This paper reinterprets the relation between Derridian deconstruction and Husserlian phenomenology on the basis of their respective methodological commitments.According to the proposed view,epoche,reduction,and eideti...This paper reinterprets the relation between Derridian deconstruction and Husserlian phenomenology on the basis of their respective methodological commitments.According to the proposed view,epoche,reduction,and eidetic variation are the fundamental methodological principles of Husserlian phenomenology.This paper interprets Derrida's reading of Husserl as presenting a type of semiological reductionism,which is marked by the absorption of the fundamental phenomenological principles within a semiological framework.Conceiving of meaning as a sign that refers to other signs,Derrida contends that neither epoche,nor reduction,nor eidetic variation can be carried through successfully;their validity is thereby indefinitely deferred.This paper also addresses the relationship between indication and expression,the Principle of all Principles,the living present,and their alleged deconstruction in Derrida's writings.I conclude with some suggestions concerning how,apart from deconstructing phenomenology,one could also phenomenologize deconstruction.According to my suggestion,this would require problematizing evidence that underlies the central claims and commitments of deconstruction.展开更多
This paper offers a systematic account of Scheler＇s phenomenology of pain, addresses its place in the history of the phenomenology of pain and traces its significance for pain research. Against the popular view, whic...This paper offers a systematic account of Scheler＇s phenomenology of pain, addresses its place in the history of the phenomenology of pain and traces its significance for pain research. Against the popular view, which maintains that for Scheler pain is a feeling-state, this paper argues that Scheler conceives of pain as an irreducibly ambiguous phenomenon： as both a non-intentional feeling-state and an intentional feeling. This paper further shows how this ambiguity leads Scheler to qualify pain as a stratified phenomenon, composed of causal, sensory, emotive and cognitive dimensions. This paper demonstrates how such a stratified conception enables one to draw meaningful distinctions between pain and other emotive phenomena, such as suffering, illness, and despair. This paper concludes with some remarks concerning the significance of Scheler＇s phenomenology of pain for pain research.展开更多
文摘This paper reinterprets the relation between Derridian deconstruction and Husserlian phenomenology on the basis of their respective methodological commitments.According to the proposed view,epoche,reduction,and eidetic variation are the fundamental methodological principles of Husserlian phenomenology.This paper interprets Derrida's reading of Husserl as presenting a type of semiological reductionism,which is marked by the absorption of the fundamental phenomenological principles within a semiological framework.Conceiving of meaning as a sign that refers to other signs,Derrida contends that neither epoche,nor reduction,nor eidetic variation can be carried through successfully;their validity is thereby indefinitely deferred.This paper also addresses the relationship between indication and expression,the Principle of all Principles,the living present,and their alleged deconstruction in Derrida's writings.I conclude with some suggestions concerning how,apart from deconstructing phenomenology,one could also phenomenologize deconstruction.According to my suggestion,this would require problematizing evidence that underlies the central claims and commitments of deconstruction.
文摘This paper offers a systematic account of Scheler＇s phenomenology of pain, addresses its place in the history of the phenomenology of pain and traces its significance for pain research. Against the popular view, which maintains that for Scheler pain is a feeling-state, this paper argues that Scheler conceives of pain as an irreducibly ambiguous phenomenon： as both a non-intentional feeling-state and an intentional feeling. This paper further shows how this ambiguity leads Scheler to qualify pain as a stratified phenomenon, composed of causal, sensory, emotive and cognitive dimensions. This paper demonstrates how such a stratified conception enables one to draw meaningful distinctions between pain and other emotive phenomena, such as suffering, illness, and despair. This paper concludes with some remarks concerning the significance of Scheler＇s phenomenology of pain for pain research.
