幼儿专项化训练的TCSI分析及应对

科学合理地运动能够促进幼儿身心健康发展,运动不当则会阻碍幼儿身心健康发展。如果幼儿的运动存在与专项相结合的单一动作模式,采取的是在成人监管下有计划、长期进行的机械训练形式,且运动量大、运动强度高,那么就属于幼儿专项化训练范畴。幼儿专项化训练起源于体育竞赛,并服务于体育竞赛。这种专项化训练因为违背幼儿身心发展规律,会对幼儿的身体、心理、社会行为等产生严重的消极影响。政府和社会应坚决禁止以获取良好比赛成绩为目的的幼儿体育竞赛,以在源头上消灭引发幼儿专项化训练的诱因;应让民众充分了解专项化训练对幼儿身心的危害,从而自觉抵制幼儿专项化训练;应运用多种游戏化策略,助推幼儿科学运动。

Mobile channel estimation for MU-MIMO systems using KL expansion based extrapolation

In multi-user multiple input multiple output （MU-MIMO） systems, the outdated channel state information at the transmit- ter caused by channel time variation has been shown to greatly reduce the achievable ergodic sum capacity. A simple yet effec- tive solution to this problem is presented by designing a channel extrapolator relying on Karhunen-Loeve （KL） expansion of time- varying channels. In this scheme, channel estimation is done at the base station （BS） rather than at the user terminal （UT）, which thereby dispenses the channel parameters feedback from the UT to the BS. Moreover, the inherent channel correlation and the parsimonious parameterization properties of the KL expan- sion are respectively exploited to reduce the channel mismatch error and the computational complexity. Simulations show that the presented scheme outperforms conventional schemes in terms of both channel estimation mean square error （MSE） and ergodic capacity.

公司治理新论(下)——一个中国社会关系结构的视角

宏观层面持续之经济增长,必有其微观层面公司治理结构的有效支持。遗憾的是,无论在实践层面还是理论层面,当前中国公司治理在认识上似乎处于一种含混模棱的状态。实践中的形似而神不似,理论上的神似而形不似,构成了当前中国公司治理研究的困境与挑战。文章致力于提出一种新的公司治理论点——中国社会关系结构下之隐性契约解释,试图为破解上述困境尽微薄之力。公司治理是不同利益相关者的契约集合,任一社会的契约内容及形式都嵌入在交易各方所处的社会结构。离开了对契约的理解,就难以理解公司治理;同样,离开了对社会关系结构的理解,也难以理解契约。文章从历史分析视角,远承中国儒家道德哲学,近袭梁漱溟关于中国文化及陶孟和、费孝通、翟学伟等社会学先生之发明创见,勾勒当下社会所赖以建构的基础逻辑,分析契约内容及形式背后之社会决定,辨明东西方契约形式之关键差异,提出隐性契约在中国社会中形成的文化及伦理源起,厘清隐性契约的特征、利弊及所适,阐释构筑于隐性契约之上的中国公司治理的分析及框架模式,包括隐性契约之交易成本节约的缘由,及其在中国社会关系结构中的实施机制,对已有实证研究成果进行了梳理和解释,最后分析了隐性契约对交易的激发作用,从契约激发交易促进经济增长,于从一新侧面理解科斯定理亦有启发。文章提出的隐性契约视角,区别于英美模式下的显性契约视角,是内窥和展析中国历史传统下公司治理机制的有效路径,亦合于中国式现代化“深深植根于中华优秀传统文化”“展现了不同于西方现代化模式的新图景”的要求,以及应奋力在哲学社会科学领域有所创新之精神。文章不排斥西方公司治理理论的既有逻辑,但更强调结合中国的制度社会文化背景,对不同的契约形式和适应情境进行深入分析和拓展。

