Central bank digital currency,loan supply,and bank failure risk:a microeconomic approach

Central bank digital currencies(CBDCs),which are legal tenders in digital form,are expected to reduce currency issuance and circulation costs and broaden the scope of monetary policy.In addition,these currencies may also reduce consumers’need for conventional demand deposits,which,in turn,increases banks’loan provision costs because deposits require higher rates of return.We use a microeconomic banking model to investigate the effects of introducing an economy-wide,account-type CBDC on a bank’s loan supply and its failure risk.Given that a CBDC is expected to lower the cost of liquidity circulation and become a strong substitute for demand deposits,both the loan supply and the bank failure risk increase.These increases are countered by subsequent increases in the rates of return on term deposits and loans,which,in turn,reduce the loan supply and thus bank failure risk.These offsetting forces lead to no significant change in banking,as long as the rate of return on loans is below a certain threshold.However,once the rate is above the threshold,bank failure risk increases,thereby undermining banking stability.The problem is more pronounced when the degree of pass-through of funding costs to the loan rate is high and the profitability of a successful project is low.Our results imply that central banks wishing to introduce an economy-wide,account-type CBDC should first monitor yields on bank loans and consider policy measures that induce banks to maintain adequate liquidity reserve levels.

The Digital Currency of China’s Central Bank:Digital Currency Electronic Payment(DCEP)

DCEP is the Chinese version of Central Bank Digital Currency(CBDC).It is the only legal digital currency in China and meets four conditions:(a)it is issued by the central bank;(b)it is digitized;(c)it is account and wallet based;(d)it is oriented towards the general public.As a retail central bank digital currency,it has three main technical features:a“tiered limit arrangement”(small-scale payments can be made anonymously while large-scale payments cannot),a“two-tier operating system”(as with the central bank-commercial bank traditional model),and a“dual offline payment system”(supporting both parties of the transaction).Compared with CBDCs in other countries,China’s DCEP has smaller economic impacts,more obscure strategic goals,and more scarce technical details.But its progress in testing is ahead of central banks of other countries.This article is based on public information and is intended to explain what DCEP is and why and how it was developed.It also offers suggestions for future research.

Independence and Accountability of Central Banks With a Special Focus on India

According to the consensus view, central banks reached a high level of independence by the end of last century. This paper argues that as a result short-term political considerations applied during the appointment process of central bank decision-makers, their actual independence was at a lower level already that time. The global f＇mancial crisis created new tasks for central banks and forced a review of the meaning of independence. The paper argues that central banks should be responsible for safeguarding fmancial stability and their macro-prudential activity can only be executed in cooperation with governments. However, interest rate policy decisions must remain free of political influence. The novelty of this paper lies in showing the conflictual relationship of the various roles of central banks. The paper concludes that the duality of independence and cooperation represents a major uncertainty in the operation of central banks. As a result of the greater degree of politicisation of the activities of central banks, their de facto independence in interest rate policy making may further shrink in the future. The paper also shows that India represents a unique case of central bank independence. In most countries, de jure independence is higher than de facto. India is one of the very rare countries where the reverse is the case.

Central Bank Interest Rate Policy as a Pro-Crisis Instrument of Macroeconomic Regulation

Why does interest rate policy not work in the economy as economic theory suggests?To understand why,you need to look at the economy from a higher level of abstraction.With this approach,only two states of the economy can be distinguished.The first is a“normal”state;the second is crisis and recession.The“normal”state is the period after the recession and before the next crisis.During this period,the basic laws of the market economy work.During a crisis,the relationship between the level of interest rates and borrowing by households and businesses is broken.This explains the ineffectiveness of the policy of lowering interest rates.Different states of the economy have their own laws,and you cannot extrapolate tools that are successful under“normal”market conditions linearly to the crisis state of the economy.Why does the interest rate policy during the period of the“normal”state of the economy not adjust its development in order to prevent the onset of the crisis?Firstly,the conditions for the emergence of crisis phenomena are created by the interest rate policy at the very beginning of the business cycle,when central banks set and maintain low interest rates for a relatively long period.Secondly,by the end of the business cycle,the credit burden in economy reaches its maximum,so there is no further possibility of expanding effective demand by decreasing interest rates.Thirdly,interest rate policy is an instrument for rough adjustment of the economy,indiscriminately affecting all participants in economic relations.In an attempt to stimulate the economy,the central bank creates the conditions for increasing its imbalance.Fourth,at the end of the business cycle,the interest rate policy does not actually support the real economy,but only the stock market.Fifth,the Fed’s policy has formed a pro-crisis conditioned reflex among market participants.Thus,central banks should leave the determination of the level of interest rates to the free market.

