Pricing and Service Strategies for Two-sided Platforms

Nowadays,more and more transactions or interactions like online dating and shopping are completed on two-sided platforms involving two groups of agents.On these two-sided platforms,there often exist cross-network effects,i.e., the benefits that agents at one side receive are positively related to the number of agents at the other side,and vice versa.This paper considers such two-sided platforms,where the platforms offer a certain service to attract agents of both sides to join the platforms,and then charge agents who join the platforms a lump-sum fee to gain the profit.We present service and pricing strategies for both monopolistic and duopolistic platforms,respectively.We also investigate the impact of platforms'life cycle on their service and pricing strategies.Some managerial implications are shown.

Platform Competition for Advertisers and Viewers in Media Markets with Endogenous Content and Advertising

In this paper,we investigate two competing pay-tv platforms or free-to-air media platforms that consist of two groups of agents:viewers and advertisers.The pay-tv platforms can receive revenues from charging viewers pay-per-view prices and advertising,while the free-to-air platforms can only obtain all incomes from advertising.We discuss and compare advertising intensities and program content provisions of the two competing media platforms.Our findings show that if the extent to which viewers dislike advertising(the nuisance for advertising)is more massive than the marginal benefit that advertisers receive from an additional viewer,the pay-tv stations tend to maximally differentiate their program content and charge the viewers higher pay-per-view prices.If the nuisance approaches to the marginal benefit,however,both stations should offer similar program content,and charge the viewers lower prices under certain conditions.Particularly,if both platforms provide duplicated content,they should subsidize the viewers.In contrast,we show that the free-to-air media platforms never duplicate program content with a positive nuisance for advertising,and tend to offer maximal differentiated content if the nuisance is sufficiently large.Moreover,we reveal that if the viewers greatly dislike advertising(care less about advertising),the advertising volume of the pay-tv platforms is lower(higher)than that of the free-to-air platforms.Finally,we extend our base model to the case in which a pay-tv platform competes against a free-to-air station,and numerically show that the profit of the pay-tv platform may be larger or smaller than that of the free-to-air station.

Effective shape-controlled synthesis of gallium selenide nanosheets by vapor phase deposition

The controlled synthesis of large and uniform gallium selenide(GaSe)crystals is crucial for its various applications based on the attractive properties of this emerging material.In this work,vapor phase growth of high-quality monolayer GaSe nanosheets with multiple shape and size is achieved by tuning the Ga/GaSe ratio in the precursor.A theoretical model based on density functional theory calculations and kinetic Wulff construction theory describe the observed shape evolution of the GaSe nanosheets.Results show that the Ga/Se ratio plays a critical role in the evolution of the domain shape and size.Moreover,the as-grown GaSe nanosheets show improved performance with photoresponse time less than 0.7 ms and responsibility up to 3,000 AW.This study presents a previously unexplored strategy for the controlled growth of two-dimensional(2D)GaSe nanosheets for promising applications in next-generation optoelectronics.

Optimal Pricing Strategies for a Manufacturer and a Value-Adding Retailer in a Dual-Channel Environment

In this paper,we study a supply chain that consists of a manufacturer and a value-adding retailer that sell a product to customers through dual channels,i.e.a traditional channel(TC)and an online channel(OC).Observing that in practice,the manufacturer may or may not offer an OC guide price to the retailer and/or act as the leader in the supply chain,we discuss and compare two practical pricing strategies,with and without an OC guide price,under two different power configurations based on which member of the supply chain acts as the leader.Our results show that if the manufacturer does not provide a guide price,the retailer might/might not set a higher TC price than the two OC prices,depending on the level of migration effectiveness and the potential market demand.However,if the manufacturer does provide a guide price,the retailer will always charge a higher TC price than the guide price(or the two OC prices)when the retailer acts as the leader.Moreover,we show that the two players in the supply chain might or might not prefer the pricing strategies with an OC guide price.Our results also indicate that migration effectiveness harms the retailer's profit,and the manufacturer may benefit from mild competition between the two channels.Finally,we show that regardless of whether the manufacturer chooses to offer an OC guide price or not,both the manufacturer and the retailer prefer to act as the follower for high migration effectiveness and the profit of the supply chain will increase when the retailer acts as the leader for low migration effectiveness.

Horizontal Mergers between Asymmetric Low-Carbon Manufacturers

Mergers have become an important means for low-carbon manufacturers to improve their efficiency and competitiveness.This paper studies the impact of horizontal mergers between asymmetric low-carbon manufacturers on product diversity,profits,consumer surplus,and the environment.In the premerger model,we consider two asymmetric manufacturers in terms of market potential that produce two products and compete on prices and carbon emissions.In the postmerger model,the two asymmetric manufacturers merge into one firm.The merged manufacturer can either continue to produce two products and collude on both products'prices and carbon emissions or enjoy both production and green technology investment cost savings to produce only one product.Our result suggests that when the merged manufacturer produces two products,the merger does not necessarily lead to higher prices,which stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom.Furthermore,the merger always benefits the manufacturer but harms consumers.When the merged manufacturer chooses to produce only one product,however,we confirm that the merger can lead to a win-win-win outcome,i.e.,the manufacturer,customers,and environment all become better off if either the production or investment savings are salient.The conventional wisdom shows that salient costing savings lead to price reduction.Nevertheless,we show that the merged manufacturer can charge consumers higher prices to provide lower-emission products.In addition,we show that improving investment(production)cost savings is more effective for the merged manufacturer if these two cost savings are salient(not salient).Finally,the merged manufacturer should not reduce diversity if these two cost savings are relatively low because the profit and consumer surplus may be simultaneously lower.We also extend our base model to the case where there exist three manufacturers in the premerger model and the merged firm still operates in a competitive market.

Transaction or Membership?Impact on On-Demand Delivery Service Platforms'Profits,Consumer Surplus,and Labor Welfare

In recent years,two pricing policies are commonly adopted by on-demand delivery service platforms(e.g,Meituan PaoTui and Costco)that provide delivery services to heterogeneous customers via self-scheduling providers.One called"transaction-based"pricing policy(TBPP)allows the platforms to determine a per-service wage paid to providers and a price charged to customers for each transaction.The other one called"membership-based"pricing policy(MBPP)also allows the platforms to announce a wage paid to providers but charge customers a membership fee for using an unlimited number of the services in a certain period(e.g.,one month).This paper considers an on-demand delivery service platform with self-scheduling providers and two classes of customers(i.e.,regular and frequent customers).We aim to analyze and compare the platform's profits and welfare performances generated by the two pricing policies.If the number of regular customers and their preference for TBPP equal the number of frequent customers and their preference for MBPP,respectively,we show that compared with the MBPP,employing the TBPP is beneficial for the platform but is detrimental for customers and providers.However,adopting the MBPP(TBPP)can simultaneously benefit the platform,customers and providers if frequent customers'preference for MBPP is higher(lower)than regular customers'preference for TBPP or the number of frequent customers is larger(less)than regular customers.