公司治理新论(上)——一个中国社会关系结构的视角

宏观层面持续之经济增长,必有其微观层面公司治理结构的有效支持。遗憾的是,无论在实践层面还是理论层面,当前中国公司治理在认识上似乎处于一种含混模棱的状态。实践中的形似而神不似,理论上的神似而形不似,构成了当前中国公司治理研究的困境与挑战。文章致力于提出一种新的公司治理论点——中国社会关系结构下之隐性契约解释,试图为破解上述困境尽微薄之力。公司治理是不同利益相关者的契约集合,任一社会的契约内容及形式都嵌入在交易各方所处的社会结构。离开了对契约的理解,就难以理解公司治理;同样,离开了对社会关系结构的理解,也难以理解契约。文章从历史分析视角,远承中国儒家道德哲学,近袭梁漱溟关于中国文化及陶孟和、费孝通、翟学伟等社会学先生之发明创见,勾勒当下社会所赖以建构的基础逻辑,分析契约内容及形式背后之社会决定,辨明东西方契约形式之关键差异,提出隐性契约在中国社会中形成的文化及伦理源起,厘清隐性契约的特征、利弊及所适,阐释构筑于隐性契约之上的中国公司治理的分析及框架模式,包括隐性契约之交易成本节约的缘由,及其在中国社会关系结构中的实施机制,对已有实证研究成果进行了梳理和解释,最后分析了隐性契约对交易的激发作用,从契约激发交易促进经济增长,于从一新侧面理解科斯定理亦有启发。文章提出的隐性契约视角,区别于英美模式下的显性契约视角,是内窥和展析中国历史传统下公司治理机制的有效路径,亦合于中国式现代化“深深植根于中华优秀传统文化”“展现了不同于西方现代化模式的新图景”的要求,以及应奋力在哲学社会科学领域有所创新之精神。文章不排斥西方公司治理理论的既有逻辑,但更强调结合中国的制度社会文化背景,对不同的契约形式和适应情境进行深入分析和拓展。

嵌入理论视角下的中国公司治理与政府行为——一个整体框架

文章基于中国的制度背景,以政府的经济发展和社会福利动机为出发点,借鉴Granovetter(1985)的嵌入理论,试图为中国公司治理与政府行为之间构建一个新的分析框架。文章将政企关系解释为政府以资源分配为激励,委托企业实现特定经济和非经济目标的隐性契约关系,并揭示了"政府-企业"契约中存在的委托代理结构,将两者的二元对立范式更新为有机整体范式。进一步将公司治理纳入这一整体框架,指出中国公司治理结构和内容上的诸多特征,根源于其既要追求经典的股东价值又要兼顾政府委托责任的嵌入属性。从嵌入视角研究公司治理与政府行为的整体关系,在理论上可以进一步推进中国公司治理的研究范式,更客观地评价和指导中国公司治理实践,更好地构建符合中国有为政府情境下的公司治理理论。

隐性控制权的家族内部传承——一项案例研究

本文认为家族传承是一个控制权传递的长期过程,是一项期间事件,而非时点事件,其中既包含显性控制权的转移,也包含隐性控制权的转移.通过对一个成功实现传承的典型案例分析,我们发现,控制权来源侧重点的不同决定了传承方式和过程的差异,只有显性控制权和隐性控制权都传递完成才能视为家族传承的真实终点.更重要的是,隐性控制权在显性控制权传递之后才能最终完成传递.在显性控制权传递完成之后,传承人和继承人可以通过控制权分享机制保障继承人顺利获得掌握隐性控制权所必需的个人资本,从而实现继承人隐性控制权的“跳跃”式发展.本文的研究为传承中的“扶上马送一程”提供了经济学的刻画与解释,也有助于我们理解在转型和新兴背景下嵌入于传统文化和外部制度环境下的家族传承模式,并对家族传承实践带来一定的启示.

Five-year plans, China finance and their consequences

An important factor influencing corporate finance and economic growth in China lies in its government sponsored industrial policies. Examining China's five-year plans during 1991–2010, we find that state-owned firms in government supported industries enjoy faster growth in initial public offerings and higher offer prices. Further, they enjoy faster growth in loans granted by major national banks. However, this preferential access to capital by state-owned firms appears to be achieved at the expense of non-state-owned firms which are crowded out. Government support induces more investment but also brings more overinvestment, which mainly comes from the non-state sector.Finally, supported industries have higher stock market returns and cash flow growth that dampen when state ownership increases.

Selective enforcement of regulation

Regulatory agencies may,whether outside of set rules or within their discretion,depart from the original goals or principles set for enforcing the rules,which we term selective enforcement.Taking China,a country in transition,as an example,and using cases and large-sample tests,we present empirical evidence of selective enforcement.The results show that the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) takes into account whether companies violating the rules have a state-owned background and the strength of that background when investigating and punishing non-compliance.After controlling for the degree of violation,state-owned-enterprises(SOEs) are punished less severely than private companies;and the higher the hierarchy of the SOE in question,the less severe the punishment.It also takes longer for SOEs to be punished.We also find that companies that violate the rules less seriously have a greater tendency to apply for refinancing than those that violate the rules more seriously.This may be because the severity of the violation can affect listed companies' expectations of obtaining refinancing.The analysis and conclusions of this study prove useful in understanding the causes and consequences of selective enforcement in transition economies.

