期刊文献+
共找到1篇文章
< 1 >
每页显示 20 50 100
Designing Social Programs in Circumstances of Informational Asymmetry
1
作者 Adrian VINTILESCU BELCIUG Lacramioara CORCHES +1 位作者 Daniela CRETU adriana lupu 《Economics World》 2014年第1期11-24,共14页
The social programs represent the redistribution of revenues collected from taxpayers toward persons considered to be in need according to the public policies. Therefore, the govemment-financed welfare program is ofte... The social programs represent the redistribution of revenues collected from taxpayers toward persons considered to be in need according to the public policies. Therefore, the govemment-financed welfare program is often looked as a type of a safety net of the state itself by groups of persons having certain features which are detected according to a selection process. The state should grant the ultimate successive safety net to persons in whose cases the previous safety nets would have failed. The beneficiaries are persons selected by different decision-makers who are aware of the actual status of that person. The individual who actually grants the access to the social program does not have all the necessary data. In this context, is the redistribution system effective? The study aims to determine an equilibrium in social assistance and effective methods for providing social benefits. The study has proposed to build a model using the concept of labelling. The quantitative model hereby proposed represents a possibility to design social programs in circumstances of asymmetric information. Therefore, it reveals the sensitivity of the social programs toward social controls or penalties, and it has a stabilizing effect on the economic crisis. The study proposes the use of an expert system (SE) in redistributing incomes in social assistance and concrete ways of state intervention. 展开更多
关键词 expert system REDISTRIBUTION social benefits social assistance
下载PDF
上一页 1 下一页 到第
使用帮助 返回顶部