Infinite horizon discrete time non-cooperative games with observable actions of players and discounting of future single period payoffs are a suitable tool for analyzing emergence and sustainability of cooperation bet...Infinite horizon discrete time non-cooperative games with observable actions of players and discounting of future single period payoffs are a suitable tool for analyzing emergence and sustainability of cooperation between all players because they do not contain the last period. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a standard solution concept for them. It requires only immunity to unilateral deviations in any subgame. It does not address immunity to deviations by coalitions. In particular, it does not rule out cooperation based on punishments of unilateral deviations that the grand coalition would like to forgive. We first briefly review concepts of renegotiation-proofness that rule out such forgiveness. Then we discuss the concept of strong perfect equilibrium that requires immunity to all deviations by all coalitions in all subgames. In games with only one level of players (e.g. members of the population engaged in the same type of competitive activity), it fails to exist when the Pareto efficient frontier of the set of single period payoff vectors has no sufficiently large flat portion. In such a case, it is not possible to punish unilateral deviations in a weakly Pareto efficient way. In games with two levels of players (e.g. members of two populations with symbiotic relationship, while activities within each population are competitive), it is possible to overcome this problem. The sum of benefits of all players during a punishment can be the same as when nobody is punished but its distribution between the two populations can be altered in favor of the punishers.展开更多
We analyze an infinite horizon discrete time inventory model with deterministic but non-stationary demand for a single product at a single stage. There is a finite cycle of vectors of characteristics of the environmen...We analyze an infinite horizon discrete time inventory model with deterministic but non-stationary demand for a single product at a single stage. There is a finite cycle of vectors of characteristics of the environment (demand, fixed ordering cost, variable procurement cost, holding cost) which is repeated after a finite number of periods. Future cost is discounted. In general, minimization of the sum of discounted total cost over the cycle does not give the minimum of the sum of discounted total cost over the infinite horizon. We construct an algorithm for computing of an optimal strategy over the infinite horizon. It is based on a forward in time dynamic programming recursion.展开更多
基金supported by grant VEGA 1/0181/12 from the Slovak Ministry of Education,Science,Research,and Sport.
文摘Infinite horizon discrete time non-cooperative games with observable actions of players and discounting of future single period payoffs are a suitable tool for analyzing emergence and sustainability of cooperation between all players because they do not contain the last period. A subgame perfect equilibrium is a standard solution concept for them. It requires only immunity to unilateral deviations in any subgame. It does not address immunity to deviations by coalitions. In particular, it does not rule out cooperation based on punishments of unilateral deviations that the grand coalition would like to forgive. We first briefly review concepts of renegotiation-proofness that rule out such forgiveness. Then we discuss the concept of strong perfect equilibrium that requires immunity to all deviations by all coalitions in all subgames. In games with only one level of players (e.g. members of the population engaged in the same type of competitive activity), it fails to exist when the Pareto efficient frontier of the set of single period payoff vectors has no sufficiently large flat portion. In such a case, it is not possible to punish unilateral deviations in a weakly Pareto efficient way. In games with two levels of players (e.g. members of two populations with symbiotic relationship, while activities within each population are competitive), it is possible to overcome this problem. The sum of benefits of all players during a punishment can be the same as when nobody is punished but its distribution between the two populations can be altered in favor of the punishers.
基金the grant VEGA 1/0181/12 from the Slovak Ministry of Education, Science, Research, and Sport
文摘We analyze an infinite horizon discrete time inventory model with deterministic but non-stationary demand for a single product at a single stage. There is a finite cycle of vectors of characteristics of the environment (demand, fixed ordering cost, variable procurement cost, holding cost) which is repeated after a finite number of periods. Future cost is discounted. In general, minimization of the sum of discounted total cost over the cycle does not give the minimum of the sum of discounted total cost over the infinite horizon. We construct an algorithm for computing of an optimal strategy over the infinite horizon. It is based on a forward in time dynamic programming recursion.