Overemployment,executive pay-for-performance sensitivity and economic consequences:Evidence from China

Using a sample of state-owned enterprises(SOEs) listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges during the 1999-2009 period,we investigate the effects of overemployment on executives' pay-for-performance sensitivity(PPS) and analyze how the behavior of firms with high/low PPS affects the number of surplus employees.We find the existence of a redundant workforce significantly weakens PPS and the role of accounting measures in performance assessment.In contrast to prior literature,we find that higher PPS is associated with a stronger incentive to lay off redundant employees and to limit future employee numbers.We also find that weaker government intervention strengthens managerial control over the future size of the workforce.Finally,our findings suggest that a heavier government policy burden on SOEs leads to lower tax rates and more government gains.

Government Regulation,Enforcement,and Economic Consequences in a Transition Economy:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies Implementing the Split Share Structure Reform

In a changing transition economy, Chinese government regulations that adopt the relatively simple bright line rule formula are enforceable in practice. Taking the early reform-oriented policies of the China Securities Regulatory Commission(CSRC) as an example, we find that the CSRC did not consider local enthusiasm for reform when allocating IPO resources because of the high enforcement costs involved. We also find that CSRC listed company regulations were enforced due to the lower costs involved in verifying regulatory violations, and that listed companies that completed the reform process were given priority in public refinancing. We present empirical evidence supporting the theoretical basis for the hypotheses outlined above. We also conclude that companies that completed the reform process in 2005 were of significantly higher quality and that the SEO regulation did not affect stock market efficiency. These findings enhance our understanding of the efficiency of government regulation in a transition economy.

Does EVA performance evaluation improve the value of cash holdings? Evidence from China

This paper investigates the influence of the economic value added(EVA)performance evaluation,issued in 2010 by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council,on the value of the cash holdings of central state-owned enterprises(CSOEs).We find that EVA performance evaluation has some influence on the overinvestment of CSOE cash holdings and significantly increases the value of CSOE cash holdings compared with the cash holdings of local state-owned enterprises.The greater value of CSOE cash holdings derives from underinvestment modification and overinvestment restraint.The value of cash holdings increases more for companies with better accounting performance.Thus,the EVA performance evaluation policy increases CSOE efficiency.This study contributes to the emerging literature related to cash holdings and the economic consequences of the EVA performance evaluation policy.It expands the literature related to investor protection in countries experiencing economic transition.

ZmOST1 mediates abscisic acid regulation of guard cell ion channels and drought stress responses

The phytohormone abscisic acid(ABA) is an important mediator in the drought response, participating in, among other processes, stomatal movements. In Arabidopsis thaliana, the serine/threonine protein kinase,OST1, regulates this response, but the function of its maize homolog has yet to be established. Here, we isolated ZmOST1 and show that its encoded protein indeed acts to regulate guard cell movement. ZmOST1 was ubiquitously expressed throughout the plant, being highly expressed in guard cells, and inducible both by exogenous ABA and water stress. Transient expression of a ZmOST1-GFP fusion protein, in maize mesophyll protoplasts, indicated its subcellular localization in the cytoplasm and nucleus. A Zmost1 loss-of-function mutant exhibited reduced sensitivity to ABA-activated slow anion channels in maize guard cells, and reduced drought tolerance. Constitutive expression of ZmOST1, in an A. thaliana ost1-1 mutant rescued the phenotype with respect both to the sensitivity of guard cell slow anion currents to ABA treatment and stomatal closure. Our findings indicate a positive regulatory role for ZmOST1 in guard cell ABA signaling and drought response in maize plants.

Macroeconomic control,political costs and earnings management:Evidence from Chinese listed real estate companies

Firms in China have faced high political costs during China's economic transition,because they are affected by macroeconomic policies.However,research to date has offered no consistent conclusions on the relationship between political costs and earnings management in China.This study tests whether real estate firms attempt to decrease earnings during periods of macroeconomic control,using variables related to the national real estate market as proxies for political costs.We find that political costs are negatively related to earnings management in listed real estate firms.In addition,we find that non-state-owned enterprises utilized more income-decreasing accruals during this period.Our results are consistent with the political costs hypothesis.

Relative performance evaluation and executive compensation:Evidence from Chinese listed companies

This paper focuses on the effect of relative performance evaluation(RPE) on top managers' compensation in Chinese public firms. Overall, we find no evidence of an RPE effect or any asymmetry in firms' use of RPE. The results obtained using Albuquerque's(2009) method are similar to those obtained using traditional methods. In addition, we find that RPE is used more in non-SOEs than in SOEs. This may be due to the regulation of compensation,various forms of incentives and the multiple tasks of managers in SOEs.

