目的 研究氨甲环酸不同给药途径对接受闭合复位股骨近端防旋髓内钉(PFNA)内固定术治疗的老年股骨粗隆间骨折患者围术期失血情况,以及血红蛋白(Hb)、红细胞压积(HCT)水平的影响。方法 选取2020年6月至2022年5月期间安徽医科大学附属巢湖...目的 研究氨甲环酸不同给药途径对接受闭合复位股骨近端防旋髓内钉(PFNA)内固定术治疗的老年股骨粗隆间骨折患者围术期失血情况,以及血红蛋白(Hb)、红细胞压积(HCT)水平的影响。方法 选取2020年6月至2022年5月期间安徽医科大学附属巢湖医院收治的122例老年股骨粗隆间骨折患者,均行闭合复位PFNA内固定术治疗,根据随机数字表法将患者分为对照组(33例,不使用氨甲环酸)、术中局部给药组(32例,术中局部应用氨甲环酸)、术前静脉给药组(26例,术前30 min静脉滴注氨甲环酸)、联合给药组(31例,术中局部联合术前静脉应用氨甲环酸)。比较4组患者显性出血量、总失血量、隐性失血量及手术时间,术前及术后1、3、5 d Hb、HCT水平。结果 与对照组比,术中局部给药组、术前静脉给药组、联合给药组患者显性出血量、总失血量、隐性失血量均显著减少,且联合给药组上述指标均显著低于术前静脉给药组、术中局部给药组;与术前比,术后1~5 d 4组患者Hb、HCT水平均显著降低,与对照组比,术后各时间点术中局部给药组、术前静脉给药组、联合给药组患者Hb、HCT水平均显著升高,但联合给药组显著高于术中局部给药组、术前静脉给药组(均P<0.05)。术中局部给药组、术前静脉给药组患者显性出血量、总失血量、隐性失血量及术后1~5 d Hb、HCT水平,4组患者手术时间、术后1个月血栓发生率比较,差异均无统计学意义(均P>0.05)。结论 氨甲环酸采用术中局部与术前静脉联合的给药方式应用于老年股骨粗隆间骨折患者手术中,可发挥良好的止血效果,同时对血液系统影响较小,可预防血栓、贫血的发生。展开更多
Frege's Concept Horse Paradox shows difficulty in Frege's theory of semantics.Frege himself thinks the paradox originates from the necessity of language,and this view is shared by some other philosophers.In co...Frege's Concept Horse Paradox shows difficulty in Frege's theory of semantics.Frege himself thinks the paradox originates from the necessity of language,and this view is shared by some other philosophers.In contrast,Wright and Hale do not think that this paradox originates from the language but from Frege's own theory,which implicitly holds Reference Principle.However Trueman claims that this paradox can be ignited without Reference Principle.In this paper I argue that this ignition is essentially utilizing the Reference Principle.I also explain how the Reference Principle develops into its final formulation,in order to reply to Trueman'complaint.Furtherly,I defend Hale's revision of Frege's theory against Trueman's critics.展开更多
Hintikka thinks that second-order logic is not pure logic,and because of Godel's incompleteness theorems,he suggests that we should liberate ourselves from the mistaken idea that first-order logic is the foundatio...Hintikka thinks that second-order logic is not pure logic,and because of Godel's incompleteness theorems,he suggests that we should liberate ourselves from the mistaken idea that first-order logic is the foundational logic of mathematics.With this background he introduces his independence friendly logic(IFL).In this paper,I argue that approaches taking Hintikka’s IFL as a foundational logic of mathematics face serious challenges.First,the quantifiers in Hintikka’s IFL are not distinguishable from Linstrom's general quantifiers,which means that the quantifiers in IFL involve higher order entities.Second,if we take Wright’s interpretation of quantifiers or if we take Hale’s criterion for the identity of concepts,Quine’s thesis that second-order logic is set theory will be rejected.Third,Hintikka's definition of truth itself cannot be expressed in the extension of language of IFL.Since second-order logic can do what IFL does,the significance of IFL for the foundations of mathematics is weakened.展开更多
Godel asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of GOdel's conceptual realism's basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism ...Godel asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of GOdel's conceptual realism's basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz's and Kant's philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, Grdel asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too naive to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. Grdel and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, Grdel thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of Grdel's conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from naive, despite what some philosophers have claimed.展开更多
