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AN INVARIANCE PRINCIPLE IN LARGE POPULATION STOCHASTIC DYNAMIC GAMES 被引量:1
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作者 Minyi HUANG peter E. CAINES roland p. malhame 《Journal of Systems Science & Complexity》 SCIE EI CSCD 2007年第2期162-172,共11页
We study large population stochastic dynamic games where the so-called Nash certainty equivalence based control laws are implemented by the individual players. We first show a martingale property for the limiting cont... We study large population stochastic dynamic games where the so-called Nash certainty equivalence based control laws are implemented by the individual players. We first show a martingale property for the limiting control problem of a single agent and then perform averaging across the population; this procedure leads to a constant value for the martingale which shows an invariance property of the population behavior induced by the Nash strategies. 展开更多
关键词 Large population martingale representation Nash equilibrium optimal control stochastic dynamic games
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