We investigate cooperative behaviors of lattice-embedded scale-free networking agents in the prisoner'sdilemma game model by employing two initial strategy distribution mechanisms,which are specific distribution t...We investigate cooperative behaviors of lattice-embedded scale-free networking agents in the prisoner'sdilemma game model by employing two initial strategy distribution mechanisms,which are specific distribution to themost connected sites (hubs) and random distribution.Our study indicates that the game dynamics crucially dependson the underlying spatial network structure with different strategy distribution mechanism.The cooperators' specificdistribution contributes to an enhanced level of cooperation in the system compared with random one,and cooperationis robust to cooperators' specific distribution but fragile to defectors' specific distribution.Especially,unlike the specificcase,increasing heterogeneity of network does not always favor the emergence of cooperation under random mechanism.Furthermore,we study the geographical effects and find that the graphically constrained network structure tends toimprove the evolution of cooperation in random case and in specific one for a large temptation to defect.展开更多
文摘We investigate cooperative behaviors of lattice-embedded scale-free networking agents in the prisoner'sdilemma game model by employing two initial strategy distribution mechanisms,which are specific distribution to themost connected sites (hubs) and random distribution.Our study indicates that the game dynamics crucially dependson the underlying spatial network structure with different strategy distribution mechanism.The cooperators' specificdistribution contributes to an enhanced level of cooperation in the system compared with random one,and cooperationis robust to cooperators' specific distribution but fragile to defectors' specific distribution.Especially,unlike the specificcase,increasing heterogeneity of network does not always favor the emergence of cooperation under random mechanism.Furthermore,we study the geographical effects and find that the graphically constrained network structure tends toimprove the evolution of cooperation in random case and in specific one for a large temptation to defect.
