In bimatrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permitpure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit init...In bimatrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permitpure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initialquantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixedsymmetric Nash equilibrium.展开更多
文摘In bimatrix games the Bishop-Cannings theorem of the classical evolutionary game theory does not permitpure evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) when a mixed ESS exists. We find the necessary form of two-qubit initialquantum states when a switch-over to a quantum version of the game also changes the evolutionary stability of a mixedsymmetric Nash equilibrium.
