Strategic interaction between institutional investors and supervision department:a theoretical analysis of low‑price collusion in SBIC

We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LIIs),small and medium-sized institutional investors(SMIIs),and supervision department(SD).The results show that supervision behaviors of SD,and quotation behaviors of institutional investors,are subject to supervision conditions.Under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are lower a lot than minimum benefits of light supervision(light supervision condition),SD will choose light supervision and institutional investors will turn to illegal quotation in response.Finally,a steady-state equilibrium with low-price collusion will form in SIBC’s inquiry market even with a large supervision penalty for illegal quotation.On the contrary,under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are higher a lot than maximum benefits of light supervision(tough supervision condition)and with a large penalty for illegal quotation,SD and institutional investors will choose tough supervision and legal quotation.Further numerical simulations under light supervision condition show that:(1)High-price culling rule will become a booster for low-price collusion and accelerate SMIIs’evolutionary process to imitative quotation.(2)Blindly increasing penalties for illegal quotation or reducing the culling rate is not an appropriate approach to solve the problem of low-price collusion since it cannot shift supervision condition from light into tough and make SD supervise toughly.(3)Institutional investors’choices of quotation strategies are more volatile and highly susceptible to supervision behaviors of SD when facing exogenous uncertainty.Therefore,the keys to solving the problem of low-price collusion are shifting supervision condition from light into tough through increasing incremental benefits of tough supervision,and providing institutional investors with a stable and predictable supervision policy.In conclusion,the creation of a fair inquiry market doesn’t only depend on restraint and punishment to institutional investors,but also requires the establishment of supervision mechanism those are compatible with market-based inquiry.

The cost of collusion:economic thinking on the uniform accommodation price of the hotel industry in Kunming,Yunnan

This paper studies the case of the collusive price of the hotel industry in Kunming by economically analyzingthe unsustainability of the collusive price and instability of collusive organizations, doubts about the collusive behavior,and thinks that the collusive price is not helpful to the development of tourism industry, the pillar industry in YunnanProvince.

Collusion detector based on G-N algorithm for trust model

In the open network environment, malicious attacks to the trust model have become increasingly serious. Compared with single node attacks, collusion attacks do more harm to the trust model. To solve this problem, a collusion detector based on the GN algorithm for the trust evaluation model is proposed in the open Internet environment. By analyzing the behavioral characteristics of collusion groups, the concept of flatting is defined and the G-N community mining algorithm is used to divide suspicious communities. On this basis, a collusion community detector method is proposed based on the breaking strength of suspicious communities. Simulation results show that the model has high recognition accuracy in identifying collusion nodes, so as to effectively defend against malicious attacks of collusion nodes.

DEFENSE AGAINST COLLUSION SCHEME BASED ON ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOGRAPHY FOR WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS

Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are being deployed for a wide variety of applications and the security problems of them have received considerable attention. Considering the limitations of power, computation capability and storage resources, this paper proposed an efficient defense against collusion scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography for wireless sensor networks in order to solve the problems that sensor node-key leaking and adversaries make compromised nodes as their collusions to launch new attack. In the proposed scheme, the group-key distribution strategy is employed to compute the private key of each sensor node, and the encryption and decryption algorithms are constructed based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The command center (node) only needs to broadcast a controlling header with three group elements, and the authorized sensor node can correctly recover the session key and use it to decrypt the broadcasting message. Analysis and proof of the proposed scheme's efficiency and security show that the proposed scheme can resist the k-collusion attack efficiently.

A Collusion-Resistant Distributed Agent-Based Signature Delegation (CDASD) Protocol for E-Commerce Applications