Economic uncertainty,central bank digital currency,and negative interest rate policy

The covID-19 outbreak has brought unprecedented social attention to economic uncertainty and negative interest rate policy(NIRP).How does uncertainty affect economic activity,and how effective is a NIRP based on central bank digital currency(CBDC)?To answer the two questions,we constructed a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium(DSGE)model that accommodates sticky prices and wages.The results indicated:(i)Economic uncertainty has substantially reduced investment,output,wage,and loans,which increases unemployment risk.In the short term,it has triggered impulsive consumption by households,while consumption has fallen into a slump in the long run.(ii)After suffering an uncertainty shock,the economy entered short-term stagflation and long-term deflation.The short-term stagflation was mainly caused by resident wage adjustment,and the long-term deflation was due to the decline in effective demand caused by unemployment risk.(ii)CBDC could eliminate the zero lower bound(ZLB)constraint,thereby improving the effectiveness of NIRP.Compared with traditional currency,CBDCbased NIRP could more effectively smooth macroeconomic fluctuations and alleviate the negative impact of an uncertainty shock,which is more conducive to restoring market confidence and promoting economic recovery.

The Threat of Financial Sanctions:What Safeguards Can Central Banks Build?

The sanctions imposed by the G10 countries on financial institutions in Russia,including on its central bank,mil come under scrutiny by emerging market central banks.This will help them build appropriate safeguards against disruptions to cross-border transactions and revise their investment mandates to reduce the risk of reserve asset freezes.Building new1 financial market infrastructure and cross-border payment systems,or strengthening existing ones,will become the priority of emerging global powers.The goal will be to build systems that support democratic governance mechanisms,have oversight arrangements involving the central banks of trusted countries,and promote fair and safe access to clearing and settlement under well-defined policy guidelines.The use of alternatives to the US dollar as the invoicing currency in international trade will gather momentum.Markets for energy and other commodities will be the change drivers.China has an important role to play.

China's Central Bank Issues Additional Rule on QFII Custodianship

China’s central bank issued an additional regulation recently concerning the Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFH) scheme, clarifying key procedural matters when banks apply for a custodian’s role.The government has unveiled the long-awaited reform in the early Nov. 2002, allowing foreigners through such QFHs to trade its A. shares and bonds. Six banks, including three Chinese and three foreign ones, have already applied to

Transactional Network Analysis and Money Laundering Behavior Identification of Central Bank Digital Currency of China

With the gradual application of central bank digital currency(CBDC)in China,it brings new payment methods,but also potentially derives new money laundering paths.Two typical application scenarios of CBDC are considered,namely the anonymous transaction scenario and real-name transaction scenario.First,starting from the interaction network of transactional groups,the degree distribution,density,and modularity of normal and money laundering transactions in two transaction scenarios are compared and analyzed,so as to clarify the characteristics and paths of money laundering transactions.Then,according to the two typical application scenarios,different transaction datasets are selected,and different models are used to train the models on the recognition of money laundering behaviors in the two datasets.Among them,in the anonymous transaction scenario,the graph convolutional neural network is used to identify the spatial structure,the recurrent neural network is fused to obtain the dynamic pattern,and the model ChebNet-GRU is constructed.The constructed ChebNet-GRU model has the best effect in the recognition of money laundering behavior,with a precision of 94.3%,a recall of 59.5%,an F1 score of 72.9%,and a microaverage F1 score of 97.1%.While in the real-name transaction scenario,the traditional machine learning method is far better than the deep learning method,and the micro-average F1 score of the random forest and XGBoost models both reach 99.9%,which can effectively identify money laundering in currency transactions.

