches on considering other forms of strategy updating rules,among which pursuing h...Payoff-driven strategy updating rule has always been adopted as a classic mechanism,but up to now,there have been a great many of researches on considering other forms of strategy updating rules,among which pursuing high fitness is one of the most direct and conventional motivations in the decision-making using game theory.But there are few or no researches on fitness from the perspective of others'evaluation.In view of this,we propose a new model in which the evaluation effect with fitness-driven strategy updating rule is taken into consideration,and introduce an evaluation coefficient to present the degree of others'evaluation on individual's behavior.The cooperative individuals can get positive evaluation,otherwise defective individuals get negative evaluation,and the degree of evaluation is related to the number of neighbors who have the same strategy of individual.Through numerical simulation,we find that the evaluation effect of others can enhance the network reciprocity,thus promoting the cooperation.For a strong dilemma,the higher evaluation coefficient can greatly weaken the cooperation dilemma;for a weak one,the higher evaluation coefficient can make cooperator clusters spread faster,however,there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation in the final stable state among different evaluation coefficients.The cooperation becomes more flourish as the number of fitness-driven individuals increases,when all individuals adopt fitness-driven strategy updating rule,the cooperators can quickly occupy the whole population.Besides,we demonstrate the robustness of the results on the WS small-world network,ER random network,and BA scalefree network.展开更多
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.61673096)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities,China(Grant No.N160602002)+1 种基金the Social Science Project of the Ministry of Education of China(Grant No.16YJC630118)the Project of Promoting Talents in Liaoning Province,China(Grant No.XLYC1807033)
文摘Exploring the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in social dilemma is valuable and it arises considerable concerns of many researchers. In this paper, we propose a mechanism to promote cooperation, called benefit community,in which cooperators linking together form a common benefit community and all their payoffs obtained from game are divided coequally. The robustness of conclusions is tested for the PDG(prisoners' dilemma game) on square lattice and WS small world network. We find that cooperation can be promoted by this typical mechanism, especially, it can diffuse and prevail more easily and rapidly on the WS small world network than it on the square lattice, even if a big temptation to defect b. Our research provides a feasible direction to resolve the social dilemma.
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.61673096 and 62076057)the Social Science Project of the Ministry of Education of China(Grant No.16YJC630118)the Project of Promoting Talents in Liaoning Province,China(Grant No.XLYC1807033)。
文摘Payoff-driven strategy updating rule has always been adopted as a classic mechanism,but up to now,there have been a great many of researches on considering other forms of strategy updating rules,among which pursuing high fitness is one of the most direct and conventional motivations in the decision-making using game theory.But there are few or no researches on fitness from the perspective of others'evaluation.In view of this,we propose a new model in which the evaluation effect with fitness-driven strategy updating rule is taken into consideration,and introduce an evaluation coefficient to present the degree of others'evaluation on individual's behavior.The cooperative individuals can get positive evaluation,otherwise defective individuals get negative evaluation,and the degree of evaluation is related to the number of neighbors who have the same strategy of individual.Through numerical simulation,we find that the evaluation effect of others can enhance the network reciprocity,thus promoting the cooperation.For a strong dilemma,the higher evaluation coefficient can greatly weaken the cooperation dilemma;for a weak one,the higher evaluation coefficient can make cooperator clusters spread faster,however,there is no significant difference in the level of cooperation in the final stable state among different evaluation coefficients.The cooperation becomes more flourish as the number of fitness-driven individuals increases,when all individuals adopt fitness-driven strategy updating rule,the cooperators can quickly occupy the whole population.Besides,we demonstrate the robustness of the results on the WS small-world network,ER random network,and BA scalefree network.
文摘通过对等规聚丙烯(iPP)过冷熔体施加不同应变的正弦振荡剪切场,研究了大应变振荡剪切流场作用下,等温iPP的流动诱导结晶过程.研究结果表明,施加大应变振荡剪切流场可以明显加速iPP的结晶动力学,且施加的应变越大可以促使iPP结晶动力学加速现象越明显.通过对iPP熔体的应力波形进行傅立叶变换分析发现,由于结晶会引起熔体内部非线性行为改变,傅里叶变化峰值的3倍基频峰值I3与基频峰值I1之比I3/I1可以敏感反映iPP的流动诱导结晶过程.当流变仪施加的应变幅度从10%提高到30%时,I3/I1比值发生突跃的时间则从2500 s迅速减小为600 s.
