We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LII...We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LIIs),small and medium-sized institutional investors(SMIIs),and supervision department(SD).The results show that supervision behaviors of SD,and quotation behaviors of institutional investors,are subject to supervision conditions.Under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are lower a lot than minimum benefits of light supervision(light supervision condition),SD will choose light supervision and institutional investors will turn to illegal quotation in response.Finally,a steady-state equilibrium with low-price collusion will form in SIBC’s inquiry market even with a large supervision penalty for illegal quotation.On the contrary,under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are higher a lot than maximum benefits of light supervision(tough supervision condition)and with a large penalty for illegal quotation,SD and institutional investors will choose tough supervision and legal quotation.Further numerical simulations under light supervision condition show that:(1)High-price culling rule will become a booster for low-price collusion and accelerate SMIIs’evolutionary process to imitative quotation.(2)Blindly increasing penalties for illegal quotation or reducing the culling rate is not an appropriate approach to solve the problem of low-price collusion since it cannot shift supervision condition from light into tough and make SD supervise toughly.(3)Institutional investors’choices of quotation strategies are more volatile and highly susceptible to supervision behaviors of SD when facing exogenous uncertainty.Therefore,the keys to solving the problem of low-price collusion are shifting supervision condition from light into tough through increasing incremental benefits of tough supervision,and providing institutional investors with a stable and predictable supervision policy.In conclusion,the creation of a fair inquiry market doesn’t only depend on restraint and punishment to institutional investors,but also requires the establishment of supervision mechanism those are compatible with market-based inquiry.展开更多
This paper studies the case of the collusive price of the hotel industry in Kunming by economically analyzingthe unsustainability of the collusive price and instability of collusive organizations, doubts about the col...This paper studies the case of the collusive price of the hotel industry in Kunming by economically analyzingthe unsustainability of the collusive price and instability of collusive organizations, doubts about the collusive behavior,and thinks that the collusive price is not helpful to the development of tourism industry, the pillar industry in YunnanProvince.展开更多
In the open network environment, malicious attacks to the trust model have become increasingly serious. Compared with single node attacks, collusion attacks do more harm to the trust model. To solve this problem, a co...In the open network environment, malicious attacks to the trust model have become increasingly serious. Compared with single node attacks, collusion attacks do more harm to the trust model. To solve this problem, a collusion detector based on the GN algorithm for the trust evaluation model is proposed in the open Internet environment. By analyzing the behavioral characteristics of collusion groups, the concept of flatting is defined and the G-N community mining algorithm is used to divide suspicious communities. On this basis, a collusion community detector method is proposed based on the breaking strength of suspicious communities. Simulation results show that the model has high recognition accuracy in identifying collusion nodes, so as to effectively defend against malicious attacks of collusion nodes.展开更多
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are being deployed for a wide variety of applications and the security problems of them have received considerable attention. Considering the limitations of power, computation capabilit...Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are being deployed for a wide variety of applications and the security problems of them have received considerable attention. Considering the limitations of power, computation capability and storage resources, this paper proposed an efficient defense against collusion scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography for wireless sensor networks in order to solve the problems that sensor node-key leaking and adversaries make compromised nodes as their collusions to launch new attack. In the proposed scheme, the group-key distribution strategy is employed to compute the private key of each sensor node, and the encryption and decryption algorithms are constructed based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The command center (node) only needs to broadcast a controlling header with three group elements, and the authorized sensor node can correctly recover the session key and use it to decrypt the broadcasting message. Analysis and proof of the proposed scheme's efficiency and security show that the proposed scheme can resist the k-collusion attack efficiently.展开更多
Mobile agent technology is promising for e-commerce and distributed computing applications due to its properties of mobility and autonomy. One of the most security-sensitive tasks a mobile agent is expected to perform...Mobile agent technology is promising for e-commerce and distributed computing applications due to its properties of mobility and autonomy. One of the most security-sensitive tasks a mobile agent is expected to perform is signing digital signatures on a remote untrustworthy service host that is beyond the control of the agent host. This service host may treat the mobile agents unfairly, i.e. according to its’ own benefit rather than to their time of arrival. In this research, we present a novel protocol, called Collusion-Resistant Distributed Agent-based Signature Delegation (CDASD) protocol, to allow an agent host to delegate its signing power to an anonymous mobile agent in such a way that the mobile agent does not reveal any information about its host’s identity and, at the same time, can be authenticated by the service host, hence, ensuring fairness of service provision. The protocol introduces a verification server to verify the signature generated by the mobile agent in such a way that even if colluding with the service host, both parties will not get more information than what they already have. The protocol incorporates three methods: Agent Signature Key Generation method, Agent Signature Generation method, Agent Signature Verification method. The most notable feature of the protocol is that, in addition to allowing secure and anonymous signature delegation, it enables tracking of malicious mobile agents when a service host is attacked. The security properties of the proposed protocol are analyzed, and the protocol is compared with the most related work.展开更多
基金funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(72172164)Natural Science Foundation of Guangdong Province(2021A1515011354).