Central Bank’s New Duo

The People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the country’s central bank, recently appointed two new vice governors. Ma Delun (left) and Yi Gang replaced Wu Xiaoling, who retired due to age, and Xiang Junbo, who was

隐私信息供需视域下央行数字货币与现金替换:模型与数值分析

本文从隐私信息供需分析出发,通过拆解CBDC与实物现金使用净效用差异阐明社会平均隐私偏好强度与CBDC使用情况的基本逻辑;将社会平均隐私偏好纳入货币搜寻框架构建含隐私因素的货币替代模型,考察社会平均隐私偏好与CBDC替代现金的关系;借助数值分析手段对强保密型、弱保密型和可控保密型CBDC技术进行情景模拟。研究发现,社会平均隐私偏好变化通过商家交易激励影响CBDC和现金的流动性,若商家(消费者)平均隐私偏好更强,CBDC相对现金的比例增加(下降);福利最大化的一种情形是CBDC-现金结构与社会平均隐私偏好强度相匹配且商品均匀分布;可控保密型CBDC在抵御强隐私偏好冲击和福利效应维度占有相对优势;引入可控保密型CBDC后中国情景的最大化社会福利水平最高,一般经济体次之,发达经济体最小。

朝鲜政府的五次币制改革及启示

朝鲜的币制改革一直是世界关注的焦点,系统了解和把握其历次改革的动因与进程以及实施结果十分重要。1946年,朝鲜设立国立中央银行构建了独立发行主权货币的自主银行体系,并且相继进行了五次币制改革,即1947年、1959年、1979年、1992年、2009年的币制改革,带来了商品价格、价格标准以及社会货币流通量等的较大变化。不过,每次所处的时代背景和特点及政策效果是不同的,有时夯实了货币制度基础,提高了中央银行对宏观经济的掌控能力,但有时也引起了货币体系紊乱和过大价格波动,影响了国民经济稳定发展。朝鲜也正在不断总结经验,研究符合国内经济运行的新的货币制度及中央银行改革。

货币政策预期管理的宏观经济效应:兼论流动性监管的作用

面对逐渐升高的经济不确定性和预期转弱压力,通过强化预期管理来提升货币政策有效性变得更加重要,同时考虑到流动性监管对货币政策具有重要影响,本文从实证和理论角度探讨货币政策预期管理的宏观经济效应,并兼顾考察流动性监管对货币政策和宏观经济的影响。SVAR模型的经验证据表明,货币政策预期冲击表现为正向需求冲击,刺激宏观经济的同时引起货币政策的扩张性响应,流动性监管冲击具有相似的效果。进一步构建NK-DSGE模型,在模型中引入货币政策预期和流动性监管,利用我国宏观经济数据和贝叶斯方法估计该模型,研究发现:引入预期可以提升货币政策的调控效果,但当前我国货币政策中未预期到的成分仍较多;流动性监管能较好地防范流动性风险,稳定宏观经济,但监管带来的流动性约束会在一定程度上削弱宽松货币政策的刺激效果。本文的结论对加强货币政策预期管理、推动货币政策与流动性监管协同发力具有一定的借鉴意义。

央行信息披露对通胀预期的非对称效应研究

本文构建了央行分层化信息披露指数,测度了公众通胀预期,并基于MSVAR模型分区制探讨了央行信息披露对通胀预期的非对称效应。研究结果表明:(1)央行信息披露可以有效引导公众通胀预期,且在经济繁荣区制下,央行信息披露对通胀预期的引导作用大于经济平稳及经济衰退区制;(2)央行使用描述物价上涨、经济增长加速的措辞频率越高,公众通胀预期就越高,即目标性央行信息披露对通胀预期的影响为正,且这种正向影响在经济衰退区制下更大;(3)央行宽松性货币政策意图越强,公众通胀预期越高,即政策性央行信息披露对通胀预期的影响也为正,且这种正向影响在经济繁荣区制下更大。与目标性央行信息披露相比,政策性央行信息披露对通胀预期的影响较小。本文的结论为央行进一步健全信息披露机制提供了新的思路。