Mobile agent technology is promising for e-commerce and distributed computing applications due to its properties of mobility and autonomy. One of the most security-sensitive tasks a mobile agent is expected to perform is signing digital signatures on a remote untrustworthy service host that is beyond the control of the agent host. This service host may treat the mobile agents unfairly, i.e. according to its’ own benefit rather than to their time of arrival. In this research, we present a novel protocol, called Collusion-Resistant Distributed Agent-based Signature Delegation (CDASD) protocol, to allow an agent host to delegate its signing power to an anonymous mobile agent in such a way that the mobile agent does not reveal any information about its host’s identity and, at the same time, can be authenticated by the service host, hence, ensuring fairness of service provision. The protocol introduces a verification server to verify the signature generated by the mobile agent in such a way that even if colluding with the service host, both parties will not get more information than what they already have. The protocol incorporates three methods: Agent Signature Key Generation method, Agent Signature Generation method, Agent Signature Verification method. The most notable feature of the protocol is that, in addition to allowing secure and anonymous signature delegation, it enables tracking of malicious mobile agents when a service host is attacked. The security properties of the proposed protocol are analyzed, and the protocol is compared with the most related work.

政府监管下直播带货平台合谋行为的奖惩机制研究

“直播+电商”的新型商品销售模式正飞速发展,但该过程中存在诸多问题。本文考虑了直播带货平台与平台商家合谋以获取超额利润的现象,建立并分析了不同的奖惩机制下直播带货平台与政府监管机构的演化博弈模型,最终得出以下结论:静态奖惩机制与动态奖励静态惩罚机制下,系统不存在稳定均衡点;静态奖励动态惩罚和动态奖励动态惩罚机制下,系统存在稳定均衡点,但动态奖惩机制下直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率更低。动态奖惩机制下,直播带货平台和直播电商合谋行为与奖惩力度有关,当惩罚力度增加时,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋的概率下降,政府监管成本降低;当奖励强度增加时,政府严格监管概率降低,直播带货平台与平台商家合谋概率降低但变化较小。因此,政府监管机构采用科学合理的动态奖惩机制有助于直播带货行业的稳健发展。

抗理性敌手共谋的安全K-prototype聚类

针对云环境下数据隐私泄露及聚类过程中云服务器间共谋的问题,提出一种抗理性敌手共谋的安全协作K-prototype聚类方案,目的在不泄露各方隐私数据情况下根据距离度量将相似的数据进行聚类。首先,考虑到同态加密不直接支持非线性计算,基于同态加密和加性秘密共享技术设计安全比较协议和安全大于协议,并确保输入数据、中间结果及模型参数均为加性秘密份额形式,以防止单个服务器能够获得完整数据,且能实现非线性函数的精确计算,在已设计的安全计算协议基础上,实现安全距离计算、安全聚类标签更新、安全聚类中心更新、聚类标签及聚类中心重构;其次,根据博弈均衡理论设计多种高效激励机制,构造互制合约及举报合约以约束云服务器诚实非共谋地执行聚类任务;最后,对所提的安全计算协议及合约进行理论分析,并对该方案的性能进行实验验证。实验结果表明,与明文环境下的模型精度相比,该方案的模型精度损失控制在0.22%内,进而验证了所提方案的有效性。

地缘关系与机构投资者合谋报价:来自科创板IPO的经验证据

本文以科创板IPO公司为样本,基于地缘关系考察了机构投资者合谋报价行为。研究发现,科创板IPO过程中,存在地缘关系的机构投资者一致报价概率显著更高;在考虑了信息相似性、锚点报价问题、羊群效应及其他关系类型的替代性解释后,该研究结果依然成立,这表明机构投资者涉嫌实施基于地缘关系的合谋报价行为。拓展性分析显示,监管加强后,机构投资者报价行为随之改变,存在地缘关系的机构投资者一致报价频率降低,微小差异报价频率提升,从而降低了合谋报价嫌疑与被监管机构关注的风险;IPO公司信息环境较好时,机构投资者基于地缘关系的合谋报价嫌疑较低。本文不仅丰富了IPO领域的理论研究,也为舆论关切的机构投资者合谋报价问题提供了经验证据和机理解释。

平行行为的反垄断规制

长期以来,传统寡头市场中大企业协调一致的平行行为的反垄断规制一直困难重重,也由此产生了一系列相互交错的制度工具。这些制度工具包含多种相互关联的基本概念,也反映了反垄断规制对于平行行为的复杂的理论立场。随着算法时代的来临,反垄断法将面对数量更多、更为稳固的平行行为。必须进一步将缺乏合意证据的“协议”、滥用共同支配地位行为、算法合谋等视为一个同源的整体——平行行为,并明确反垄断法相应的制度工具及其发展变化,才能更好地实现对平行行为的规制。

共同机构所有权与股票市场稳定:协同治理还是合谋垄断?

