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Solutions to BSDEs Driven by Both Standard and Fractional Brownian Motions 被引量:5
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作者 wei-yin fei Deng-Feng XIA Shu-guang ZHANG 《Acta Mathematicae Applicatae Sinica》 SCIE CSCD 2013年第2期329-354,共26页
The backward stochastic differential equations driven by both standard and fractional Brownian motions (or, in short, SFBSDE) axe studied. A Wick-It6 stochastic integral for a fractional Brownian motion is adopted. ... The backward stochastic differential equations driven by both standard and fractional Brownian motions (or, in short, SFBSDE) axe studied. A Wick-It6 stochastic integral for a fractional Brownian motion is adopted. The fractional It6 formula for the standard and fractional Brownian motions is provided. Introducing the concept of the quasi-conditional expectation, we study some its properties. Using the quasi-conditional expectation, we also discuss the existence and uniqueness of solutions to general SFBSDEs, where a fixed point principle is employed. Moreover, solutions to linear SFBSDEs are investigated. Finally, an explicit solution to a class of linear SFBSDEs is found. 展开更多
关键词 fractional Brownian motion Malliavin calculus fractional It6 formula quasi-conditional expec-tation SFBSDE
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Optimal Contract for the Principal-Agent Under Knightian Uncertainty 被引量:3
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作者 Kun-Lun Wang Chen fei wei-yin fei 《Journal of the Operations Research Society of China》 EI CSCD 2020年第4期637-654,共18页
Under the Knightian uncertainty,this paper constructs the optimal principal(he)-agent(she)contract model based on the principal’s expected profit and the agent’s expected utility function by using the sublinear expe... Under the Knightian uncertainty,this paper constructs the optimal principal(he)-agent(she)contract model based on the principal’s expected profit and the agent’s expected utility function by using the sublinear expectation theory.The output process in the model is provided by the agent’s continuous efforts and the principal cannot directly observe the agent’s efforts.In the process of work,risk-averse agent will have the opportunity to make external choices.In order to promote the agent’s continuous efforts,the principal will continuously provide the agents with consumption according to the observable output process after the probation period.In this paper,the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation is deduced by using the optimality principle under sublinear expectation while the smoothness viscosity condition of the principal-agent optimal contract is given.Moreover,the continuation value of the agent is taken as the state variable to characterize the optimal expected profit of the principal,the agent’s effort and the consumption level under different degrees of Knightian uncertainty.Finally,the behavioral economics is used to analyze the simulation results.The research findings are that the increasing Knightian uncertainty incurs the decline of the principal’s maximum profit;within the probation period,the increasing Knightian uncertainty leads to the shortening of probation period and makes the agent give higher effort when she faces the outside option;what’s more,after the smooth completion of the probation period for the agent,the agent’s consumption level will rise and her effort level will drop as Knightian uncertainty increasing. 展开更多
关键词 Knightian uncertainty PRINCIPAL-AGENT Sublinear expectation HJB equation Behavioral economics
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