Securities regulation and implicit penalties

The extant literature offers extensive support for the significant role played by institutions in financial markets,but implicit regulation and monitoring have yet to be examined.This study fills this void in the literature by employing unique Chinese datasets to explore the implicit regulation and penalties imposed by the Chinese government in regulating the initial public offering(IPO) market.Of particular interest are the economic consequences of underwriting IPO deals for client firms that violate regulatory rules in China's capital market.We provide evidence to show that the associated underwriters' reputations are impaired and their market share declines.We further explore whether such negative consequences result from a market disciplinary mechanism or a penalty imposed by the government.To analyze the possibility of a market disciplinary mechanism at work,we investigate(1) the market reaction to other client firms whose IPO deals were underwritten by underwriters associated with a violation at the time the violation was publicly disclosed and(2) the under-pricing of IPO deals undertaken by these underwriters after such disclosure.To analyze whether the government imposes an implicit penalty,we examine the application processing time for future IPO deals underwritten by the associated underwriters and find it to be significantly longer than for IPO deals underwritten by other underwriters.Overall,there is little evidence to suggest that the market penalizes underwriters for the rule-violating behavior of their client firms in China.Instead,the Chinese government implicitly penalizes them by imposing more stringent criteria on and lengthening the processing time of the IPO deals they subsequently underwrite.

Timing earnings

Since the opening of China's securities market,there have been a number of bull and bear cycles.This paper discusses how executives use the market timing approach to manage earnings in different cycles to maximize firm value.We find that Chinese listed companies choose to release more earnings during bull markets and this phenomenon is more evident in companies that are more profitable and have higher valuations.We also find that executives who do not release more earnings during bull markets are more likely to be dismissed.

Performance Volatility and Wage Elasticity:An Examination of Listed Chinese A-share Enterprises

The management of future financial risk on the part of managers and changes in firm finances are two of the fundamental reasons for upward and downward rigidity of wages.The proxy variable for firm financial risk is volatility,the past performance of which is among the principal indicators of wage rigidity.In firms whose current performance is on the upswing,the greater the volatility in past performance,the smaller the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward rigidity;the more stable past performance,the larger the elasticity ratio and the more acute the upward elasticity.In firms in which current performance is declining,greater past performance volatility leads to a larger elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity,whereas more stable such performance leads to a smaller elasticity ratio and more acute downward rigidity.

Large Shareholder Tunneling and Risk of Stock Price Crash： Evidence from China

尽管几研究检验了大股东通道行为的经济后果，很少注意都没在公司极端事件上对通道的否定效果被给予。在这篇文章，我们调查通道行为怎么影响公司级的股票价格碰撞。调查结果显示股票价格碰撞的概率被大股东断然与通道行为的程度联系。积极关系在股票结构改革的裂口以后是更显著的并且被公司节制金融条件。这研究贡献文学集中于通道和股票价格碰撞的经济后果的新兴的身体。从学习得出的结论也在中国基于大股东通道行为为投资者保护和投资公事包提供一个原则。

Synthesis and characterization of Ca0.9Mg0.1TiO3：Pr3＋,Ag＋ phosphor

Ca_（0.9）Mg_（0.1）TiO_3：Pr^（3＋）,Ag~＋ phosphors were synthesized by solid-state reaction technique. The crystalline phase and luminescence performances of Ca_（0.9）Mg_（0.1）TiO_3：Pr^（3＋）,Ag~＋ were observed by X-ray powder diffractometer（XRD）, transmission electron microscope（TEM）, photoluminescence spectrometer and brightness meter, respectively. The addition of Ag~＋ can diminish in the crystal particle sizes of Ca_（0.9）Mg_（0.1）TiO_3：Pr^（3＋）. Because Ag＋ can reduce the concentration of the undesirable defects in the phosphor, luminescence intensity of Ca_（0.9）Mg_（0.1）TiO_3：Pr^（3＋）,Ag~＋ is 2.3 times as high as that of Ca_（0.9）Mg_（0.1）TiO_3：Pr^（3＋）at the same preparation condition. The effect of Ag＋ on the persistent afterglow properties is to deepen the energy storage traps and enhance the energy transfer efficiency from Ca_（0.9）Mg_（0.1）TiO_3 to Pr^（3＋）. The persistent afterglow properties of Ca_（0.9）Mg_（0.1）TiO_3：Pr^（3＋）,Ag~＋ are better than those of Ca_（0.9）Mg_（0.1）TiO_3：Pr^（3＋） at the same preparation condition. In conclusion,Ca_（0.9）Mg_（0.1）TiO_3：Pr^（3＋）,Ag~＋ phosphor with molar ratio of Ag~＋to Pr^（3＋） 3：1 obtained at 900 ℃ for 4 h exhibits the optimal photoluminescence performances.