期刊文献+
共找到2篇文章
< 1 >
每页显示 20 50 100
E-Supply Chain Incentive and Coordination Based on Revenue Sharing Contract 被引量:4
1
作者 常志平 蒋馥 《Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong university(Science)》 EI 2004年第1期42-48,共7页
This paper took the buyer-biased electronic market as an example, where multiple suppliers selling short-life-cycle products are bidding for an order from a powerful buyer with stochastic customer demand. It used a si... This paper took the buyer-biased electronic market as an example, where multiple suppliers selling short-life-cycle products are bidding for an order from a powerful buyer with stochastic customer demand. It used a single period newsvendor model to analyze the decision of supplied and buyers to do or not do business online. The results suggest that lack of Incentive is the key factor of B2B electronic markets failure. At the same time, it designed a revenue sharing contract to coordinate the E-supply chain in order to prevent failure of E-market. 展开更多
关键词 electronic markets E-supply chain INCENTIVE COORDINATION supply chain contracts
下载PDF
The Supply Chain Contract Design under Cap-and-Trade Mechanism with Free Riding
2
作者 Fu-qiang Wang Jun Liu 《Frontiers of Engineering Management》 2015年第3期277-286,323,共11页
This paper studies the influence of free riding on enterprise product pricing and carbon emissions reduction investment, as well as the contract design to achieve supply chain coordination under the carbon trading mec... This paper studies the influence of free riding on enterprise product pricing and carbon emissions reduction investment, as well as the contract design to achieve supply chain coordination under the carbon trading mechanism. First, we discuss the situation where carbon emissions reduction investment affects the product price and income. It demonstrates that the optimal investment of the upstream manufacturer increases with the degree of the free riding of the downstream manufacturer. The upstream manufacturer can improve their carbon reduction investment and the whole supply chain achieves Pareto improvement when the investment cost sharing contract is introduced. Nevertheless, under the cost-sharing contract the optimal investment of the decentralized supply chain is still lower than that of the centralized supply chain, and only in some particular cases can the two types of supply chain achieve equal total profits. Then, we preliminarily explore the situation where the product price and income is influenced by carbon emissions reduction investment. The consequences indicate that the optimal investment of the upstream manufacturers in this situation is less than the former one's, and the transfer payment mechanism is able to improve the level of the supply chain overall carbon emissions-reduction. Moreover, compared to the former situation, the effects of free riding of the downstream manufacturer are even more serious. The conclusions can provide some intellectual support for manufacturing enterprises to make reasonable emissions reduction strategies and coordinate the supply chain existing in free riding. 展开更多
关键词 carbon emissions reduction free riding supply chain contract design CAP-AND-TRADE
原文传递
上一页 1 下一页 到第
使用帮助 返回顶部