期刊文献+
共找到2篇文章
< 1 >
每页显示 20 50 100
Revenue-sharing contract to coordinate independent participants within the supply chain 被引量:10
1
作者 Chen Kebing gao chengxiu Wang Yan 《Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics》 SCIE EI CSCD 2007年第3期520-526,共7页
To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the dece... To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large. 展开更多
关键词 supply chain management coordination mechanism revenue-sharing contract Stackelberg game sequential strategy.
下载PDF
Analysis of Conditional Value-at-Risk for Newsvendor with Holding and Backorder Cost under Market Search 被引量:4
2
作者 LI Jianbin gao chengxiu +1 位作者 HU Wei YANG Lei 《Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences》 CAS 2007年第6期979-984,共6页
We consider a distribution system with one supplier and two retailers. For the two retailers, they face different demand and are both risk averse. We study a single period model which the supplier has ample goods and ... We consider a distribution system with one supplier and two retailers. For the two retailers, they face different demand and are both risk averse. We study a single period model which the supplier has ample goods and the retailers order goods separately. Market search is measured as the fraction of customers who unsatisfied with their "local" retailer due to stock-out, and search for the goods at the other retailer before leaving the system. We investigate how the retailers game for order quantity in a Conditional Value-at-Risk framework and study how risk averse degree, market search level, holding cost and backorder cost influence the optimal order strategies. Furthermore, we use uniform distribution to illustrate these results and obtain Nash equilibrium of order strategies. 展开更多
关键词 risk averse Conditional Value-at-Risk market search game theory
下载PDF
上一页 1 下一页 到第
使用帮助 返回顶部