We study stable and strongly stable matchings in the marriage market with indifference in their preferences.We characterize the stable matchings as integer extreme points of a convex polytope.We give an alternative pr...We study stable and strongly stable matchings in the marriage market with indifference in their preferences.We characterize the stable matchings as integer extreme points of a convex polytope.We give an alternative proof for the integrity of the strongly stable matching polytope.Also,we compute men-optimal(women-optimal)stable and strongly stable matchings using linear programming.When preferences are strict,we find the men-optimal(women-optimal)stable matching.展开更多
基金We acknowledge financial support from UNSL(No.032016 and 030320)from Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas(CONICET)(No.PIP 112-200801-00655)from Agencia Nacional de Promoción Científica y Tecnológica(No.PICT 2017-2355).
文摘We study stable and strongly stable matchings in the marriage market with indifference in their preferences.We characterize the stable matchings as integer extreme points of a convex polytope.We give an alternative proof for the integrity of the strongly stable matching polytope.Also,we compute men-optimal(women-optimal)stable and strongly stable matchings using linear programming.When preferences are strict,we find the men-optimal(women-optimal)stable matching.
