Concessions and technical assistance, described in this article, are historical examples of private-public partnership, which appeared in the industrial era. Even in homogeneous economic, political and legal systems, ...Concessions and technical assistance, described in this article, are historical examples of private-public partnership, which appeared in the industrial era. Even in homogeneous economic, political and legal systems, the business and state co-operation does not always reach harmony and consensus. Here, the researchers observe more complicated, contradictory and sometimes tense relations between the Soviet state institutions and the Western, particularly American companies, who participated in economic modernization of post-revolutionary Russia, initiated by its leadership. After termination of the New Economic Policy （NEP） （Dziewanowski, 1989, pp. 129-137, 155）, and taking foreign concessions back to the state by the beginning of 1930s, the Soviet Union was preparing to become, in a few years, a high-rank industrial power. Giant American steel-making mills, automobile and tractor factories, assembling lines, oil-extracting, and oil-cracking installations, etc. attracted Soviet political leaders, ＂red directors＂ and engineers as the best examples to follow up. They were going to accomplish their plans by means of wide technological transfer： ordering and purchasing factory designs, patents and know-how, training Russian workers and technicians both abroad and at the Soviet constructions sites by placing them under supervision of contracted foreign specialists. However, the adoption of machinery and technologies without due organization and chains of supply diminished and distorted expected results.展开更多
文摘Concessions and technical assistance, described in this article, are historical examples of private-public partnership, which appeared in the industrial era. Even in homogeneous economic, political and legal systems, the business and state co-operation does not always reach harmony and consensus. Here, the researchers observe more complicated, contradictory and sometimes tense relations between the Soviet state institutions and the Western, particularly American companies, who participated in economic modernization of post-revolutionary Russia, initiated by its leadership. After termination of the New Economic Policy （NEP） （Dziewanowski, 1989, pp. 129-137, 155）, and taking foreign concessions back to the state by the beginning of 1930s, the Soviet Union was preparing to become, in a few years, a high-rank industrial power. Giant American steel-making mills, automobile and tractor factories, assembling lines, oil-extracting, and oil-cracking installations, etc. attracted Soviet political leaders, ＂red directors＂ and engineers as the best examples to follow up. They were going to accomplish their plans by means of wide technological transfer： ordering and purchasing factory designs, patents and know-how, training Russian workers and technicians both abroad and at the Soviet constructions sites by placing them under supervision of contracted foreign specialists. However, the adoption of machinery and technologies without due organization and chains of supply diminished and distorted expected results.
