This paper studied the change of the firm’s profit and social welfare after merger in the case of oligopoly and inhomogeneous products. By the hypothesis of an uncooperative perfect information static game model, the...This paper studied the change of the firm’s profit and social welfare after merger in the case of oligopoly and inhomogeneous products. By the hypothesis of an uncooperative perfect information static game model, the characteristics of market and products needed for the firm to improve its profit through merger were discussed under Cournot oligopoly model and Bertrand oligopoly model. To raise the firm’s profit can be well described as the incentive of advantage complementary merger. The change of social welfare influenced by the merger was also discussed. From the view of maximizing global social welfare, some advice was also given to regulate this type of merger.展开更多
文摘This paper studied the change of the firm’s profit and social welfare after merger in the case of oligopoly and inhomogeneous products. By the hypothesis of an uncooperative perfect information static game model, the characteristics of market and products needed for the firm to improve its profit through merger were discussed under Cournot oligopoly model and Bertrand oligopoly model. To raise the firm’s profit can be well described as the incentive of advantage complementary merger. The change of social welfare influenced by the merger was also discussed. From the view of maximizing global social welfare, some advice was also given to regulate this type of merger.