Although China’s local governments are facing greater financial pressure,they often sell industrial land at low prices to attract investment.Local government land transfer strategies refl ect driving mechanisms of of...Although China’s local governments are facing greater financial pressure,they often sell industrial land at low prices to attract investment.Local government land transfer strategies refl ect driving mechanisms of officials’behavior.Based on the micro data of about 340000 industrial land sales in 289 prefecture-level cities in China from 2006 to 2015,this paper divides industrial land transfer into two categories,namely land transfer with the aim of attracting investment and normal transfer,according to whether the transfer price is lower than the minimum price stipulated by central government.The paper explores the strategies of industrial land transfer under financial pressure and the motivation differences of officials with the help of changes in local land transfers after the introduction of economic stimulus policies.It is found that financial pressure will signifi cantly reduce local industrial land transfer with the aim of investment attraction.However,after the introduction of economic stimulus policies,although financial pressure has increased,the infl uence of financial pressure on local governments’investment-induced land transfer behavior significantly weakened due to the increase of out-of-system financing channels,thus industrial land transfer with the aim of attracting investment has increased signifi cantly.From the perspective of promotion incentives of officials,officials with longer term were more inclined to sell industrial land to attract investment.Therefore,it is necessary to rationally arrange the financial resources and powers of central and local governments,to adapt reasonable macro control method and strategy,and to build an offi cial evaluation system that meets the needs of high-quality development.展开更多
基金Humanities and Social Sciences Research Planning Fund of the Ministry of Education:the Green Growth Effect of Regional Environmental Regulation from the Perspective of Environmental Total Factor Productivity(19YJAZH062)special fund support for basic scientific research of universities directly under the Ministry of Education(2722019PY025,2722020PY032).
文摘Although China’s local governments are facing greater financial pressure,they often sell industrial land at low prices to attract investment.Local government land transfer strategies refl ect driving mechanisms of officials’behavior.Based on the micro data of about 340000 industrial land sales in 289 prefecture-level cities in China from 2006 to 2015,this paper divides industrial land transfer into two categories,namely land transfer with the aim of attracting investment and normal transfer,according to whether the transfer price is lower than the minimum price stipulated by central government.The paper explores the strategies of industrial land transfer under financial pressure and the motivation differences of officials with the help of changes in local land transfers after the introduction of economic stimulus policies.It is found that financial pressure will signifi cantly reduce local industrial land transfer with the aim of investment attraction.However,after the introduction of economic stimulus policies,although financial pressure has increased,the infl uence of financial pressure on local governments’investment-induced land transfer behavior significantly weakened due to the increase of out-of-system financing channels,thus industrial land transfer with the aim of attracting investment has increased signifi cantly.From the perspective of promotion incentives of officials,officials with longer term were more inclined to sell industrial land to attract investment.Therefore,it is necessary to rationally arrange the financial resources and powers of central and local governments,to adapt reasonable macro control method and strategy,and to build an offi cial evaluation system that meets the needs of high-quality development.
