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Differential Game Model of Resource Extraction with Continuous and Dynamic Updating
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作者 ovanes petrosian Tihomirov Denis +1 位作者 Jiang-Jing Zhou Hong-Wei Gao 《Journal of the Operations Research Society of China》 EI CSCD 2024年第1期51-75,共25页
This paper is devoted to a new class of differential games with continuous and dynamic updating.The direct application of resource extraction in a case of dynamic and continuous updating is considered.It is proved tha... This paper is devoted to a new class of differential games with continuous and dynamic updating.The direct application of resource extraction in a case of dynamic and continuous updating is considered.It is proved that the optimal control(cooperative strategies)and feedback Nash equilibrium strategies uniformly converge to the corresponding strategies in the game model with continuous updating as the number of updating instants converges to infinity.Similar results are presented for an optimal trajectory(cooperative trajectory),equilibrium trajectory and corresponding payoffs. 展开更多
关键词 Differential games Dynamic updating Continuous updating Optimal control Feedback Nash equilibrium
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Irrational-Behavior-Proof Conditions Based on Limit Characteristic Functions 被引量:2
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作者 Cui LIU Hongwei GAO +2 位作者 ovanes petrosian Juan XUE Lei WANG 《Journal of Systems Science and Information》 CSCD 2019年第1期1-16,共16页
Irrational-behavior-proof(IBP) conditions are important aspects to keep stable cooperation in dynamic cooperative games. In this paper, we focus on the establishment of IBP conditions.Firstly, the relations of three k... Irrational-behavior-proof(IBP) conditions are important aspects to keep stable cooperation in dynamic cooperative games. In this paper, we focus on the establishment of IBP conditions.Firstly, the relations of three kinds of IBP conditions are described. An example is given to show that they may not hold, which could lead to the fail of cooperation. Then, based on a kind of limit characteristic function, all these conditions are proved to be true along the cooperative trajectory in a transformed cooperative game. It is surprising that these facts depend only upon the individual rationalities of players for the Shapley value and the group rationalities of players for the core. Finally,an illustrative example is given. 展开更多
关键词 dynamic cooperative GAME irrational-behavior-proof condition LIMIT characteristic function individual RATIONALITY
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