随着我国资本市场的快速发展,机构投资者在同一行业持股多家公司(共同机构所有权)的经济现象日益普遍。从股价崩盘风险视角研究共同机构所有权如何影响股票市场稳定,实证研究发现:共同机构所有权显著加剧股价崩盘风险,支持合谋垄断的观点。异质性检验发现:共同机构所有权对股价崩盘风险的影响在产业资本持股更高和信息环境较差的公司样本中更显著。作用机制检验发现:存在共同机构所有权的公司会显著减少年报中负面语调的披露,并且《中华人民共和国反垄断法》的实施能够显著抑制共同机构所有权对股价崩盘风险的影响,从而验证合谋垄断动机下的坏消息隐藏机制。

有限公司股权对外转让行为的效力研究——以侵害股东优先购买权为视角

2023年《公司法》第84条就优先购买权作出规定,用以保护有限公司的人合性特征,但对侵害股东优先购买权具体情形仍未予言明,致使司法裁判和理论学说已有争议仍存在。亟待2023年《公司法》在其司法解释中对股权对外转让行为进行体系化完善。在股权转让行为方面,应采用区分原则明确股权转让行为系债权行为;在优先购买权性质认定方面,应采用公司组织法上的特殊权利说保障其他股东的顺位优势;在以侵害优先购买权主张股权转让合同无效时,应根据《民法典》规定分别对欺诈、通谋行为等情形的转让合同效力进行认定。

新形势下串通投标犯罪数据化侦查实践路径

招投标全流程电子化的日益普及给串通投标犯罪侦查工作带来了一定困难。如何不断提升串通投标犯罪的数据化侦查能力和水平,已经成为全国经济犯罪侦查理论与实务部门广泛关注并亟待解决的问题。本文通过文献研究、案例分析等方法探讨了新形势下我国串通投标犯罪产生的原因、手段及危害,较为系统地阐释了如何综合利用各种数据导侦工具、采用企业基因测序、社会网络分析等方法和技术研判风险企业、分析违法资金流向等问题,深入挖掘显性和隐性犯罪网络,锁定重点人物,构建完整的证据体系,实现对串通投标犯罪的全链条式打击。

机构大股东交叉持股与企业市场势力

本文基于我国资本市场股权结构高度集中的特征,探究机构大股东交叉持股对企业市场势力的影响。研究发现,我国资本市场机构大股东交叉持股可以显著提高投资组合公司的产品市场势力,支持了“合谋效应”假说。异质性检验发现,股权集中度越高,合谋效应越强;相比于金融资本,产业资本交叉持股的合谋效应更强。机制检验发现,机构大股东交叉持股还会通过向上操纵持股公司的生产成本以“合理化”产品价格上升。经济后果检验发现,机构大股东交叉持股的合谋效应会显著弱化《反垄断法》的实施效果。本文揭示了机构大股东交叉持股的合谋效应,讨论了其对企业市场势力的影响,对市场监管具有重要的政策启示。

基建项目业主代表寻租及各方合谋的博弈分析

在研究基础设施建设过程中因合谋产生的腐败犯罪现象时,大多数研究重点在业主方、施工方与监理方的合谋行为。然而在实际基础建设项目实施过程中,作为业主方维护自身利益派遣的业主代表,可能会因寻租行为与其他责任主体合谋损害业主方利益。为探索避免国有资产因业主代表寻租及各方合谋流失的措施,本文以博弈论视角分析基础建设项目各方主体关系以及博弈行为,建立业主代表寻租及各方合谋的博弈模型,提出业主代表寻租及各方合谋的前提条件,并通过对合谋体发生合谋的条件及理论分析明确了合谋体合谋的博弈条件。本文从制度建设、增强惩戒和提高合理收益三个方面提出措施建议,以期提高业主方打击业主代表寻租及合谋的成功率,降低各方合谋意愿。

