The paper presents a comprehensive model of a banking system that integrates network effects,bankruptcy costs,fire sales,and cross-holdings.For the integrated financial market we prove the existence of a price-payment...The paper presents a comprehensive model of a banking system that integrates network effects,bankruptcy costs,fire sales,and cross-holdings.For the integrated financial market we prove the existence of a price-payment equilibrium and design an algorithm for the computation of the greatest and the least equilibrium.The number of defaults corresponding to the greatest price-payment equilibrium is analyzed in several comparative case studies.These illustrate the individual and joint impact of interbank liabilities,bankruptcy costs,fire sales and cross-holdings on systemic risk.We study policy implications and regulatory instruments,including central bank guarantees and quantitative easing,the significance of last wills of financial institutions,and capital requirements.展开更多
文摘The paper presents a comprehensive model of a banking system that integrates network effects,bankruptcy costs,fire sales,and cross-holdings.For the integrated financial market we prove the existence of a price-payment equilibrium and design an algorithm for the computation of the greatest and the least equilibrium.The number of defaults corresponding to the greatest price-payment equilibrium is analyzed in several comparative case studies.These illustrate the individual and joint impact of interbank liabilities,bankruptcy costs,fire sales and cross-holdings on systemic risk.We study policy implications and regulatory instruments,including central bank guarantees and quantitative easing,the significance of last wills of financial institutions,and capital requirements.
