This paper examines the relations between the disciplinary role of Japanese relationship-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, such as keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors, and pay for performance sen...This paper examines the relations between the disciplinary role of Japanese relationship-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, such as keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors, and pay for performance sensitivity in Japan. Previous studies show that pay for performance sensitivity of Japanese executive compensation is positive and almost the same as in a market-oriented system like that of the United States of America （USA）. However, previous studies do not investigate how Japanese corporate governance mechanisms like financial keiretsu ties and bank-appointed directors affect pay for performance sensitivity. This paper finds that the disciplinary mechanism of keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed monitors did not function well in Japan in the 1990s.展开更多
文摘This paper examines the relations between the disciplinary role of Japanese relationship-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, such as keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors, and pay for performance sensitivity in Japan. Previous studies show that pay for performance sensitivity of Japanese executive compensation is positive and almost the same as in a market-oriented system like that of the United States of America （USA）. However, previous studies do not investigate how Japanese corporate governance mechanisms like financial keiretsu ties and bank-appointed directors affect pay for performance sensitivity. This paper finds that the disciplinary mechanism of keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed monitors did not function well in Japan in the 1990s.