共犯意思联络的教义学展开

意思联络是共同犯罪的成立要件,作为一种事实认知活动,是界定共犯行为性质的判断资料,不能与因果性混同。意思联络涉及法秩序对共犯行为法益侵害性的客观初步评价,建立在特定事实与犯罪关联性的基础上,具有与故意过失不同的评价内容。在对故意认定存在扩张倾向的司法现状下,有必要基于行为主义的要求,强调意思联络的独立地位与客观属性。我国刑法采取定罪与量刑分离的双层区分模式,并无对共同正犯的专门规定,共谋与德日刑法中的正犯性评价无关,共同正犯的结果归属应个别进行,没有必要承认共谋共同正犯概念。对意思联络的形成发挥重要作用者是共同正犯,在结果归属阶段,共同正犯与狭义共犯具有不同评价侧重。

《民法典》恶意串通条款的独立价值与规范释义

恶意串通行为并非违反公序良俗行为之子情形。在体系定位上,《民法典》第154条属于独立的合同无效制度。在适用范围上,《民法典》第154条可以对以股权等投资性权利为标的的转让、非商品房与动产的一物多卖、债务人的诈害行为损害担保人利益等案型中的恶意串通行为加以规制,具有独立的制度价值。恶意串通的主观构成聚焦于对“串通之恶意”的判断,当事人既需存在明知或应知行为可能导致损害之“观念”,又需具备积极追求或放任损害结果发生之“意思”。《民法典》第154条所称“他人合法权益”中的“他人”仅指向特定第三人。恶意串通的客观构成以“特定第三人财产利益”为中心,并以“造成实际损害”作为其必要条件。基于比例原则的考量,《民法典》第154条中的“无效”应为相对无效之法律效果,其只能由受害方主张,且仅相对该受保护的特定第三方无效。

网络平台轴辐协议的认定路径

网络平台轴辐协议是国际反垄断领域的新兴话题,基于平台网络性和轴辐协议隐蔽性的双重特点,它的危害程度远胜传统轴辐协议。为了顺应数字经济的发展,我国在《反垄断法》和《关于平台经济领域的反垄断指南》中引入了轴辐协议制度。传统轴辐协议的诸多理论在平台最惠国待遇条款及算法共谋等情形下无法适用,致使平台轴辐协议的认定受阻。我国可以借鉴美国和欧盟的相关经验来构建平台轴辐协议的反垄断认定路径:明晰平台轴辐协议“实质性帮助”的具体内涵;确定平台轴辐协议适用可抗辩违法推定规则;修正平台轴辐协议的主客观要件理论;完善平台轴辐协议反竞争效果的抗辩规则。

论算法共谋的反垄断法规制

算法共谋属于反垄断法的规制范畴,但是基于算法和垄断行为的复杂性,在运用反垄断法对这类行为进行规制时存在诸多困境。在违法性认定层面存在主观意图难以界定、协议行为难以认定和损害后果难以评估等困难;在责任追究层面存在主体难以明确、责任分配困难的问题;在反垄断监管层面存在监管力度不足的问题。为了有效规制算法共谋,需要在反垄断法的框架下充分利用间接证据,综合评估损害后果,明确责任的承担主体及分配原则,合理定位算法透明以及建立行之有效的监管机制。

帮助洗钱行为扩张性认定研究

随着我国刑事立法对治理洗钱行为的重视和落实,司法打击的效果亟待与实践需求相适应。由于事前允诺帮助洗钱的行为存在被评价为上游共同犯罪或洗钱罪的两可性,司法实践对“通谋”的适用不论是从时间、形式还是内容的判断上都存在扩张认定为上游共犯的倾向。其中主要原因在于洗钱罪与上游帮助犯的认定界限模糊和通谋型共同犯罪处罚的法理依据不明确。为防止司法适用中刑罚权的扩张,应当严格把握共同犯罪人的成立要件。一方面,从主观上严格限制“明知”的适用语境;另一方面,从客观上厘定行为的可罚范围并注重洗钱罪法益保护的独立性,以推进反洗钱罪名的合理适用。