According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, ...According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the formulation and implementation of compensation contracts by means of their managerial power. As fair value has been introduced into the new accounting standards in China, new concerns have arisen over the relationship between profits and losses from changes in fair value(CFV) and levels of executive compensation.In this study, we find that executive compensation is significantly related to CFV. However, this sensitivity is asymmetric in that increases to compensation due to profits from changes in fair value(PCFV) are higher than reductions to compensation due to losses from changes in fair value(LCFV). Furthermore,we find that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry.展开更多
基金supported by the Leading Academic Discipline Project from the Education Committee of Shanghai (Project No.J51701)the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project No.70902063)+2 种基金the Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (Project Nos.09YJC630157 and 12YJA790197)the Key Research and Innovation Project of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission (11ZS86)the IAPHD Project of Nanjing University
文摘According to optimal contracting theory, compensation contracts are effective in solving the agency problem between stockholders and managers. Executive compensation is naturally related to firm performance. However, contracts are not always perfect. Managers may exert influence on the formulation and implementation of compensation contracts by means of their managerial power. As fair value has been introduced into the new accounting standards in China, new concerns have arisen over the relationship between profits and losses from changes in fair value(CFV) and levels of executive compensation.In this study, we find that executive compensation is significantly related to CFV. However, this sensitivity is asymmetric in that increases to compensation due to profits from changes in fair value(PCFV) are higher than reductions to compensation due to losses from changes in fair value(LCFV). Furthermore,we find that managerial power determines the strength of this asymmetry.
