The paper analyses the coordinated hydro-wind power generation considering joint bidding in the electricity market.The impact of mutual bidding strategies on market prices,traded volumes,and revenues has been quantifi...The paper analyses the coordinated hydro-wind power generation considering joint bidding in the electricity market.The impact of mutual bidding strategies on market prices,traded volumes,and revenues has been quantified.The coordination assumes that hydro power generation is scheduled mainly to compensate the differences between actual and planned wind power outputs.The potential of this coordination in achieving and utilizing of market power is explored.The market equilibrium of asymmetric generation companies is analyzed using a game theory approach.The assumed market situation is imperfect competition and non-cooperative game.A nu-merical approximation of the asymmetric supply function equilibrium is used to model this game.An introduced novelty is the application of an asymmetric supply function equilibrium approximation for coordinated hydro-wind power generation.The model is tested using real input data from the Croatian power system.展开更多
基金the H2020 project CROSSBOW-CROSS Border management of variable renewable energies and storage units enabling a transnational wholesale market(No.773430)this work was supported in part by the Croatian Science Foundation under the project IMPACT-Implementation of Peer-to-Pecr Advanced Concept for Electricity Trading(No.UIP-2017-05-4068).
文摘The paper analyses the coordinated hydro-wind power generation considering joint bidding in the electricity market.The impact of mutual bidding strategies on market prices,traded volumes,and revenues has been quantified.The coordination assumes that hydro power generation is scheduled mainly to compensate the differences between actual and planned wind power outputs.The potential of this coordination in achieving and utilizing of market power is explored.The market equilibrium of asymmetric generation companies is analyzed using a game theory approach.The assumed market situation is imperfect competition and non-cooperative game.A nu-merical approximation of the asymmetric supply function equilibrium is used to model this game.An introduced novelty is the application of an asymmetric supply function equilibrium approximation for coordinated hydro-wind power generation.The model is tested using real input data from the Croatian power system.
