Strategic interaction between institutional investors and supervision department:a theoretical analysis of low‑price collusion in SBIC

We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LIIs),small and medium-sized institutional investors(SMIIs),and supervision department(SD).The results show that supervision behaviors of SD,and quotation behaviors of institutional investors,are subject to supervision conditions.Under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are lower a lot than minimum benefits of light supervision(light supervision condition),SD will choose light supervision and institutional investors will turn to illegal quotation in response.Finally,a steady-state equilibrium with low-price collusion will form in SIBC’s inquiry market even with a large supervision penalty for illegal quotation.On the contrary,under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are higher a lot than maximum benefits of light supervision(tough supervision condition)and with a large penalty for illegal quotation,SD and institutional investors will choose tough supervision and legal quotation.Further numerical simulations under light supervision condition show that:(1)High-price culling rule will become a booster for low-price collusion and accelerate SMIIs’evolutionary process to imitative quotation.(2)Blindly increasing penalties for illegal quotation or reducing the culling rate is not an appropriate approach to solve the problem of low-price collusion since it cannot shift supervision condition from light into tough and make SD supervise toughly.(3)Institutional investors’choices of quotation strategies are more volatile and highly susceptible to supervision behaviors of SD when facing exogenous uncertainty.Therefore,the keys to solving the problem of low-price collusion are shifting supervision condition from light into tough through increasing incremental benefits of tough supervision,and providing institutional investors with a stable and predictable supervision policy.In conclusion,the creation of a fair inquiry market doesn’t only depend on restraint and punishment to institutional investors,but also requires the establishment of supervision mechanism those are compatible with market-based inquiry.

The transition from traditional banking to mobile internet finance:an organizational innovation perspective-a comparative study of Citibank and ICBC

The development of Financial Technology(FinTech)in areas such as mobile Internet,cloud computing,big data,search engines,and blockchain technology have significantly changed the financial industry.FinTech is expected to overturn the traditional banking business model,forcing banks to upgrade and transform.This study adopts a comparative case study method to contrast and analyze the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China(ICBC)and Citibank.It analyzes the strategies,organizations,HR systems,and product innovations adopted by these two banks in response to the impact of FinTech.This paper proposes an“electric vehicle”mode for ICBC and an“airplane mode”for Citibank.Further,it describes the difficulties encountered by the Chinese banking industry and proposes some feasible ways to upgrade.“Technology power”will become the core competitive concept for the financial institutions of the future.

Gasification of iron coke and cogasification behavior of iron coke and coke under simulated hydrogen-rich blast furnace condition

To explore the iron coke application in hydrogen-rich blast furnace,which is an effective method to achieve the purpose of low carbon emissions,the initial gasification temperature of iron coke in CO_(2) and H_(2)O atmosphere and its cogasification reaction mechanism with coke were systematically studied.Iron coke was prepared under laboratory conditions,with a 0-7wt%iron ore powder addition.The properties of iron cokes were tested by coke reactivity index(CRI)and coke strength after reaction(CSR),and their phases and morphology were evolution discussed by scanning electron microscopy and X-ray diffraction analysis.The results indicated that the initial gasification temperature of iron coke decreased with the increase in the iron ore powder content under the CO_(2) and H_(2)O_((g))atmosphere.In the 40vol%H_(2)O+60vol%CO_(2) atmosphere,CRI of iron coke with the addition of 3wt%iron ore powder reached 58.7%,and its CSR reached 56.5%.Because of the catalytic action of iron,the reaction capacity of iron coke was greater than that of coke.As iron coke was preferentially gasified,the CRI and CSR of coke were reduced and increased,respectively,when iron coke and coke were cogasified.The results showed that the skeleton function of the coke can be protected by iron coke.

PRICING FOR CORPORATE PROPERTY RIGHTS TRANSFER WITH STOCHASTIC MARKETS

This paper employs the real option theory to develop a pricing model for the transfer of property rights.We list the conditions for the good,intermediate and bad firms respectively,and work out the closed-form solution to the equilibrium transfer price,the optimal transfer timing.Using the comparative static analysis,we find that for good firms the transfer price of the target is increasing in its capital.The higher the capital of the target owns,the faster it will be transferred.For intermediate and bad firms,similar conclusions can be derived.The larger gap between the acquirer＇s size and market power and those of the target,the lower the transfer triggered price.The transfer price goes up as the capital ratio of the acquirer over the target diminishes,while it is decreasing in the amount of the capital the target owns.