A Market Model of Risk Transfer and Insurance

We introduce a model of a market where risk-averse consumers pay a fee to transfer their future losses to one or more firms.The future loss of each consumer is stochastic with a unique,known mean and variance.The law of large numbers allows the firms to know with certainty the expected aggregate loss of the consumers to whom they sell.The model could describe the behavior of agents in the market for property insurance where an insurance company sells a single type of policy to a specific group of consumers based upon the expected losses of those consumers and their willingness to pay for coverage.The model demonstrates how a single firm can choose the optimal segment of the market to which they sell a policy and how that choice might change when the distribution of consumers and their risk aversion changes.The model also demonstrates how two firms might engage in a cooperative strategy and share the market.The model shows how a firm entering the market will find it more advantageous to target a segment of the market with consumers that have a lower expected loss.

A Model of Interest Rate and Loan Covenant Competition

This paper develops a model where two lenders to subprime borrowers compete with the interest rates charged and the severity of loan covenants. The model has a stable equilibrium, which demonstrates how an increase in the number of borrowers or an increase in the cost of meeting covenants will reduce the severity of the covenants required by lenders, and each of these changes will increase the difference in the severity of the loan covenant levels. An increase in the expected losses to the lender from relaxing covenants will increase the severity of loan covenants, and this will also make the levels of severity more dispersed. Additional analysis demonstrates how exogenous shifts affect the interest rates charged by the lenders and their profits