When an emergency happens, the scheduling of relief resources to multiple emergency locations is a realistic and intricate problem, especially when the available resources are limited. A non-cooperative games model an...When an emergency happens, the scheduling of relief resources to multiple emergency locations is a realistic and intricate problem, especially when the available resources are limited. A non-cooperative games model and an algorithm for scheduling of relief resources are presented. In the model, the players correspond to the multiple emergency locations, strategies correspond to all resources scheduling and the payoff of each emergency location corresponds to the reciprocal of its scheduling cost. Thus, the optimal results are determined by the Nash equilibrium point of this game. Then the iterative algorithm is introduced to seek the Nash equilibrium point. Simulation and analysis are given to demonstrate the feasibility and availability of the model.展开更多
文摘When an emergency happens, the scheduling of relief resources to multiple emergency locations is a realistic and intricate problem, especially when the available resources are limited. A non-cooperative games model and an algorithm for scheduling of relief resources are presented. In the model, the players correspond to the multiple emergency locations, strategies correspond to all resources scheduling and the payoff of each emergency location corresponds to the reciprocal of its scheduling cost. Thus, the optimal results are determined by the Nash equilibrium point of this game. Then the iterative algorithm is introduced to seek the Nash equilibrium point. Simulation and analysis are given to demonstrate the feasibility and availability of the model.
