This paper carries out a game-theoretic analysis of a single-server queueing system with setup times under N-policy by considering both the partially observable and the partially unobservable information scenarios. Th...This paper carries out a game-theoretic analysis of a single-server queueing system with setup times under N-policy by considering both the partially observable and the partially unobservable information scenarios. The server switches off whenever the system becomes empty, and is resumed when the number of customers reaches a certain threshold value. Customers decide whether to join or to balk the system upon arrival based on their available information. The equilibrium joining strategy of customers as well as the systemzs performance measures are derived under different information levels. We find that both Follow-the-Crowd (FTC) and Avoid-the-Crowd (ATC) behaviors exist in our system. Numerical results show that the social welfare is unimodal in the threshold, and is decreasing in the waiting cost.展开更多
The article“Equilibrium Joining Strategies in the M/M/1 Queues with Setup Times under N-Policy”unfortunately contained a mistake about the first author’s affiliation.In the original publication of the paper,this af...The article“Equilibrium Joining Strategies in the M/M/1 Queues with Setup Times under N-Policy”unfortunately contained a mistake about the first author’s affiliation.In the original publication of the paper,this affiliation was“Department of Mathematics,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China”.It should be“School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing,100190,China”.展开更多
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71871008 and 71571014.
文摘This paper carries out a game-theoretic analysis of a single-server queueing system with setup times under N-policy by considering both the partially observable and the partially unobservable information scenarios. The server switches off whenever the system becomes empty, and is resumed when the number of customers reaches a certain threshold value. Customers decide whether to join or to balk the system upon arrival based on their available information. The equilibrium joining strategy of customers as well as the systemzs performance measures are derived under different information levels. We find that both Follow-the-Crowd (FTC) and Avoid-the-Crowd (ATC) behaviors exist in our system. Numerical results show that the social welfare is unimodal in the threshold, and is decreasing in the waiting cost.
文摘The article“Equilibrium Joining Strategies in the M/M/1 Queues with Setup Times under N-Policy”unfortunately contained a mistake about the first author’s affiliation.In the original publication of the paper,this affiliation was“Department of Mathematics,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China”.It should be“School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing,100190,China”.