文摘目的 研究氨甲环酸不同给药途径对接受闭合复位股骨近端防旋髓内钉(PFNA)内固定术治疗的老年股骨粗隆间骨折患者围术期失血情况,以及血红蛋白(Hb)、红细胞压积(HCT)水平的影响。方法 选取2020年6月至2022年5月期间安徽医科大学附属巢湖医院收治的122例老年股骨粗隆间骨折患者,均行闭合复位PFNA内固定术治疗,根据随机数字表法将患者分为对照组(33例,不使用氨甲环酸)、术中局部给药组(32例,术中局部应用氨甲环酸)、术前静脉给药组(26例,术前30 min静脉滴注氨甲环酸)、联合给药组(31例,术中局部联合术前静脉应用氨甲环酸)。比较4组患者显性出血量、总失血量、隐性失血量及手术时间,术前及术后1、3、5 d Hb、HCT水平。结果 与对照组比,术中局部给药组、术前静脉给药组、联合给药组患者显性出血量、总失血量、隐性失血量均显著减少,且联合给药组上述指标均显著低于术前静脉给药组、术中局部给药组;与术前比,术后1~5 d 4组患者Hb、HCT水平均显著降低,与对照组比,术后各时间点术中局部给药组、术前静脉给药组、联合给药组患者Hb、HCT水平均显著升高,但联合给药组显著高于术中局部给药组、术前静脉给药组(均P<0.05)。术中局部给药组、术前静脉给药组患者显性出血量、总失血量、隐性失血量及术后1~5 d Hb、HCT水平,4组患者手术时间、术后1个月血栓发生率比较,差异均无统计学意义(均P>0.05)。结论 氨甲环酸采用术中局部与术前静脉联合的给药方式应用于老年股骨粗隆间骨折患者手术中,可发挥良好的止血效果,同时对血液系统影响较小,可预防血栓、贫血的发生。
基金supported by the Research Foundation of Renmin University of China(Grant No.13XNJ047)
文摘Frege's Concept Horse Paradox shows difficulty in Frege's theory of semantics.Frege himself thinks the paradox originates from the necessity of language,and this view is shared by some other philosophers.In contrast,Wright and Hale do not think that this paradox originates from the language but from Frege's own theory,which implicitly holds Reference Principle.However Trueman claims that this paradox can be ignited without Reference Principle.In this paper I argue that this ignition is essentially utilizing the Reference Principle.I also explain how the Reference Principle develops into its final formulation,in order to reply to Trueman'complaint.Furtherly,I defend Hale's revision of Frege's theory against Trueman's critics.
基金Renmin University of China’s 2018 Fund for Building World-Class Universities(Disciplines).
文摘Hintikka thinks that second-order logic is not pure logic,and because of Godel's incompleteness theorems,he suggests that we should liberate ourselves from the mistaken idea that first-order logic is the foundational logic of mathematics.With this background he introduces his independence friendly logic(IFL).In this paper,I argue that approaches taking Hintikka’s IFL as a foundational logic of mathematics face serious challenges.First,the quantifiers in Hintikka’s IFL are not distinguishable from Linstrom's general quantifiers,which means that the quantifiers in IFL involve higher order entities.Second,if we take Wright’s interpretation of quantifiers or if we take Hale’s criterion for the identity of concepts,Quine’s thesis that second-order logic is set theory will be rejected.Third,Hintikka's definition of truth itself cannot be expressed in the extension of language of IFL.Since second-order logic can do what IFL does,the significance of IFL for the foundations of mathematics is weakened.
文摘Godel asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of GOdel's conceptual realism's basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz's and Kant's philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, Grdel asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too naive to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. Grdel and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, Grdel thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of Grdel's conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from naive, despite what some philosophers have claimed.