Regional Guanxi Culture and Entrepreneurs＇ Action Logic： A Multilevel Analysis

At the beginning of the reform period, though informal institutions as a substitute for formal institutions efficiently promoted the development of private enterprises, it eroded and destroyed the authority and execution efficiency of formal institutions with guanxi behaviors and implicit rules. With the progress of marketization, how to restrain and guide the evolution of informal institutions is an tmavoidable obstacle for the development of private enterprises-- transforming their competitive strategy from ＂non-market＂ dominance to ＂market＂ dominance. Based on survey data of 2,628 private enterprises from 31 provinces in China, we establish a regional commercial culture index to empirically investigate the different influences of guanxi behavior between entrepreneurs of different ages and regional guanxi culture. The results show that, compared with entrepreneurs who started businesses in recent years, i.e., after the 1990s, those who started businesses during the 1970s and the 1980s are more dependent on guanxi behaviors. Meanwhile, the higher the level of education, the less an entrepreneur is likely to be dependent on guanxi behaviors. However, compared with the constraint of the degree of regional marketization, regional guanxi culture promotes entrepreneurs＇ guanxi behaviors. Further research indicates that the more enterprises depart from regional guanxi culture, the stronger the ability to innovation. This study can not only enrich the institutional analysis of entrepreneurs＇ guanxi behaviors, but also provide a theoretical foundation for further expansion and deepening of reform.

The Nature and Avoidance of the ＂Middle Income Trap＂

The ＂middle income trap＂ is a significant theoretical and practical issue closely related to the economic and social transition and sustainable development of a country. This paper explores the essence of the ＂middle income trap＂ and ways to avoid it. It reveals that the inner nature of the ＂middle income trap＂ lies in the institutional transition dilemma, which results essentially from a lack of reasonable and clear definitions of governance boundaries between government and market as well as government and society. This lack of boundaries causes coexistent and interrelated government inefficiency, market distortion/failure and social anomie, leading to a stagnant transition from a factor-driven to an efficiency-driven and further innovation-driven economy. Moreover, this paper proposes that the proper way to avoid the ＂trap＂ can be found in the reconstruction of the state governance mode, that is, to transition from a development-oriented and omnipotent government to a public service-oriented and limited government, from factor-driven to efficiency-driven and further innovation-driven development, and from a traditional society to a modem civil society through defining reasonable and clear boundaries between government and market as well as government and society. Thus, reconstruction can establish a state public governance mode featuring the interactive role of government, market and society, and achieve the modernization of state governance systems and capacity.