文摘We introduce evolutionary game method to analyze low-price collusion in inquiry market of Sci-Tech Innovation Board of China(SIBC)from the perspective of strategic interaction between large institutional investors(LIIs),small and medium-sized institutional investors(SMIIs),and supervision department(SD).The results show that supervision behaviors of SD,and quotation behaviors of institutional investors,are subject to supervision conditions.Under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are lower a lot than minimum benefits of light supervision(light supervision condition),SD will choose light supervision and institutional investors will turn to illegal quotation in response.Finally,a steady-state equilibrium with low-price collusion will form in SIBC’s inquiry market even with a large supervision penalty for illegal quotation.On the contrary,under the condition that benefits of tough supervision are higher a lot than maximum benefits of light supervision(tough supervision condition)and with a large penalty for illegal quotation,SD and institutional investors will choose tough supervision and legal quotation.Further numerical simulations under light supervision condition show that:(1)High-price culling rule will become a booster for low-price collusion and accelerate SMIIs’evolutionary process to imitative quotation.(2)Blindly increasing penalties for illegal quotation or reducing the culling rate is not an appropriate approach to solve the problem of low-price collusion since it cannot shift supervision condition from light into tough and make SD supervise toughly.(3)Institutional investors’choices of quotation strategies are more volatile and highly susceptible to supervision behaviors of SD when facing exogenous uncertainty.Therefore,the keys to solving the problem of low-price collusion are shifting supervision condition from light into tough through increasing incremental benefits of tough supervision,and providing institutional investors with a stable and predictable supervision policy.In conclusion,the creation of a fair inquiry market doesn’t only depend on restraint and punishment to institutional investors,but also requires the establishment of supervision mechanism those are compatible with market-based inquiry.
文摘This paper studies the case of the collusive price of the hotel industry in Kunming by economically analyzingthe unsustainability of the collusive price and instability of collusive organizations, doubts about the collusive behavior,and thinks that the collusive price is not helpful to the development of tourism industry, the pillar industry in YunnanProvince.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(6140224161572260+3 种基金613730176157226161472192)the Scientific&Technological Support Project of Jiangsu Province(BE2015702)
文摘In the open network environment, malicious attacks to the trust model have become increasingly serious. Compared with single node attacks, collusion attacks do more harm to the trust model. To solve this problem, a collusion detector based on the GN algorithm for the trust evaluation model is proposed in the open Internet environment. By analyzing the behavioral characteristics of collusion groups, the concept of flatting is defined and the G-N community mining algorithm is used to divide suspicious communities. On this basis, a collusion community detector method is proposed based on the breaking strength of suspicious communities. Simulation results show that the model has high recognition accuracy in identifying collusion nodes, so as to effectively defend against malicious attacks of collusion nodes.
基金Supported by the Six Great Talent Peak Plan of Jiangsu Province (No.06-E-044)the "Qinlan Project" Plan of Jiangsu Province 2006
文摘Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) are being deployed for a wide variety of applications and the security problems of them have received considerable attention. Considering the limitations of power, computation capability and storage resources, this paper proposed an efficient defense against collusion scheme based on elliptic curve cryptography for wireless sensor networks in order to solve the problems that sensor node-key leaking and adversaries make compromised nodes as their collusions to launch new attack. In the proposed scheme, the group-key distribution strategy is employed to compute the private key of each sensor node, and the encryption and decryption algorithms are constructed based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC). The command center (node) only needs to broadcast a controlling header with three group elements, and the authorized sensor node can correctly recover the session key and use it to decrypt the broadcasting message. Analysis and proof of the proposed scheme's efficiency and security show that the proposed scheme can resist the k-collusion attack efficiently.
文摘Mobile agent technology is promising for e-commerce and distributed computing applications due to its properties of mobility and autonomy. One of the most security-sensitive tasks a mobile agent is expected to perform is signing digital signatures on a remote untrustworthy service host that is beyond the control of the agent host. This service host may treat the mobile agents unfairly, i.e. according to its’ own benefit rather than to their time of arrival. In this research, we present a novel protocol, called Collusion-Resistant Distributed Agent-based Signature Delegation (CDASD) protocol, to allow an agent host to delegate its signing power to an anonymous mobile agent in such a way that the mobile agent does not reveal any information about its host’s identity and, at the same time, can be authenticated by the service host, hence, ensuring fairness of service provision. The protocol introduces a verification server to verify the signature generated by the mobile agent in such a way that even if colluding with the service host, both parties will not get more information than what they already have. The protocol incorporates three methods: Agent Signature Key Generation method, Agent Signature Generation method, Agent Signature Verification method. The most notable feature of the protocol is that, in addition to allowing secure and anonymous signature delegation, it enables tracking of malicious mobile agents when a service host is attacked. The security properties of the proposed protocol are analyzed, and the protocol is compared with the most related work.