This paper discusses the relationship of two independently developed models of games with incomplete information,hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games.It can be considered as a generalization of the previous stud...This paper discusses the relationship of two independently developed models of games with incomplete information,hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games.It can be considered as a generalization of the previous study on the theoretical comparison of simple hypergames and Bayesian games(Sasaki and Kijima,2012) by taking into account hierarchy of perceptions,i.e.,an agent's perception about the other agents' perceptions,and so on.The authors first introduce the general way of transformation of any hierarchical hypergames into corresponding Bayesian games,which was called as the Bayesian representation of hierarchical hypergames.The authors then show that some equilibrium concepts for hierarchical hypergames can be associated with those for Bayesian games and discuss implications of the results.展开更多
文摘This paper discusses the relationship of two independently developed models of games with incomplete information,hierarchical hypergames and Bayesian games.It can be considered as a generalization of the previous study on the theoretical comparison of simple hypergames and Bayesian games(Sasaki and Kijima,2012) by taking into account hierarchy of perceptions,i.e.,an agent's perception about the other agents' perceptions,and so on.The authors first introduce the general way of transformation of any hierarchical hypergames into corresponding Bayesian games,which was called as the Bayesian representation of hierarchical hypergames.The authors then show that some equilibrium concepts for hierarchical hypergames can be associated with those for Bayesian games and discuss implications of the results.
