The independence of supervision agency is of great importance for anti-corruption.After the leadership transition of the provincial Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2006,Secretaries of Discipline Inspection ...The independence of supervision agency is of great importance for anti-corruption.After the leadership transition of the provincial Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2006,Secretaries of Discipline Inspection Commission(SDICs)were suddenly dispatched from the centre or transferred from another province in China(‘airborne’SDICs)to enhance their independence in inspecting corruption cases.To investigate the effect of this policy reform,we collect data of SDICs and anti-corruption in 31 provinces from 2003 to 2014,and evaluate this policy using the difference-in-differences econometrics method.We find that there is no significant effect of these‘airborne’SDICs whether from the centre or another province on anti-corruption.This result is robust to different measurements of anti-corruption and subsamples.We argue that the dispatch of external SDICs is not enough to ensure the independence of supervision agency,because local discipline inspection commissions(DICs)are still subject to local Chinese Communist Party committees in terms of personnel,funds and property.This paper has important policy implications for the current anti-corruption campaign in China.展开更多
In this paper,we propose a political-economy model of China that explains both the rapid economic growth and frequent rate of accidents that have occurred in China.The central government delegates authority to the loc...In this paper,we propose a political-economy model of China that explains both the rapid economic growth and frequent rate of accidents that have occurred in China.The central government delegates authority to the local government to regulate the production activities of the firm.Under information asymmetry,the local government can collude with the firm and choose"bad"technology,the use of which will lead to faster economic growth and more accidents than the use of"good"technology.We characterize optimal equilibrium within collusion contracts,under which the central government will allow collusion when the cost to eliminate collusion is high.We also characterize the optimal collusion-proof contract,under which the payments,reprimands,and taxes that take place between the local government and the firm are endogenously determined.Our predictions on collusion and growth are supported by an empirical study on the coal industry.展开更多
文摘The independence of supervision agency is of great importance for anti-corruption.After the leadership transition of the provincial Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2006,Secretaries of Discipline Inspection Commission(SDICs)were suddenly dispatched from the centre or transferred from another province in China(‘airborne’SDICs)to enhance their independence in inspecting corruption cases.To investigate the effect of this policy reform,we collect data of SDICs and anti-corruption in 31 provinces from 2003 to 2014,and evaluate this policy using the difference-in-differences econometrics method.We find that there is no significant effect of these‘airborne’SDICs whether from the centre or another province on anti-corruption.This result is robust to different measurements of anti-corruption and subsamples.We argue that the dispatch of external SDICs is not enough to ensure the independence of supervision agency,because local discipline inspection commissions(DICs)are still subject to local Chinese Communist Party committees in terms of personnel,funds and property.This paper has important policy implications for the current anti-corruption campaign in China.
基金the financial support from the Special Fund for Authors of National Excellent Doctoral DissertationChina Ministry of Education Fund for Young Scholars in Humanities and Social Science
文摘In this paper,we propose a political-economy model of China that explains both the rapid economic growth and frequent rate of accidents that have occurred in China.The central government delegates authority to the local government to regulate the production activities of the firm.Under information asymmetry,the local government can collude with the firm and choose"bad"technology,the use of which will lead to faster economic growth and more accidents than the use of"good"technology.We characterize optimal equilibrium within collusion contracts,under which the central government will allow collusion when the cost to eliminate collusion is high.We also characterize the optimal collusion-proof contract,under which the payments,reprimands,and taxes that take place between the local government and the firm are endogenously determined.Our predictions on collusion and growth are supported by an empirical study on the coal industry.