论《老子》的三个道德律令

《老子》之道德形上学以人的“德性”为出发点,通过经验批判和确立生命原则来寻求最高的以“无”为核心的道德实践原则,因而有其纯粹性。人之得道,有赖于超越“形我”的内在本真,即婴儿状态的“含德之厚”,归之于生命自我的“恒常”和“无待”,由此从“无”进到“应该”,表明其道德价值取向,并从人追求本真状态的自由境界得出“无为”、“不争”和“知足”三个道德律令。

The Concept of Being; Where There Is No Pertinence between Avicenna and Aristotle＇s Live Dog Better than Dead King

In 2012, my winter in Athens began with Aristotle＇s Metaphysics Zeta. Among strong classical philologists, 1 was the only student whose understanding of metaphysics had been based on Avicenna. After a while 1 found myself amid audiences beforehand precluded to compromise milestones of mine. But on the contrary, I embarked to reread both of the Avicenna and Aristotle from entirely different angle again. Inquiring in the concept of Being in both of the Aristotle and Avicenna was the first candidate of my decision. This paper is the result of mentioned concern. Aristotle＇s equivalence between the question of ＂what substance is＂ rendered to the question of ＂what being is＂ in addition to spelling out the implications of this observation done by Avicenna--basing on his own metaphysics---constitutes the body of my paper.

Kant＇s Copernican Revolution

In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains his critical method ＂as an experiment＂ in metaphysics. The aim of that ＂experiment＂ is to establish ＂an entire revolution＂ in philosophical thinking, which was initiated by the Copernican revolution in cosmology in order to find the secure path, and its possibility application to metaphysics. Kant＇s aim in Critique of Pure Reason is to rescue metaphysics from a ＂blind groping＂ by undertaking a revolution in metaphysics as Copernicus has brought to cosmology. Kant＇s Copernican turn consists in the assertion that the possibility of knowledge requires that ＂the objects must conform to our cognition.＂ From Kant＇s view, we can know only what we ＂construct,＂ ＂make,＂ or ＂produce＂ as a necessary condition of knowledge, but we cannot know the mind--independent external world, i.e., the world which is independent of us. Kant＇s epistemological constructivism is the central point to his Copernican revolution.

An Equivalence of Moore＇s Paradox and G6del＇s Incompleteness Sentence in Two-Valued Algebra of Formal Ethics

The paper submits surprising results of systematical investigating a formal-ethical aspect of conjoining Wittgenstein＇s, Moore＇s, Parmenides＇, GSdel＇s, and Lukasiewicz＇s ideas. A critique of Wittgenstein＇s critique of the natural language of ethics and of metaphysics results in submitting and elaborating a new paradigm of metaphysics as formal axiology （in particular, formal ethics）. In result, the classical metaphysics and ethics of moral rigor are represented as two-valued algebraic systems of metaphysics and formal ethics respectively. By means of this algebraic model, all the well-known scandal-making metaphysical tenets of Parmenides are produced as translations of corresponding algebraic equations from the symbolic language to the natural one. At the level of submitted discrete mathematical model of formal axiology, Parmenides＇ metaphysical （formal-axiological） concepts ＂consistency＂ and ＂inconsistency,＂ ＂completeness＂ and ＂incompleteness＂ are compared with G^del＇s logic ones. Formal-axiological meanings of the words ＂consistency,＂ ＂incompleteness,＂ ＂being,＂ ＂nonbeing,＂ ＂movement,＂ ＂knowledge,＂ ＂belief,＂ etc., are considered as moral-evaluation-functions determined by one moral-evaluation-variable. Binary moral-evaluation-functions are studied as well. The functions are precisely defined by tables. Precise definitions of ＂formal-axiological-equivalence,＂ ＂formal-axiological-law,＂ and ＂formal-axiological contradiction＂ are submitted. Thus, one can either generate or examine formal-axiological equations of algebra of metaphysics by ＂computing＂ relevant compositions of moral-value-functions. Using this ＂moral-value-table-computation-technique,＂ one can arrive to a surprising conclusion that both the notorious sentence of Moore （called ＂epistemic paradox＂） and the incompleteness sentence of Godel are formally-axiologically inconsistent ones： Hence, they are formally-axiologically equivalent. For overcoming the negative psychological effect of such a surprising result, the author has used graphic models explicating the famous Lukasiewicz＇s statement ＂Logic is morality of thought and speech.＂

