This paper examines the tension between the standard （common sense） theory of action and the epiphenomenalist view of the mind. The theory of action that is appealed to is one that emphasizes the calculative ＂means...This paper examines the tension between the standard （common sense） theory of action and the epiphenomenalist view of the mind. The theory of action that is appealed to is one that emphasizes the calculative ＂means-ends＂ structure of rational deliberation--a structuring that appears to place practical reasoning at odds with other forms of causal explanation. The epiphenomenalist view presented is one that attempts to preserve certain foundational tenets of physicalism in the face of worries generated by the existence of qualia. In the latter part of the paper, the author makes use of a novel thought experiment involving phenomenal qualia in order to undermine the epiphenomenalist position and to vindicate the view that properties of consciousness matter to human agency.展开更多
文摘This paper examines the tension between the standard （common sense） theory of action and the epiphenomenalist view of the mind. The theory of action that is appealed to is one that emphasizes the calculative ＂means-ends＂ structure of rational deliberation--a structuring that appears to place practical reasoning at odds with other forms of causal explanation. The epiphenomenalist view presented is one that attempts to preserve certain foundational tenets of physicalism in the face of worries generated by the existence of qualia. In the latter part of the paper, the author makes use of a novel thought experiment involving phenomenal qualia in order to undermine the epiphenomenalist position and to vindicate the view that properties of consciousness matter to human agency.