法定数字货币对商业银行风险承担的影响

运用支付投资组合模型和金融中介模型,分析法定数字货币发行对商业银行风险承担的影响机制,并结合中国2007—2020年344家银行的面板数据进行实证检验。研究表明,法定数字货币发行对存款的挤占会增加商业银行的风险承担水平,并通过银行放贷能力、流动性水平和银行盈利能力的中介机制发挥作用。此外,金融科技发展水平会影响法定数字货币发行对商业银行风险承担的影响强度,并且该调节效应具有门槛特征,即金融科技发展水平跨越门槛值之后,正向促进法定数字货币和银行风险承担之间关系的作用会减弱,从长期来看金融科技的积极作用不容忽视。本文研究结论对于了解法定数字货币发行相关风险敞口特征、探寻防范化解法定数字货币风险对策具有一定的政策参考价值。

数字货币强制执行的问题与化解

我国法院迈向切实解决执行难的进程也是执行制度迈向适配数字金融治理的进程,强制执行的法定性、非抗辩性、要求协助性及惩防措施的准确性,与制度和技术之中的数字货币之隔阂是对数字货币强制执行的问题所在。作为金融创新的产物,私人数字货币为特定的虚拟财产,实体法应当明确,法院应依履行基础有无分别判决交付返还原物和返还财产性权益。此后强制执行中的执行标的是非金钱债权,为解决判决返还原物后的执行难,法院应建立与数字货币平台的联动执行机制。作为金融普惠的产物,央行数字货币是特殊种类物,此后强制执行中的执行标的是金钱债权,央行数字货币的执行查控和执行惩防机制应当得到完善。法院在对两类数字货币的强制执行中都应实现强制性和灵活性相结合、微观面向和宏观面向相统一。

央行担保品扩容、企业融资能力与绿色创新效率——基于企业绿色债券视角

为加强货币政策有效调控,以绿色技术创新推动绿色产业高质量发展,使用多时点双重差分模型,探究央行担保品扩容政策对企业融资能力和绿色创新效率的影响,研究发现:央行担保品扩容政策能显著提升发债企业的融资能力和绿色创新效率,且在国有企业和污染企业中政策效果更明显;扩容政策效果通过降低融资约束来提高融资能力进而显著提升企业绿色创新效率,对质量和数量创新效率同样具有显著提升作用;当企业经济不确定性低、商业信用环境好和行业垄断程度高时,扩容政策的传导效果更显著;扩容政策效果存在区域差异性,在科技金融结合试点城市和非绿色金融改革试验区效果更明显。

数字人民币推进跨境资本管理创新的作用机制

我国央行数字货币(CBDC)在提升货币政策与跨境资本管理效能方面蕴含可观的创新潜力。与其他国家CBDC相比,数字人民币(e-CNY)体现了我国金融科技发展的特色和优势,契合我国经济实际和金融高质量发展需求。未来数字人民币还可在提升货币政策传导效率、促进金融包容性、增强宏观经济政策跨领域协同性等方面发挥更积极的作用,助力实现高水平和高效能的跨境资本管理(CFMs)。在CBDC框架下实施资本流动管理的三个层级分别为用户界面层、央行架构层和跨境平台层。技术层面挑战与先发优势实现、相关法律与制度有待完善、国际货币体系环境限制、数据治理共识与国际标准缺失,是数字人民币进一步发展面临的主要挑战。未来需要持续优化数字人民币的技术链,完善相关法律与制度,积极参与多边协商和机制创新,加强与其他国家的数字货币合作,审慎评估和设计数字货币的治理机制,妥善弥合分歧,为全球CBDC的数据治理一致性贡献“中国方案”。