Contradictory Freedoms？ Kant on Moral Agency and Political Rights

This essay examines the degree to which Kant＇s understanding of external freedom and right are consistent with and can form a part of his moral philosophy. In doing so, this essay begins by looking at the foundation and possibility of moral experience as it is presented in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. This essay then turns to explore Kant＇s understanding of external freedom and right as set out in The Metaphysics of Morals and examines the apparent inconsistencies that exist between these concepts and Kant＇s explication of moral worth. After pointing out the distinction between right and morality, this essay goes on to argue that, strictly speaking, Kant＇s conception of external freedom and right cannot form part of his moral philosophy （as so defined in the Groundwork）. Finally, this essay concludes by arguing that although right and morality are irreconcilable, Kant＇s account of external freedom and right can nevertheless serve as part of his ＂moral＂ philosophy insofar as these concepts represent Kant＇s attempt to externalize the moral law, or simply expand the definition of morality to cover any action that accords with the right.

再论康德关于伦理与道德的区分及其意义

针对学界普遍认为康德不区分伦理与道德、甚至黑格尔对康德所做的众所周知的批评:在康德伦理学中只有道德而无伦理的观点,通过详细考察康德在其《伦理形而上学探本》(Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten)一书中关于“伦理”(Sitte)和“道德”(Moral)、“伦理性”(Sittlichkeit)和“道德性”(Moralitat)以及“伦理法则(Sittengesetz)“道德的法则”(das moralische Gesetz)的具体使用语境,以此证明康德在其著作中实际上已经对“伦理”和“道德”作出了比较严格的区分。基于康德的区分,我们才能清楚地知道,“伦理法则”是“先天立法”的,是在“理念”中为一切规范奠定自由的根据,从而是“自由的法则”;而“道德的法则”是对“伦理法则”的评价性表述,“道德的”(moralisch)作为形容词使用,不具有主体意义,“伦理法则”才是康德伦理学的主词。康德哲学中有两种“伦理学”(Ethik)概念,一种是与“物理学”(Physik)或“自然学”(Naturlehre)相对的伦理学(Sittenlehre),可称之为“大伦理学”,它探求与“自然法则”相对的“自由法则”,“伦理法则”作为“自由法则”,其“伦理性”具有普遍性、客观性和绝对性之含义;一种是与“法权学说”(ius;Rechtslehre)相对的伦理学,它不为“行动本身”立法而只为行动的“主观准则”立法,因而是作为“德性学说”(Tugenslehre)的“伦理学”(ethica)。在为“主观准则”立法的“德性论”意义上,康德确立了其“道德性”(Moralitat)概念,它与先天立法的“伦理性”相区别,是单一个体在“行动”发生之前为考虑该行动“该不该发生”“该如何发生”的“先行立法”,它涉及这样一种行为原则:永远都要将“普遍的法则”当作自己行动的“主观准则”,因而它只是在行动者的个人意志中所确立,而不像先天立法的伦理法则那样,是被给予的(gegeben)。康德的Metaphysik der Sitten严格按照康德的语义学,只能翻译为“伦理形而上学”,它区别于作为“通俗的伦理处世智慧”的“道德哲学”(Moralphilosphie),但恰恰又是要将它提升到“伦理形而上学”,以便把具有“先天立法”能力的“伦理法则”作为个人主观意志立法(道德性)的普遍、必然的标准。依据康德这样的“伦理”与“道德”的区别,黑格尔对康德的批判,故意的误解多于可接受的事实,是早该抛弃的成见。